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CREATIVE EVOLUTION IN ITS BEARING ON THE IDEA OF GOD

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"Some call it Evolution,
And others call it God."[1]

IN two previous articles I have considered (1) the significance of Aristotle's conception of God and its relation to the philosophy of Plato[2] and (2) Spinoza's central doctrine as related to his view of causation.[3] Both articles were especially concerned with the question of the relation of God to the World or Universe. The purpose of the present paper, which is the concluding one of the series, is to inquire what contribution toward a solution of the problem is made by the theory of Creative Evolution.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHANGE

Foundational for the whole doctrine of Creative Evolution is the philosophy of Bergson, and the principle has been one of the most prominent in philosophy ever since the publication of his epoch-making book bearing that title. I shall begin, therefore, with a brief statement of his general theory as leading up to later developments.

Reality as process.—The basic concept of Bergson's philosophy is that of change. Reality is essentially change or process. It is life or movement manifesting itself, as life must, in continual change. But the change is not mere change, it is becoming or development. For

[1] From some verses by William Henry Carruth entitled "Each in His Own Tongue."

[2] "Aristotle's Concept of God as Final Cause" (*Philosophy*, Vol. XXII, No. 82, July 1947).

[3] "Spinoza's Doctrine of God in Relation to his Conception of Causality" (Vol. XXIII, No. 87, October 1948).

change is not just a passage or transition from one state of being to another. It is the very character of existence itself inasmuch as every state of being is, as such, a process; and a process is the enduring of a beginning or earlier phase into a later phase, or series of phases, in such wise that each successive step or moment of the process is modified by all that has gone before and in its turn modifies all that comes after it. This is most clearly seen in the sphere of consciousness or of the self, which is the only reality we know immediately from within. For here we experience change and process as the coming to be of something new though related to what went before. But the same is true of existence generally. It is as characteristic of all life as it is of mind; and even in the case of matter or what is commonly called inanimate nature, since nothing happens without requiring time for it to happen, e.g. it takes time for sugar to melt in water and for a flooded river to fall, there is always a certain process of development and not only a change of state.[1]

The significance of time.—Along with the principle of change in Bergson's philosophy goes his insistence on the fundamental importance of time as real duration. Real or concrete time, i.e. time as lived and therefore experienced from within (*durée réelle*), is not a mere succession of moments qualitatively alike and external to one another, but the mutual interpenetration of psychic factors such as constitutes a real advance. Such felt or immediately experienced duration is a process having an end qualitatively different from its beginning, and it is therefore a true development or creative evolution. It is indeed the actual process of developing experience, not something distinguishable from it as its vehicle or medium. From this concrete time or real duration, which differs for every experient being and for each one according to the nature of the particular experience, is derived by abstraction the common time whereby the relative durations of different experiences are measured. Abstract time, or time as the common measure of all durations, is conceived as a homogeneous medium within which all processes occur but which is itself indifferent to and independent of all of them. Thus is formed the limitative concept of a time that is perfectly uniform, that effects nothing by its duration, and that has therefore the character of reversibility. Real duration, on the contrary, is never uniform, never reversible, and always cumulative, effecting something as it proceeds. This is seen in every process of thought or emotion or volition. Nay, even a sensation when prolonged does not remain the same, since

[1] *Creative Evolution*, ch. i, esp. pp. 1–24; *Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 8 ff. For the principle that movement is primary, rest only secondary as the arrest of movement, see *Matter and Memory*, pp. 246 ff.; *Introduc. to Metaphys.*, pp. 40 ff. (Except in the case of one or two quotations from the original my references are all to the English translations of Bergson's works.)

the past always makes a difference to the present and the present to the future. Thus an hour by the clock is a mere abstraction, but an hour of waiting is an actual experience, and an hour of joy is an utterly different experience from an hour of grief, of disappointment, or of difficulty. In short, time as real duration is one with concrete individual experience, and it is a factor in all events, a condition controlling every advance from one phase of being to another.[1]

EVOLUTION AS CREATIVE

Freedom a precondition.—Creative evolution implies not only the reality of change or process and of time with causal relevance, but also the reality of freedom. For no true development in any sphere of existence is possible if the changes involved are subject to a mechanical determination whereby certain antecedent facts or conditions are necessarily followed by certain consequences, without relation to an inner nature that tells in the process of change which it undergoes. Such mechanical sequence could apply, if at all, only to limited material systems that are in principle reversible, so that time makes no difference. But it cannot be true of life or mind where reversibility is meaningless, and similarly with anything else that goes through a real process of becoming. Freedom admits of degrees, and it always has a certain basis in necessity, but it cannot be anywhere altogether wanting.[2]

Matter the inverse of spirit.—Freedom is to necessity as spirit is to matter. For matter, in Bergson's philosophy, is related to life and

[1] *Time and Free Will*, ch. ii, esp. pp. 98–112 and 124–28; *Matter and Memory*, pp. 272–82; *Creative Evolution*, pp. 210–15. It is not necessary for my purpose to go into the question of the relation of time to space or of the time of the individual subject to objective or universal time. As is well known, Bergson equates or even identifies abstract time with space and connects the distinction between concrete duration and abstract time (or space) with the opposition of intuition and intellect. What should rather be contrasted are concrete time and space (or space-time) and abstract conceptions of *either* of them. Cf. the reference to Alexander's criticism of Bergson's view given below.

[2] *Time and Free Will*, ch. iii, pp. 140–55. In relation to human action and volition Bergson's exposition of freedom is directed to showing the falsity of both absolute determinism and absolute indeterminism. Although the reality of free will is an essential condition of all volitional activity, this does not imply arbitrary or motiveless willing. For motives are the very life of the agent or self whose volition and action they determine or direct; and any motive, provided it goes deep enough, is indistinguishable from the whole self. "Freedom is the relation of the concrete self to the act which it performs." But our acts are fully free only when they spring, not from mere habit or from some momentary feeling or impulse, but from our whole personality, so that they manifest all that we have been, are, or could be; and in proportion as they do so they are factors in the progressive development of the self. *Ibid.*, esp. pp. 165–75 and 215–21; *Matter and Memory*, pp. 243, 295–97, 330 ff.

mind by way of limitation or privation rather than absolute difference. It signifies relative inflexibility and inertia as contrasted with spontaneity or freedom. Matter, then, is the aspect of necessity or mechanism in nature, which is the foil and counterpart of the free activity and development of spirit. The reality, which is life and expresses itself in the energy of movement or the life-impetus (*élan vital*), creates (or deposits) through the inertia of habit a contrary movement or tendency that has to be overcome and controlled by making it an instrument subservient to the development of life itself. Thus matter or mechanism, though by definition the very opposite of life and spirit, is necessary to their continued existence. It is at once an obstacle to or a drag on their advance and a means or condition of their fuller manifestation.[1]

A sense of direction.—While the idea of creative evolution is primarily opposed to any conception of development for which each successive step or stage in the process is nothing but a mechanical resultant of the preceding state or a mere rearrangement of the elements of which it is composed, Bergson opposes also any teleological theory for which evolution is the realization of a preconceived plan or scheme. Neither radical mechanism nor radical finalism is consistent with real duration, i.e. with the internal factor of effort without which a genuine evolution is inexplicable. Bergson views the evolutionism of Spencer[2] as failing to apprehend the inner movement of evolution. "His method consists in reconstructing evolution with fragments of the evolved" instead of penetrating to the living principle of the process and the inmost nature of that which evolves. A true evolutionism must take its stand within the evolutionary movement itself, where the creative effort can be found at work in the actual processes of concrete experience. An abstract or external teleology, again, is only a reversed mechanism that equally negates a progressive development wrought out through effort from within. But teleology is truer than mechanism inasmuch as a real development implies not only an impulsion but also a sense of direction, signifying an unknown yet dimly foreshadowed goal.[3]

[1] *Matter and Memory*, pp. 1–45, 233–38, 291 ff.; *Creative Evolution*, p. 249 ff. In the particular case of mind and body the bodily organism is the mechanism that functions as the instrument of selection of representations of things with a view to action in relation to them, while consciousness is potentially a representation of the whole universe. I have stated more fully in previous papers this conception of the fundamental equivalence of body or matter with habit and mechanism (cf. the former of the two articles mentioned above, p. 114).

[2] I well remember how Bergson in his lectures at the Collège de France (in 1905) rolled out Spencer's formula of evolution—"from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity"—as typifying the kind of mechanical conception to which his own thought was opposed.

[3] *Creative Evolution*, ch. i, esp. pp. 38–55, 89–102; ch. iv, pp. 384 ff.

APPROACH TO THE ULTIMATE PROBLEM

Bergson's philosophy of evolution contains indications of a doctrine nowhere fully expressed of the being and nature of God. In *Creative Evolution* God is thought of as the creative impulse which is the source of evolution, a life-energy ever manifesting new forms and with endless potentialities of becoming. "God, thus defined, has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom."[1] Bergson opposes, accordingly, any doctrine that "hypostatizes the unity of nature . . . in a being who is nothing since he does nothing, an ineffectual God who simply sums up in himself all that is given."[2]

In *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* Bergson's doctrine of God is bound up with his treatment of these two subjects. He distinguishes two forms or levels both of morality and religion, which correspond to the already noted differences between matter and spirit, mechanism and purpose, necessity and freedom. Morality or the moral life is a movement or process within the evolution of life generally. But there are two phases in its development, characterized by the predominance of different standards or attitudes. In what Bergson calls "closed" morality, which has its source in the demands made upon the individual by the social group to which he belongs with a view mainly to its own immediate needs and interests, moral progress is retarded by the pressure of custom and by narrowness of outlook. This tends to shut out both the higher needs of the community itself and the wider life of humanity as a whole. The other form of morality is "open" to the requirements of moral development and regard to the interests of humanity generally. It has its source in the sense of solidarity of the individual not only with his own little group or society but with the whole of mankind, and not only in the present but in the past and the future. This is "the higher ethics of love to our fellow-men, irrespective of nearer bonds, to which the teaching of the great moral and religious teachers of the race has been a continual summons."[3]

Corresponding to these two kinds of morality are two forms of religion, the static and the dynamic. The former has its source in the desire to propitiate and win the favour of dread supernatural powers of one kind or another, and it finds its appropriate expression in myth and ritual. The latter—the kind of religion that unites individuals and peoples through the sense of a common participation in the one onward creative movement of reality—springs from personal

[1] P. 262. [2] P. 207.

[3] This section in its original form was written for the purpose of an address on Bergson's philosophy, which I was asked to give at short notice soon after the first appearance of the book, and this and another sentence below in inverted commas are, if I remember rightly, from a review by Muirhead.

experience of union with a supernatural spirit, whose law is not that of fear but of love. Such experience is enshrined in the records and teachings of the great mystics and the founders of the great religions, who have been "in intuitive touch with the pulse of creative life and inspired by the emotion thus generated." Seen from the standpoint of a revelation or insight such as this the evolutionary process appears as the manifestation not of mere force or power but of creative love. The universe is apprehended as the work of a creative spirit—the creator of creators[1]—and as having for its purpose the making of gods.[2]

THE THEORY OF EMERGENCE

Bergson views the most outstanding differences that appear in the evolutionary process not as signifying successive stages or levels of development, but as implying divergent lines of evolution. They are diverse developments of life, each emphasizing a separate direction or tendency of the life-activity, albeit with potentialities of convergence toward a unitary end. This is seen especially in the contrast between forms of life that show a preponderant development of instinct or again of intelligence. The former is found in the fullest measure in some of the insects, the latter above all in man.[3]

The theory of emergence or emergent evolution[4] is presented as a way of expressing the nature of development as seen in the transitions from one level of existence to another. It concerns such developments as those from matter to life, from life to mind, from sentience to thought. Emergence means the appearance of a new quality or character arising out of what has not already manifested it. The transition from one level to another is conceived as not implying the working of any new factor or agent, or the appearance of any wholly new constituent, but as involving a new emphasis, tendency, or direction that marks a further stage of development.[5] "Although

[1] "La Création . . . une enterprise de Dieu pour créer des créateurs, pour s'adjoindre des êtres dignes de son amour." *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion*, p. 273.

[2] "La fonction essentielle de l'univers, qui est une machine à faire des dieux," p. 343.

[3] *Creative Evolution*, ch. ii, pp. 142 ff. At its highest instinct is intuition, which is a complementary and more penetrative factor in the advancement of knowledge quite distinct from intellect.

[4] The term "emergent" was used by G. H. Lewes to signify the product of any set of factors or components in so far as it is not *only* their "resultant" but is qualitatively unlike all of them. Lloyd Morgan adopts this term, and seems to use "emergent evolution" in contradistinction to "creative evolution" as avoiding any suggestion of an extraneous factor such as a vital force or the like.

[5] *Emergent Evolution*, pp. 8, 12, etc.

there is no new factor or element, there is the release, as it were, of a new spirit or impulse, which thereby becomes free in some measure to control and direct what has hitherto bound it. Thus life means a new power of regulation and adjustment, mind a new power of orientation and selection, thought a new power of organization and of valuation, that grow out of conditions which they in turn, when they appear, mould and modify in ways that were not possible before."[1]

This doctrine seeks to combine the aspects of continuity and discontinuity or conservation and novelty in any real process of development. When properly interpreted it is not incompatible with the principle that a true evolution is a process in which there is spontaneity and effort along with limiting conditions or a necessary basis in what is already there. It signifies the progressive appearance of new qualities and relations without any complete break or gap requiring recourse to a wholly different principle of explanation. But the theory has to be guarded against two errors, namely, on the one hand, that of reading down into the lower the character of the higher without any difference, and on the other hand, of supposing that the lower can explain the higher without having in it something that is akin to its product. It is not possible "to see in matter the promise and potency of all forms of life" (Tyndall) and in life the potentiality of consciousness and thought unless there is discernible in them a nature that points forward to a possible further outcome. This condition is at least to a certain extent complied with in Bergson's view of the relation of matter to life and mind and his recognition of a sense of direction in evolution; and also in Lloyd Morgan's conception of a correlation of physical and psychical aspects in events at every level.[2]

DEITY AS EMERGENT QUALITY

Both Bergson's philosophy and Lloyd Morgan's tend to suggest a conception which neither of them actually asserts, namely that God is in some sense a product as well as the source of the evolutionary process, or that deity is a quality or character supervening on mind and thought as mind supervenes on life and life on matter.

[1] Excerpted from an article of mine in the *South African Journal of Science*, vol. xxv, which contains a fuller treatment of the theory of emergence. That evolution involves a tendency toward ever fuller organization and the formation of wholes that are more than the mere sum of their component parts inasmuch as the parts are related in them in new ways, is the principle advanced by Smuts in *Holism and Evolution* (cf. "The Significance of Holism," contributed by me to the same Journal, vol. xxvi, at the time of the visit of the British Association to South Africa).

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 26, 62.

But for both thinkers God is equally at the beginning and at the end of the process. Thus Bergson not only speaks of God as the creative impulse of the evolutionary process but also of its god-making purpose and again of the inspiration, which moves the prophet and mystic to lead men on to higher levels, as coming to them from above or from beyond. Similarly Lloyd Morgan postulates God as the ultimate causal and directive activity whereby emergence in all its ascending grades is effected, and upon which therefore emergent evolution depends; and also as drawing all things and all men upwards.[1]

The concept of God or at least Deity as emergent is definitely formulated in the philosophy of Alexander. Beginning from the principle of space-time or motion as the veritable stuff of the world and the matrix of all that exists or comes to be, Alexander constructs a system of thought for which God is at once ever present and ever in the making. The movement in (or of) space-time is a ceaseless nisus or impulse to the creation—not of anything that is no wise contained within it, for the universe is infinite and there is nothing beyond it—but of ever new forms or modes of being. In the course of this movement there appear new qualities or new levels of existence, each presenting to view its own distinctive character, although in fundamental nature identical with the highest development on the next lower level and always completely expressible in terms of each one of the lower stages. These qualities, such as matter, life, and mind, form an ascending series or hierarchy, each of which is related to the quality just below it somewhat as time is to space or as mind is to body. This is the general nature of creative evolution.[2]

But further, just as matter is not fundamental but is itself a development within space-time, so even mind or spirit is not the highest level of existence but is the condition of the emergence of still higher quality, which, as a further phase of development to which it tends, stands to it as divine model or ideal inspiring effort toward its realization. God is the universe as the creator of all beings within it, and especially as creating any higher form of existence beyond what has hitherto emerged. The evolutionary process, so interpreted, does not imply any foreordained end, but it involves an

[1] Pp. 33–4, 62–3, 89, 116. Making use of Whitehead's terminology he says that the ideal values are not only "emergent" but also in some sense "ingredient." Cf. p. 44.

[2] *Space, Time, and Deity*, esp. bk. iii, ch. 2. Alexander criticizes Bergson's view of the relation between space and time (see bk. i, pp. 140–43, 148–50). But the two doctrines are in general agreement; for Alexander takes time and space to be so related that time is the mind of space, while space is the body of time. Space and time are mutually implicative, but time is distinctively the generating principle in all becoming. Cf. Alexander's very interesting little book *Spinoza and Time*.

impulse to the production of higher and higher planes of being under the influence of some new ideal of perfection, which draws the possessors of the idea onwards toward it.[1]

REALITY AS CREATIVE EXPERIENCE[2]

The doctrine of creative evolution is still further developed in the philosophy of Whitehead. The principles chiefly relevant to the subject on hand may be summarized as follows:—

A universe of events.—That process, change or becoming is a fundamental character of reality is expressed by Whitehead in the principle that nature or the universe consists of events and their interrelations. The stuff of the world is events and groups or systems of events. Ultimately all nature or the whole universe is one complete event of which particular events are parts or partial aspects. The general nature of events of whatever kind—from a vibration to an emotion—is that they are constituted by what are named actual occasions, or occasions of experience.[3]

But while reality is thus characterized by change or process, there is something that abides. For each actual occasion is linked with those which precede and follow it by what Whitehead calls prehension[4] or appropriation, i.e. a feeling, more or less definite, of the nature or significance—the universal character as distinct from the particular existence—of each preceding by each succeeding actual entity or occasion. In this way every actual occasion attains "objective immortality"; and by virtue of such interconnection each individual event has some degree of reference to all spaces, near and remote, and to all times, past and future as well as present.[5]

With determinate character and potentialities.—Thus, while each event is unique or individual, it has features that are common to it and others; and it is only by the discrimination of such recurrent

[1] *Ibid.*, bk. iv, esp. pp. 341–54. Cf. *Artistic and Cosmic Creation* (from Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. xiii, 1927).

[2] The expression is Whitehead's own, and it indicates perhaps more distinctively than "the philosophy of organism" (or "organic realism") the nature of his fundamental principle. As Whitehead himself says, there are aspects of his philosophy that connect with that of Bradley.

[3] *Process and Reality, passim.* Whitehead's method of exposition makes it particularly difficult to give detailed references to sections or pages. It is worth noting that for Whitehead the space-time continuum is not, as with Alexander, a primary datum but is a construction from the relations between actual occasions.

[4] Prehension is the grasping or taking hold of one thing by another which is the root of conscious apprehension. The theory of prehensions is given more especially in *Process and Reality*, pt. iii, ch. 1–3.

[5] Cf. Bergson's principle of the inheritance of the past by the present and the present by the future.

and relatively permanent features in the flow of events that the character of the world composed of these is in any definite fashion disclosed to us. Any such relatively permanent items recognized in events are what are called objects, namely sense-objects, perceptual objects, scientific objects, laws of nature, and the like. They are the determinate conditions to which all subjective or individual experience has to conform. In the actual becoming of experience, therefore, every particular existent has with (or in) its own character of feeling or subjective immediacy a certain universal or mediated aspect constituting its objective reference. All development of experience has its basis or datum in the actual relations thus existing between one such particular being or occurrence and others.

Further, every event or actual entity is a process of achievement. There is always in it a movement toward a more or less definite end, which is the controlling or directing factor in the process, and the attainment of which is its fulfilment or satisfaction. Hence all becoming involves vision or apprehension of possibilities of being beyond the present actuality. The whole process of becoming implies potentialities of existence lying in the nature of reality that supply goals for further endeavour. Whitehead calls these enduring potentialities of being "eternal objects"; and he describes the actualization of any potentiality as the entrance or ingression into events of such eternal objects or ideal forms. All development is thus conditioned by the feeling of something not yet realized but present as an urge toward its realization. Creative evolution is the progressive embodiment or actualization in finite centres of experience of the permanent potentialities of being inherent in the true eternal nature of things.

Signifying the becoming of God.—That the process of becoming or the temporal world is distinguishable from the eternal nature which it manifests or embodies is expresssed in Whitehead's philosophy by his distinction between the "primordial" and the "consequent" nature of God. The "primordial" nature of God is the idea, thought or envisagement[1] of a differentiated unity or harmony of being, with yearning for its actualization in a world of finite individuals freely seeking self-fulfilment in such a unity-in-difference. The "consequent" nature of God is, firstly, the realization by means of actual entities in the temporal world of this *ideal* goal through an inherent impulse toward it; and, secondly, the prehension of all the actual values achieved thereby into his primordial eternal nature. Hence, while the general character and issue of the temporal process of becoming —or what is called creation—is determined by the nature of God or eternal being, the course of the world process in all its particularity is dependent on the volitions of finite creatures and their efforts to

[1] Cf. on this conception E. D. Fawcett: *Divine Imagining; Zermatt* and *Oberland Dialogues*.

attain perfection according to the eternal pattern. There is thus an aspect of contingency as well as of necessity in the world. For each individual being in its quest of self-realization is free to choose its own course of action, and is limited or conditioned only by its relation to other such finite beings likewise striving for fullness of life and by the compossibilities thus involved. The process of creation or temporal world is this search for ever fuller being, which can be realized only in the perfected unity that expresses the eternal nature of God. In this sense, therefore, the becoming of the world is the becoming of God.[1]

RELATION TO PREVIOUS DOCTRINES

I have taken Creative Evolution along with the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, and that of Spinoza, which were dealt with in former articles, as another representative conception concerning the relation between God and the World. It remains to ask how it is related to, or differs from, those others, and what contribution it makes to a solution of the problem that goes in any way beyond them.

In Bergson's view Plato's philosophy reverses the true order. It is dominated by the conception that being is more fundamental than becoming. For it becoming, change, movement, if not wholly unreal and illusory, are only a degraded form of changeless being. This is a characteristic construction of intellect, in which concepts replace immediate experience of sensible reality. But from the standpoint of intuition and living participation in the moving reality itself what Plato calls *ideas* or *forms*, and takes as constituting the intelligible world, are nothing but certain apprehended elements which represent static moments in a ceaseless dynamic process. Although the ideas are in one aspect ideals never fully realized, they are in another aspect realities altogether independent of any movement towards them. Time, on this view, is nothing in itself. As "a moving image of eternity," it is only a shadowy substitute for a timeless reality.[2]

Aristotle seeks to avoid ascribing to the ideas or forms an independent existence. But since for him, too, movement arises from a degradation of the immutable, there can be no movement or sensible world unless somewhere immutability is realized. Hence the unmoved mover which he identifies with God. Aristotle, Bergson holds, uses both the conception of an attraction and that of an impulsion as exercised by the prime mover on the world process—i.e. both of final

[1] *Process and Reality*, pt. v, ch. 2. Whitehead maintains that his conception of the consequent nature of God as equally a one and a many and as both changeless and changing is the only one that can avoid an opposition of reality and appearance.

[2] *Creative Evolution*, pp. 332–35 (cf. *Introd. to Metaphys.*, p. 64).

and of efficient causality—without bringing them adequately together. The changeless forms are opposed to a formless or indeterminate matter or potentiality of movement in a way that still leaves them external to each other and therefore incapable of interpreting the integral reality.[1]

Bergson's criticism of Spinoza's doctrine is on similar lines. He says it implies that the whole of being is given at once in the eternal, and thus leaves no place for freedom of choice or for the effect on action of real duration which makes behaviour different under the same external conditions in a developing being. It is impossible on these terms to pass from God to things, from eternity to time. All these philosophies, therefore, are opposed to the idea of a reality that creates itself gradually, that is, to an absolute duration.[2]

Whitehead very definitely connects his philosophy with that of Plato and his eternal objects with the ideas or forms, and he says that Plato's main position as well as Aristotle's largely anticipates the evolutionary doctrine of the philosophy of organism.[3] But in both theories change or becoming is unduly subordinated to permanence, and the principle is warped more especially by Aristotle's positing of substance and quality as ultimate category.[4] And, although the philosophy of organism is also closely allied to Spinoza's scheme of thought, it is the persistence of this same conception that differentiates his philosophy of substance from it.[5]

CONCLUSION

To discuss the value of these criticisms would mean going over again much of the ground covered in my previous articles, which indeed anticipate to some extent what I have to say by way of conclusion. But the main points call for a short statement.

Alexander describes the new standpoint of the philosophy of creative evolution as that of "taking time seriously."[6] This implies recognition of the truth that time is not mere appearance or illusion, but is an essential aspect of reality. It is the very life of the movement or process whereby the nature of the ultimate reality is progressively made manifest in a world of finite beings. As such it is the necessary and universal form or character of developing experience. Along with space as coexistence or togetherness, from which it is inseparable,

[1] Pp. 339–45.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 367–74; *Time and Free Will*, p. 208 f. I have already referred to Alexander's *Spinoza and Time*, where he suggests a recasting of Spinoza's philosophy in which *time* (in place of *thought*) would be an attribute of God as denoting God's activity. Cf. *Space, Time, and Deity*, vol. ii, p. 401.

[3] *Process and Reality*, pp. 131–34. [4] Pp. 296 f. [5] Pp. 8 f.

[6] A recent book, *The Crisis in Human Affairs*, by J. G. Bennett, speaks of the need of learning to "take eternity seriously." This may serve to indicate in advance the kind of complement which seems to me to be necessary.

time as change and succession constitutes the general condition of any evolution of actual unity in difference. As Hegel says, time is "the process of the finite."[1]

A full recognition of the significance of time in the scheme of things thus gives a new value to the past and its record in history, and it also stresses in a new way and degree responsibility for the making of the future. It opens out as never before a long vista both backwards and forwards. For the implication is that nothing whatever comes about without the strivings and efforts of finite beings, and that what the future will be depends on their envisagement, however tentative and open to revision, of further goals for attainment; and also both on learning the lessons of the past and taking all possible encouragement from it. That this principle has entered into the general thought of the present day and largely dominates its outlook and attitude is shown, on the one hand, by the new awakening of interest in the history of the past from its very earliest beginnings and the stress that is being laid on the idea—and the facts—of history as a key to the nature of reality; and, on the other hand, by a heightened sense of the necessity of giving thought to the future and taking all heed lest it be one of retrogression and not of progress.

The realization of the truth that without finite endeavour—with its inevitable character of trial and error and possible failure at any step or in any particular crisis—the divine purpose in the universe cannot be fulfilled or its divine character and significance be made manifest, with the corollary that man's destiny lies very much in his own hands, finds expression in much of modern literature. This attitude is well expressed, for example, in Hardy's poem, "A Plaint to Man":

> The truth should be told, and the fact be faced
> That had best been faced in earlier years:
> The fact of life with dependence placed
> On the heart's resource alone,
> In brotherhood bounded close and graced
> With loving-kindness fully blown,
> And visioned help unsought, unknown.

The principle here proclaimed—even if it be not the *whole* truth—has already taken deep root in contemporary philosophy and it must more and more influence human life and action.

The doctrine of creative evolution, then, negates any conception of God as a being out of all relation to time and change, and affirms on the contrary that God acts only in and through nature and man and history, and therefore by the road of time and change. But this does not validate the idea of a finite God or a God only in the making

[1] Cf. the complementary truth that time is "the path of the infinite."

—"not actually possessing deity but always becoming."[1] For, however difficult or even impossible it may be to state in fully adequate terms the relation between them, the infinite and perfect is necessarily presupposed in the existence of the finite and imperfect, since otherwise, as Spinoza shows,[2] the latter would have more "power to exist" than the former. What is truly implied in the *reality* of time and process is that the realization of the divine nature in the minds and wills of individuals is the very meaning of existence—the "one increasing purpose" that "runs through the ages" from the beginning to the end of time, and that there is none other than this long and difficult way of finite seeking and finding by which it can be accomplished.

But this involves the supplementing of the idea of time by that of eternity. Eternity does not properly mean either everlasting time or a changeless state of being. Like time it is an essential aspect or character of reality, and is indeed the counterpart of time. For it means that everything that happens, with however brief a duration, as an event in the temporal process has abiding significance in virtue of the part which it plays in the creative becoming. This accords with the principle of the presence of the past in the present and the potency of the present for the future. The "eternal present" is the present as integrating the whole past and the whole future.

But, further, it is only because every onward step is the entrance or inflowing into the world of becoming of that which truly *is*, that there can be any assurance of the eventual "triumph of good" or the realization of ideal values, apart from which life and effort would be meaningless. And this warrants the further conviction of the progressive fulfilment of the temporal process by the merging of the temporal in the eternal consciousness, which is an apprehension of the unity of all being and of the import of the becoming necessarily comprised in it.[3]

We may conclude, then, that God, by whatever terms best further characterized—whether as Indwelling Power or Superpersonal Spirit or Infinite Love—while made known or realized in the actual experience of finite individuals only by way of a temporal process, can be nothing less than *Eternal* Reality.

[1] Alexander in *Mind*, vol. xxx, p. 428. How far the conception of self-limitation or diremption as applied to God is finally tenable, is very hard to say. I made use of the conception in the second of the articles already referred to, but its validity is often questioned.

[2] *Ethics* I, 11, Dem.

[3] Cf. here McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence*, vol. ii. In my article on Spinoza I already touched on the truth that the sense or consciousness of eternity as transcending though not annihilating time is, at least at fleeting moments, an experience within the temporal process.

REASON AND CONDUCT[1]

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THE title of this paper is in many ways a bad one, but it does have the advantage of familiarity, and so indicates a well-known group of questions. The questions which philosophers who have talked about "Reason and Conduct" have really been discussing and which they help us to answer have been these: "What are the various ways in which the words 'reasonable,' 'wise,' 'foolish,' etc., are used?" "In what senses may actions and choices be called 'reasonable,' and are these senses of 'reasonable' connected in any way, and if so in what way, with the senses in which beliefs and inferences may be called 'reasonable'?" In other words our questions are, in a broad sense of the word, logical questions, not empirical ones. It is misleading to say, therefore, as philosophers commonly do, that we are discussing the relationship between Reason and Conduct, or that we are going into the question of whether Reason can or cannot be practical. Reason is the faculty of acting reasonably. If under "acting reasonably" we include only "inferring properly," then Reason can only be logical. If under "acting reasonably" we also include making correct inductions and concocting good theories then Reason can also be scientific. If under "acting reasonably" we include "acting morally" or "doing one's duty," then Reason can be practical. The dispute about whether Reason can be practical is not merely verbal but trivial, and only appears not to be trivial when we hypostatize this faculty Reason and suppose it to be a thing. It then looks as though our dispute is an empirical one about what this thing Reason can do. The truth is, however, that there is no such thing or agency as Reason. If there were, and if we were quite familiar with it and could recognize it by certain marks, just as we are familiar with and can recognize sulphuric acid or cousin Mary, it would be sensible to inquire what this thing Reason could do: "Can Reason be practical?" would be as sensible an empirical question as "can Mary cook?" We could give Reason a job to do and see what it did, just as Mary's mother could give her a joint to roast and see what she made of it. Similarly, "Can Reason influence conduct?" would be as sensible a question as "can sulphuric acid dissolve brass filings?"

Instead of "Can Reason be Practical?" we might ask "Can Practice be Reasonable?" but the answer to this question is obvious. *Of course* practice can be reasonable (and can also be unreasonable). *Of course* it is reasonable to keep promises rather than to break

[1] Two papers which have greatly influenced the writing of this one are "Practical Reason," by Reginald Jackson, *Philosophy*, 1942, and "Knowing How and Knowing That," by Professor Ryle, *Aristotelian Society*, 1945–46.

them, to do good to others rather than evil, to behave prudently rather than imprudently. *Of course* it would be unreasonable of me if I were to barge my way to the front of a queue; *of course* it would be unreasonable of me if I were to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger (that is why Hume's assertion that it would not strikes us as such a paradox). The important question is: "*In what sense* of 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' would these things be reasonable or unreasonable?" It is obviously (and this is the point of Hume's paradox) neither that in which deductive inferences may be called reasonable or unreasonable, nor that in which scientific theorizing or induction can be so characterized.

Hume held that a choice could only be called "reasonable" or "unreasonable" in so far as it proceeded from some reasonable or unreasonable belief, and indeed that if we are to speak accurately it is not the choice but the belief that is properly called "reasonable" or "unreasonable." The same may be said about the senses in which emotions and desires may sometimes be called "reasonable" or "unreasonable." Thus we say that it is silly to be frightened of ghosts, simply because we think that it is silly to believe in ghosts. Apart from the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the beliefs on which it is founded, however, there is, according to Hume, no important sense in which any action or passion may be said to be more or less reasonable than any other. Hume sums up this doctrine in the epigram "Reason is . . . the slave of the passions." Even he, we thus notice, is not free from the temptations of faculty talk. Let us not be deceived. There is no one in chains: there is no one to be liberated. I shall argue that there is an important sense of "reasonable" in which actions may be called "reasonable" or "unreasonable" in which these words do not merely refer indirectly to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the agent's beliefs, and that this sense is closely analogous to those in which cognitive processes may be called reasonable.

Some philosophers have tried to remedy Hume's deficiency by relating the moral sense of "reasonable" to the exercise of a special rational faculty of intuiting objective fitnesses or unfitnesses of actions to situations. Thus Samuel Clarke tells us that "there is a Fitness or Suitableness of certain circumstances to certain persons, and an unsuitableness to others, founded on the nature of things and the qualifications of persons. For a man endued with Reason to deny the truth of these things is the very same thing as if a man that has the use of his sight should at the same time as he beholds the sun deny that there is any such thing as light in the world."[1]

[1] "A discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation," sixth edition, pp. 29–30.

This view, or variations of it, continues to be popular. There is felt to be something comforting in it: if objective fitnesses or unfitnesses could not be discerned, it is thought, how could we ever be convinced that it is *rational* to do certain actions and irrational to do others, and should we not be at the mercy of what people happen to approve, so that if they approved of what we disapproved we should be unable to convince them of their irrationality or even to say meaningfully that they were irrational and we rational?

This comfort is both illusory and unnecessary; what we require is a morality which tells us *what to do*, whereas intellectualists give us a morality which tells us *that* certain fitnesses and unfitnesses obtain. We ask for bread and are given a stone. Ethics is not a *science*, and preachers, unlike philosophers, have never fallen into the error of supposing that it is. Philosophers have fallen into an analogous error about logic; they have thought of the principles of inference as facts about the relationship of propositions. Lewis Carroll's well-known puzzle ("What the Tortoise said to Achilles," *Mind N.S.* Vol. IV (1895), pp. 278–80), brings out the point very well that no amount of logical statements *that* could ever take the place of a rule of inference or injunction *to* proceed from premisses of a certain sort to a conclusion of a certain sort. To the logical moral of Lewis Carroll's story there is, as Professor Ryle has pointed out in his address "Knowing How and Knowing That," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1945–46, an analogous ethical moral. (I wish I were a Lewis Carroll and could invent a felicitous story to illustrate it.) Ethical statements, we must stress, are prescriptive rather than descriptive (in a sense of "prescriptive" which may be contrasted with "descriptive," though it must be emphasized that the distinction between these is a relative one, and that imperatives slide into indicatives). If the intellectualists were right "do this" would only follow from "this is right" in the way that "eat this" follows from "this is sweet"; only if I happened to like doing fitting actions would "do this" follow from "this is fitting." On the intellectualist view to say that it is irrational to do what is wrong would be as absurd as to say that a person cannot distinguish sweet from sour because he does not like sugar in his tea.

In order to prevent a possible misunderstanding of what I mean by "prescriptive," I must hasten to point out that it is obviously true that we do not have to be told to do something before we can do it. If we did have to be told not only should we have to tell ourselves to perform an inference or do an action by saying to ourselves a rule of logic or morals, but we should have to tell ourselves to tell ourselves, and so on *ad infinitum*. We could never do anything at all. The Tortoise, in Lewis Carroll's story, could quite well have drawn his inference without considering any of the

rules of inference which Achilles so patiently set out before him. Nevertheless, *if challenged*, he could have justified his inference by referring to the appropriate prescription. Similarly the propositions of ethics are more often used to *justify* actions than to *recommend* or *command* them. That which is a *justification* for the sheep is (whether heeded or unheeded) a *command* for the goats.

The intellectualist view, we have said, breaks down because it cannot account for the equation of "right" and "wrong" action to "reasonable" and "unreasonable" action. But can we account for the equation any better? Someone might argue against us as follows: If we equate "reasonable" and "unreasonable" action with "right" and "wrong" action we are obviously not using "reasonable" and "unreasonable" in the way in which Hume allows us to call actions reasonable and unreasonable, namely, as founded on reasonable and unreasonable belief. A person might have perfectly reasonable, and indeed true, beliefs about the situation in which he has to act and yet choose wrongly. Nor can we say that the reasonableness of an action is a matter simply of the agent's having true ethical beliefs, or of subscribing to correct moral rules. A person may well believe, and truly believe, that an action is wrong and yet choose to do it. We prefer, of course, that people should do the actions they believe to be right, and that they should forbear from those which they believe to be wrong, and we can express this preference by calling such people "morally good," or by using some such other appropriate laudatory expression. Similarly we can call people of the opposite sort "morally bad." Why, however, should we use the words "reasonable" and "unreasonable" in such connections? We may save ourselves from fruitless inquiry, it might be said, by saying abruptly that there is no bond between our usage of these words when we apply them to beliefs and inferences and our present usage except the laudatory function which is common to all their usages. (Francis Hutcheson comes very near to saying this, *cf. Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense*, Section 1, 3rd edit., p. 221. "An action is called by us reasonable when it is benevolent and unreasonable when malicious. This is plainly making the word reasonable denote what is approved by our moral sense.") Why look for *other* connections between the usages of "reasonable" in "moral" and "cognitive" contexts respectively?

If the line of thought sketched out in the preceding paragraph were correct the words "reasonable" and "unreasonable" would have a systematic ambiguity of a very loose sort indeed. Now it would be unwise to assume hastily that there is so little connection between the different usages of "reasonable." Why, we cannot help asking do we use this *particular* laudatory word "reasonable" when there are plenty of other laudatory words available to us? Sure there is

more connection between "reasonable" in "it is reasonable to do one's duty" and "reasonable" in "reasonable belief" or in "reasonable inference" than merely a common laudatory function. Consider how naturally the intellectual and moral uses of "reasonable" seem to blend in this passage from Berkeley (*Alciphron*, I. 14): "*Euphranor.* Will it not follow from hence that truth and virtue are natural to man? *Alciphron.* Whatever is reasonable I admit to be natural." Again, consider how the adjective "wise" has been applied. "The fear of the Lord, that is wisdom," we read (Job 28, v. 28). "Wisdom" here obviously does not refer to an intellectual excellence, some skilfulness in making deductions or in investigating nature.

An obvious reflection will indicate the way towards a solution of our problem. It is simply this: that theory is a branch of practice and not an alternative to it. All theorizing is an activity. To draw a mathematical consequence is no less a procedure than is to draw the joint out of the oven. Theory is not a timeless contemplation of timeless entities, as Plato in the *Phaedo* would seem to have it. Theory is drawing conclusions, weighing evidence, asserting, arguing, refuting, questioning, wondering, and even guessing. Let us now compare, (1) a deductive inference, (2) an evaluation of evidence for an empirical generalization, and (3) the keeping of a promise. (1) and (2) belong to theory and (3) to practice, in the sense in which "practice" is commonly opposed to "theory." Now (1) is correct or reasonable if it is in accordance with the rules of logic and incorrect or unreasonable if it is not. (2) is reasonable or unreasonable in so far as it does or does not proceed in accordance with the rules of inductive method. (3) is right or reasonable if it is in accordance with the rule "keep promises (unless this conflicts with other rules)," wrong if it is a breach of this rule.

Suppose "actions of sort X in circumstances Y are right" is a true ethical statement. Then, "Do X in circumstances Y" is a correct moral rule. The connection between the rationality of an action and the assertion that it is right is now obvious. "Reasonable action" now seems to mean "action in accordance with the rules of morals," just as "reasonable inference" means "inference in accordance with the rules of logic." Compare various ways in which we may ask the question "Why?" (a) Contrast first, "why did you return that book?" as asked in two ways: (1) as asking for some such answer as "because I promised to;" (2) as asking for some such answer as "people ought to keep their promises." (*b*) Similarly, contrast "why did you conclude that Socrates is mortal?" (1) as asking for the premisses from which this conclusion follows; (2) as asking for the rule of inference, such as the rule of syllogism in Barbara, in accordance with which the conclusion was drawn. Now compare (*a*) (1) with (*b*) (1) and (*a*) (2) with (*b*) (2). The analogy

between the rationality (or justifiability) of inference and that of action is extremely striking. These ways of using "why" must be distinguished from yet other ways of asking "why?" in which we ask for an *explanation,* as in (*a*) (3) "why did he return that book?" "Because this morning he noticed it was still on his shelf" (citation of efficient cause), or (4) "because he is honest" (citation of disposition). Compare (*b*) (3) "Why did he draw that conclusion?" "Because he put two and two together in this way . . ." (efficient cause), (*b*) (4) "Why did he draw that conclusion?" "Because he can do these sums" (citation of disposition).

Certain qualifications to this comparison of reasonable action with reasonable inference must be made if we are to guard against error. We must remember that an action may be right though done from bad motives. For example the agent may have false empirical beliefs about the situation in which he acts and may believe that he is acting for his own advantage to the harm of others, whereas in fact he is doing the opposite; we should in no way call such an agent "reasonable." Thus, if we equate reasonableness (in the moral sense of this word) with rightness it must be with the sense of "rightness" to which philosophers have given the name "subjective rightness." An action is wrong, or unreasonable, from the moral point of view, when it is not in accordance with a maxim of the following form: "your empirical beliefs about the situation in which you have to act being such and such, do so-and-so." Of course in a complete criticism of a person's behaviour we apply logical and methodological criteria to his methods of reaching the empirical beliefs on which his conduct depends as well as moral criteria to his choices; we are interested not merely that his actions should be those that he thinks right, or at least would think right if he shared our basic ethical ideals, but that they should be objectively right, i.e. that they should be such that we should think them right if we had all the relevant empirical knowledge. (If his inability to think logically or his ignorance is due to laziness or to some such moral fault in the past we can apply moral criteria to his past actions—or lack of action—whereby he came to be in this state, but this is another matter. This would be a criticism of his past actions, not of his present ones.) We may compare our purely *moral* criticism of an action with our purely *logical* criticism of a person for asserting a certain conclusion on the basis of certain premisses. In our logical criticism we are merely concerned that the proposition in question should be the conclusion of a correct inference; we are not concerned with its truth or with the truth of the premisses.

An unreasonable belief is unreasonable because it arises as a result of unreasonable inference or estimation of evidence. Some actions are unreasonable because they are based on unreasonable beliefs,

but others are unreasonable because they are not in accordance with the criteria of good or morally correct action. This last sense in which an action may be unreasonable is closely analogous to that in which an inference or induction may be unreasonable, that is, as not exemplifying the appropriate criteria.

Let us separate out the various senses of the systematically ambiguous word "reasonable" which has occurred in the last paragraph. Let us replace the word "reasonable" when it is applied to inferences by "R_1", when it is applied to inductions by "R_2", when it is applied to actions (from the moral standpoint) by "R_3" and when it is applied to empirical beliefs by "R_4". Then "R_4" is used in a derivative sense; its meaning can be explained with the aid of "R_1" or "R_2". None of "R_1", "R_2", or "R_3" on the other hand, can be derived from the others. The usages of "R_1", "R_2", and "R_3" are *analogous*. Also there is another use whereby an action can be called "reasonable." This is when we call an action "reasonable" in the sense of being founded on reasonable beliefs. Let us replace "reasonable" in this use by the symbol "R_5". Then "R_5" is definable in terms of "R_4" (and hence in terms of "R_1" and "R_2").

The systematic ambiguity of "reasonable" is hence of a twofold nature. That which relates "R_4", "R_5", and "R_1" or "R_2", is very like that which relates "healthy" in (1) "Tommy is healthy at present," (2) "Tommy is a healthy boy," (3) "The climate of Devonshire is healthy," and (4) "Torquay is healthy." We should not find much difficulty in defining "healthy" as it occurs in (2), (3), or (4) in terms of "healthy" as used in (1). The systematic ambiguity which relates "R_1", "R_2", and "R_3" is of a different nature. None of these uses can be defined in terms of the others, but there is a similarity of their logic. This sort of systematic ambiguity is found in its most perfect form in arithmetic. Consider the close syntactical similarity between the uses of "number," "multiplication," "addition," etc., when we are talking about (*a*) natural numbers, (*b*) rational numbers, (*c*) real numbers, (*d*) complex numbers. Now it is important to be clear about the structure of the ambiguity of "reasonable". In particular, if the ambiguity between "R_5" and "R_3" is thought to be like that of "healthy" we shall try fruitlessly to define "R_3" in terms of "R_5" and hence in terms of "R_1" or "R_2".

Someone might now ask whether we should or should not recommend that the present usage of "reasonable" should be altered (say, as Hume did by restricting it to the field of "R_1"). We can see now, however, that, in a way, it does not matter what we do, for we are perfectly clear about the ambiguities of the word, and are hence unlikely to be misled by its continued use in its present way or to be distressed by a change of usage. (Philosophers who are not clear

about this would be distressed by a change of usage, the recommendation of which they might mistake for an empirical statement, perhaps one asserting that the queer entity Reason which interests them so much cannot do certain things which they previously supposed that it could do. To delimit the activities appropriate to a faculty is only a muddled way of circumscribing the usage of the adjective corresponding to the faculty noun.) The question of the advisability of limiting the usage of "reasonable" hinges on the question of the effect such a change of usage would have on people who are not quite clear in their own minds about the distinctions between, and interrelationships of, the various senses of "reasonable." Since these people comprise the vast majority of mankind this is an important matter. Verbal questions of this sort are not trivial. Now clarity of usage could be achieved by laying down rules for the use of different words for R_1, R_2, and R_3. This, though pedantic, would be a harmless procedure provided that the word "reasonable" was not itself appropriated for *one* of these three meanings, and that it was made quite clear that the three words replaced special uses of "reasonable," and that the close analogy between R_1, R_2, and R_3 was stressed. On the other hand to appropriate the word "reasonable" to R_1 alone (as Hume in effect did in Book I of the *Treatise*) would have harmful consequences, at any rate unless special steps were taken to prevent them. For (1) such a procedure would tend to make us lose sight of the close analogy between R_1, R_2, and R_3, and (2) the paradoxes which would seem to arise, such as that "'tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole to the scratching of my finger," would tend to be needlessly *distressing* paradoxes, on account of the strong associations of the words "reason" and "reasonable," which tend to persist even when the range of application of the words "reason" and "reasonable" is altered. (The paradoxes would not be distressing for persons who perfectly understood the interrelationship between the various meanings of "reasonable" as it is at present used.) Still worse, from the point of view of moral philosophy, would be to appropriate the word "reasonable" for R_1 and R_2 and to forbid it for R_3. This is in effect the procedure of Hume in Books II and III of the *Treatise* and also of most modern empiricists. This would be to avoid apparently paradoxical statements about induction and scientific method, such as that the accepted criteria for assessing empirical evidence are no more reasonable (or unreasonable) than those which guide an African witch doctor, at the expense of heightening, by placing them in awful isolation, the paradoxical effects of certain statements in the field of morals. No longer would we have the slight comfort of being able to say to ourselves "if it is no more reasonable (or

unreasonable, for that matter) to seek for the happiness of others than to live my life an unscrupulous egoist, it is equally no more reasonable to be a scientist than a witch doctor; therefore just as I am perfectly assured that (in some sense or other) it is better to be a scientist than a witch doctor, so it seems to me (in some sense or other) to be better to be an altruist than an egoist." The application of "reasonable" to mathematicians and to chemists, but *not* to saints would suggest that there is a close analogy between R_1 and R_2, but *not* between R_1 or R_2 and R_3. Some philosophers in their commendable anxiety to avoid such an impiety would be up in arms and would be ready to commit any absurdities that seemed to save them from it (though, as I have tried to show, we can avoid committing absurdities and still be saved). The simplest way by far of avoiding these harmful effects is to avoid redefining "reasonable" at all; we can guard ourselves against confusion in the use of the word by keeping quite clear in our own minds about its various systematic ambiguities, and we can indeed be grateful to Hume for his paradoxes, in as much as it is these very paradoxes that draw our attention to the complicated logic of "reasonable."

Someone might now object that I have been mistaken in stressing the close analogy between R_1 or R_2 and R_3. It might be said that there is an important difference between the rules of logic and rules of scientific method on the one hand and moral rules on the other hand, for whereas we are all agreed about the rules of logic, and most of us are agreed about the way to assess empirical evidence, there is notorious disagreement about the correct rules of conduct. It might even be said that this disagreement is so widespread that it would be more correct to say that there are no rules of conduct at all.

In reply, we may observe in the first place that the fact that there are disagreements about moral rules in no way goes to show that there are no such rules; we should not try to separate out the criteria of right action from those of wrong action unless we recognized that there were such criteria. Secondly, even if there were widespread and irreconcilable disagreement about moral rules would this mean that it was mere prejudice to recommend any particular moral rules and to say that actions in accordance with these rules would be reasonable? We can conceive of a world in which people made inductions in accordance with all sorts of queer principles, quite different from those which guide the man of science. It would be quite impossible to prove to such people that they would only predict *successfully* if they used our rules, for any such proof, being itself a prediction, would only convince those who already made inductions in accordance with our rules. Nevertheless it would surely not be mere prejudice to say that our manner of prediction

is reasonable, whereas prediction in accordance with other rules, say those of Astrology or Black Magic, is unreasonable.

Suppose a person always predicted in accordance with the maxim "the more often a thing has happened the less likely it is to happen in future." (Even quite normal people have *some* tendency to think in this way. When there has been a run of five heads in the tossing of a coin some people think to themselves "it *must* be tails' turn now." If the sixth throw is heads they are even more convinced that the *seventh* throw will be tails.) No doubt this person's psychological make-up would be very curious, but this is not to the point. Moreover, he would not live long, but this also is not to the point. Suppose now that we tried to prove to such a person that his predictions would be unsuccessful. We could try a guessing match. Every time we won and he lost we should feel more and more sure that our rules were the better ones, but if he were true to his own maxim, however, every unsuccessful guess he made would make *him* more sure that his next guess would be successful. I do not wish to deny, of course, that a guessing match might administer a shock and bring about a change in such a person's psychology, but it would be pure shock that would do it. When Elijah shocked the priests of Baal out of belief in their gods by invoking Jehovah he was conducting an experiment whose import was assessable in accordance with rules of evidence held in common by both himself and the priests of Baal. In our guessing match we should have no such common ground with our opponents.

Perhaps it may be thought that I am exaggerating and that there are no rival methodologies. It may be contended that even astrologers and African witch doctors assess evidence in the same way as we do, and that their hypotheses, though outmoded, are perfectly scientific. Astrologers, it may be said, have simply got hold of certain facts suggesting, according to the correct rules of evidence, that the stars have an influence on human lives, whereas we have access to more facts and have discarded such an hypothesis. If this is so we could educate an astrologer in such a way that he would become a relatively up-to-date scientist. Now I do not wish to deny that such a view *may* very largely be true. All I wish to contend for is this: empiricist philosophers, like Stevenson, say that we have no right to *assume* that all moral disagreement is rooted in disagreement in empirical belief; similarly, I want to say, we have equally little right to *assume* that all disagreements in empirical belief do not depend on differences in empirical *method*.

We have been comparing moral rules with rules of scientific method. What about rules of logic? It might be said that these have an altogether different status—that people just *could not* disagree about these. It might therefore be argued that the sense

R_1 of "reasonable" is somehow "absolute" in a way in which R_2 and R_3 are not, and that this difference lends some justification to Hume's procedure, in Book I of the *Treatise*, of refusing to use the word "reasonable" for R_2 and R_3.

Now in a way we can dispute about the rules of logic, or about the validity of certain inferences. Consider the following immediate inferences: "all men are mortal. Therefore some men are mortal." Logicians used to dispute about the validity of this inference, but it was a purely verbal dispute about the meaning of "all." If "all men are mortal" is taken to mean the same as "There are some men and if anything is a man it is mortal," the inference is valid. If "all men are mortal" is taken to mean merely "if anything is a man it is mortal," the inference is not valid. The ordinary use of "all" is vague, and either interpretation accords with some of the uses of the word. The example is instructive in spite of its triviality, for it shows how disputes about the validity of inferences are disputes about the meanings of words. Formal logic of the Quine sort may be regarded as a systematization of certain suggested rules (not the actual ones) for the use of the words "and," "not," "all," and "some." Similarly, "whatever has shape has size" may be construed as a rule determining the usage of the words "shape" and "size," that is, as justifying the inference from "this has shape" to "this has size." To accept this inference as valid is to accept a certain way of using "shape" and "size." Again, to accept the statement "a thing cannot be in two places at once" is to accept as correct inferences such as "This was at A at time *t*. This was at B at time *t*. Therefore this is different from that." For some senses of "thing" we might prefer to do without such a use. At the logical level of "thing" at which an electron is a thing we might find it easier to express the laws of nature if we allowed ourselves to say that a thing (an electron) was in two places at once.

The objection might now be made: "you might decide to alter the meaning of 'shape' and 'size' or of 'thing' so that a thing would be said to have shape but not size, or to be in two places at once. If you choose to mean something else by 'shape,' such as location in space, of *course* you will be able to say that a thing has shape but not size. Nevertheless, if we use 'shape' and 'size' or 'thing' as we do at present we cannot say that a thing has shape and not size or is in two places at once." This, we must reply, is no objection at all; it is the merest tautology. We are challenged to keep the meanings of 'shape' and 'size' constant and alter a rule for their use, and there is felt to be some deep significance in our inability to do this. The meaning of a word cannot be described without giving rules for its use, and to alter a rule for the use of 'shape' and 'size' is *ipso facto* to change the meanings of these words. To

challenge us to keep the meanings of 'shape' and 'size' the same and *also* to change a rule for their use is thus to give us a bogus challenge. It is like challenging us to commit a legal crime. The fact that we cannot commit a legal crime goes no way to prove that all countries have the same laws.

It should now be obvious why it is logically impossible that we could be involved in an irreconcilable dispute about the validity of inferences. Disputing is talking, and in order to be able to talk to one another two people must in the main be agreed about the meanings of the words they use. This, we saw, is to be agreed about what inferences are permitted. Hence an irreconcilable dispute about the validity of an inference is impossible. Isolated disagreements may exist (such as the one we considered about the inference from "all men are mortal" to "some men are mortal"), but these can always be cleared up on the basis of the general agreement which must exist if discourse is to be possible at all. A dispute about whether an action is right or whether an inductive generalization is warranted is not a dispute about words, though it is with words. The peculiarity of a dispute about the validity of an inference is that it is both *with* words and *about* words.

It should now no longer appear mysterious that the rules of logic should seem absolute or unquestionable in a way that the rules of scientific method do not so seem. The difference in respect of universality of agreement between the rules of logic and the other two sorts of rules has been exhibited as somehow accidental and unimportant. People cannot talk to one another unless they agree (to some extent at least) in logic; but then the case of morals is not so very different, for people cannot *live* together unless they (to some extent at least) observe the same rules of conduct. There should therefore no longer be any inclination to accord R_1 special privileges, such as the appellation "reasonable," which are denied to R_2 and R_3. The analogy between these three senses of "reasonable" is so strong that there are no grounds for recommending an alteration in the use of the word.

A witch doctor may disagree with me about the correctness of an induction, and we may be unable to resolve this disagreement. Nevertheless I have a perfect right to say that the induction is probably correct and that the witch doctor is in error in believing the opposite. A devil may disagree with me about whether an action is right, but if I think that it is right I have a perfect right to say so, to wax indignant with the devil, to say that my moral assertion is true, and so on. Similarly I have a perfect right to characterize the witch doctor's theorizing as unreasonable, silly or unscientific, and I have a perfect right to characterize the devil's actions and choices as unreasonable, wrong, or immoral. Nothing could be more

fallacious than the leap from the perfectly true proposition that it is quite possible there are irreconcilable moral disagreements to the proposition that we have no right to pass moral judgments, to assert that certain actions are right or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable, for this itself would be a moral proposition (one advocating an anaemic attitude of toleration of evil).

To say that it is impossible to justify our basic moral rules is not to say that we cannot justify our actions. Actions are justified by reference to rules which cannot themselves sensibly be said to be justified or not justified (or at least not in the same sort of way). I *know* that cruelty is evil, i.e. I abhor cruelty. I can therefore justify a decision to prevent needless pain by reference to the rule "do not cause needless pain." You also know that cruelty is evil and will accept my justification. Moreover, I will still call it a justification even in the face of the Devil and will condemn him as unreasonable for not accepting it. My main contention has been that all this is a perfectly correct use of language, and that the sorts of alteration suggested by Hume are liable to be both intellectually misleading and emotionally harmful. The sting should now be entirely removed from the phrase "Reason the slave of the passions." Many philosophers, however, do not think of Reason as a slave, but as the master, or at any rate the enemy, of the passions. But it is just as bad to think of Reason as a master or as a protagonist as it is to think of it as a slave. There is no such person as Reason.

The notion of Reason as a master or an enemy of the passions is clearly connected with the widely prevalent confusion between moral and physical necessitation. I wish therefore to conclude by saying something about this topic.

Physical and Moral Necessitation.

Whenever we use words like "can," "cannot help," "must," "ought," "has to," "necessity," and so on, we are referring indirectly to rules. We say that a bishop *has to* move diagonally (its not doing so is ruled out by a rule of chess). We say that a stone *has to* fall if we drop it (its not doing so is ruled out by a law of nature). A man *ought* to keep his promises (his not doing so is ruled out by a rule of morals). A bowler *must not* throw (throwing is ruled out by the laws of cricket). We *cannot* deduce "some men are mortal" from "if anything is a man it is mortal" (doing so is forbidden by the rules of logic). A person *cannot* smoke in a non-smoking railway compartment; smoking there is forbidden by the railway regulations (whatever they are). Note that we do not have to be able to specify the rules before we can assert a "must" or a "cannot." We can leave them unspecified or refer to them as "whatever they are."

The case of the falling stone above appears to be different from all the others. It does not make sense to speak of a breach of a law of nature, and yet a rule is surely something of which it makes sense to say that someone conforms to it or makes a breach of it. This exception is only apparent. The case only appears exceptional on account of our use, in this connection, of the material mode of speech. If we think of laws of nature as rules we must think of them not as rules prescribing the behaviour of stocks and stones (the very supposition is absurd), but as governing our talk about stocks and stones. "If the stone is dropped it must fall" or "the stone's being dropped and its not falling is ruled out" is a slightly misleading way of saying something which would be better expressed in the formal mode of speech as follows: "The assertion of both the statement 'the stone is dropped' *and* the statement 'the stone does not fall' is ruled out." Such a rule is conveniently referred to by Carnap as a "P-rule." P-rules are contrasted with L-rules, or rules of logic in the wider sense of this word. There is nothing logically improper in committing a breach of a P-rule, e.g. in asserting that a stone was dropped in mid-air and rose straight up. The occurrence is perfectly conceivable. Now we can commit breaches of P-rules (though it does not make sense to say that stocks and stones do or don't do so) just as we can commit breaches of L-rules, as when we infer fallaciously, or as we can commit breaches of rules of any other sort. This is my excuse for referring to laws of nature as rules. The locution is convenient, though it may be misleading if the above considerations are not borne in mind.

When we talk about physical necessity, therefore, we are referring indirectly to laws of nature, just as when we talk about logical necessity we are referring indirectly to rules of logic or when we talk about moral necessity we are referring to rules of morals. An action or choice is morally necessary if it is prescribed by a moral rule. It is physically necessary if its non-occurrence would be contrary to the laws of nature. (I include laws of psychology as laws of nature. If, however, we so choose, we can distinguish physical necessity from psychological necessity by saying that the former refers to laws of nature *other* than those of psychology whereas the latter refers only to psychological laws.) Reasonable action is morally necessitated action. For to choose and act reasonably (in the moral sense of "reasonable") is simply to choose and act in accordance with moral rules. (There is, of course, the possibility of dispute as to *which* rules are the correct ones, and which sort of action is morally necessitated.) There is no opposition between moral and physical or psychological necessitation. The morally necessitated action may or may not be the psychologically necessitated one. That is, we may or may not actually do what we ought.

Now some philosophers talk as though moral necessitation was, if I may use an Irishism, the same as physical necessitation only different. That is, they do distinguish moral necessitation from physical necessitation, but they talk about the former in ways only appropriate to the latter. Here are a few quotations from Kant's *Grundlegung* which illustrate this tendency very well. I use Professor Paton's translation (*The Moral Law*, Hutchinson's, 1948). References in brackets are to the paging of the second edition of the *Grundlegung*, which are given by Professor Paton in the margin of his translation.

(97) "Will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings so far as they are rational." (x) "a metaphysic of morals has to investigate the Idea and principles of a possible *pure* will, and not the activities and conditions of human willing as such, which are drawn for the most part from psychology." (The obvious implication is that some are *not* "drawn from psychology.") (15) "Now an action done from duty has to set aside altogether the influence of inclination, and along with inclination every object of the will; so there is nothing left able to determine the will except objectively the *law* and subjectively *pure reverence* for this practical law." (This would not be so bad if "pure reverence" was supposed to be a *disposition*, as opposed to an efficient cause or prod, but Kant in a footnote characterizes it as "a feeling," which—still worse—is "*self-produced* by a rational concept.")

Many more examples could be given, but I am not specially concerned to prove that Kant himself was really involved in the muddle I am trying to illustrate. I leave his defence or accusation to Kantian scholars. All I am concerned to say is that he suggests to the unwary reader, at least (and there have been many such unwary readers), the following picture: Man is actuated by different prods or efficient causes. These prods are of two sorts: (1) empirical prods, i.e. feelings of desire and aversion; (2) rational prods, feelings of reverence for the moral law, and these feelings are somehow modifications of a special part of us called "Reason" or "The pure will." (Properly speaking these rational prods are not efficient causes or phenomenal prods, but a queer sort of noumenal prod. This, however, is a matter into which we shall not enter.) The idea is that rational action is action which is morally necessitated (which so far is true enough) and this is thought of as action which results from a rational or noumenal prod, not from an empirical or phenomenal prod (which is a complete muddle). This is to look for the meaning of "rational" in the wrong place. The word "rational" does not refer to a special sort of prodding, to an action's resulting from the impetus of a special Mover called "Reason." It refers to the action's being in accordance with a moral rule and says nothing about how it was caused. (Of course

there is also a subordinate muddle, that of confusing motives with efficient causes. Motives do not *occur*. They are dispositions.)

This muddle of conceiving "reasonable" in the moral sense as referring to actuation by a special coercive agent Reason instead of referring, in the manner elucidated above, to rules of action, is also manifested in certain common modes of speech. Thus we talk of the combat of Reason and the passions, or of Reason prevailing over or being overpowered by irrational impulses. (It may also be added that the habit, unfortunately very common among psychologists, of referring to motives as "impulses" is most objectionable. For "impulse" distinctly suggests "prod" and does not at all suggest "disposition.") The same idea is to be found in Plato's discussion of the soul in the *Republic*. It also lies behind the hankering of some philosophers for "practical judgments" which somehow "directly and essentially" affect action quite apart from the nature of one's motives (cf. Mrs. Kydd, *Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise*). Thus there still seems need for a non-mythological account of the rationality of actions. Perhaps my own account may be thought to be itself mythological. "What are all these 'rules'?" it may be asked; "where do they come from?" Well, why do linguistic expressions have the logical grammar they do have? It is a matter of convenience. If the world were different language might be different. It might be more convenient in one sort of world if what corresponded to "material object words" had a four-dimensional instead of a three-dimensional logic. Similarly, why should there be the moral rules which we have? Here it is not a matter of what sort of *language* we want, but what sort of *society* we want. Kant gives us the clue. A man may want to break a promise in a particular instance, but he does not on that account want a society which has no institution of promise keeping. We must recognize, however, that men of different temperaments may have, to a greater or less degree, different conceptions of the sort of society they would like to see established. Kant went too far in assimilating the universalizing of a wrong maxim to logical contradiction, but he did see a similarity which really exists. For just as no one wants a contradictory language, a language in which he would be saying opposite things at once, so no one wants a morality such that if everyone abided by it he would be defeating his own ends.

"TIME IS THE MIND OF SPACE"[1]

Professor DOROTHY EMMET

It is a sobering experience to be giving my first Sir Samuel Hall Oration in the line of succession of Samuel Alexander. Some of his Sir Samuel Hall Orations have been published in his book on *Beauty and the Other Forms of Value* and the *Philosophical and Literary Pieces*, and they must indeed have been a joy to his audiences. I think it is fitting that I should devote this first lecture to Samuel Alexander, taking one of the central ideas of his philosophy and considering it. If some of what I have to say is critical, I think he would have thought that was all in order. "Pitch into me," he used to say. After all, the best tribute one can pay to a philosopher is to try to go on with one's own thinking helped by the stimulus of his ideas, and often not least helped by finding oneself impelled to criticize them.

Alexander himself thought that hardly anyone would read *Space, Time, and Deity*, and that in any case his work was only a prelude to Whitehead's: that he had "but rung the bell for him." In both these judgments he was characteristically over-modest. But many others besides those who have read *Space, Time, and Deity* may have seen quoted Samuel Alexander's saying "Time is the Mind of Space," and they may have thought this is just one of those queer things philosophers do say from time to time, and does it mean anything at all, or is it just intended to mystify? The last thing Alexander would have wanted to do was just to mystify people—it would have been foreign to his deep simplicity. When he said "Time is the Mind of Space" he meant something very definite by it. I want to try and show what he did mean.

First, the saying is obviously meant as an analogy; and this brings us right up to the problem of metaphysical thinking. To Alexander metaphysics was a sustained attempt at synoptic interpretation: an attempt to see whether a world view could be achieved which would co-ordinate the results of thinking in the human and natural sciences. Where I think his view of metaphysical thinking is questionable is when he suggests that it can be purely a description of the general features of the world as it discloses itself to the mind confronting it. Would anyone confronted with the world as he sees it be prepared to say that it obviously consists (as Alexander tells

[1] A shortened version of the Sir Samuel Hall Oration, given at the University of Manchester on December 2, 1947. In much of what follows I am greatly indebted to Professor Broad's discussions of Alexander's views, notably in *Mind*, N.S. XXX.

us) of complexes of Space-Time point-instants enjoying themselves? Perhaps it does, but this is by no means evident. A metaphysician is working at much too high a level of interpretative generalization for his method to be purely description. He is trying out certain very general ideas as possible co-ordinating ideas, testing them it is true by their capacity to make our empirical knowledge coherent and significant. As Alexander rightly says, all our balloons should be captive balloons, our interpretative ideas should be tethered to experience. But the ideas themselves are not simply suggested by experience. If we ask how these very general ideas are reached, I believe the answer is nearly always that a philosopher starts from some range of thought or experience in which he is specially interested and finds there some idea which excites him and which he believes is capable of wider application. He then extends its meaning by analogy into other fields, to see whether with this extended meaning it could serve as a possible intellectual model for a more general interpretation. And this is a tricky business, since thinking in terms of analogies is notoriously tricky.

Now what about the metaphysical analogy—for it is obviously such an analogy, and a startling one—used by Alexander when he said "Time is the Mind of Space"? Alexander's view of the world was founded on a view of Space-Time but I do not believe that physical and mathematical theories of Space and Time were his starting-point, or even his main interest. Where he found links with what he was saying in certain aspects of relativity theory, that came as an additional reinforcement to his own thinking after the event. His first approach was through his study of the nervous system, and his attempt to give an account of mental processes which would integrate them with their physiological bases. He thought that the Idealist Philosophy in which he had been nurtured at Oxford failed to do this. The view he reached about the relation of mental and neural processes—or of mind and body—seemed to him to contain a principle capable of wider application, and it is in terms of a generalization from this that he works out his metaphysical theory.

Of course if there is to be an attempt to give a general world view in terms of a principle extended by analogy from some special field, it is surely necessary that the initial relation from which the analogy is drawn should itself be clearly understood. Is this so in the case of the psycho-physical relation which Alexander selects as his clue, and if not, have we not to own that the whole gigantic effort is an attempt to explain *obscurum per obscurius*? I must own that I think there is a good deal in this objection. The relation between body and mind is notoriously one of the most difficult and unsolved problems facing physiology, psychology and philosophy.

So in this respect Alexander's choice of an analogy must be counted unfortunate. But his choice at least has the merit of focussing attention on what is one of the main questions concerning our knowledge and our relation to the world (both central questions of philosophy). For the physical body is, as far as our present experience goes, our link with our environment. In one sense we are conscious of it, as "ourselves"; in another sense we can look on it as one object among others in the world. It is also the centre from which we see the world as ordered in perception, and in thought we can learn to allow for this perspective and correct it. I believe theories of knowledge must be prepared to take seriously this inescapable experience we all have of what Whitehead calls the "withness" of the body, and the elucidation of the dual character of this experience might then well provide a clue for a metaphysical theory. Meanwhile, we must own that until we understand more than we do at present about this question of the relation of mind and body, we are not in a very good position to say whether it is a relation which can be generalized to interpret anything else. But now let us see how Alexander thinks of it.

The body-mind relation is to Alexander a particular instance of "Emergence." By Emergence is meant that from elements organized in a certain pattern a new qualitative synthesis is derived; that is to say, the pattern as a whole is characterized by qualities which could not have been predicted from knowledge of its constituent elements before they were so organized. In that sense they are genuinely new. But the new qualities are not additional factors or elements which could be distinguished or separated alongside the other constituents. They result from the total organized pattern and only appear when it is so organized. Hence we get continuity in the components of a complex along with qualitative discontinuity in its character as a whole. So Alexander holds that in one sense mind is identical with an organized structure of physiological neural processes. There is no animistic or purely "mental" factor to be distinguished over and above these. But certain organizations of neural processes have as a function a completely new quality, conscious awareness. In this respect, mind is a new emergent. Of course in one way this is a naturalistic view of mind, but it is not what may be called "nothing but" naturalism. Mind is in one sense identical with its neural and physiological base, but in another sense, it is the new quality manifested by neural processes at a certain level of organization, and this is something genuinely new and unique, which must be considered in terms of its own characteristic quality, i.e. conscious awareness. Hence Alexander maintained, and rightly, that he was not a behaviourist.

But does he go far enough in saying that mental processes are

neural processes with the quality of conscious awareness? Conscious awareness is presumably found pretty low in the scale of rudimentary minds. Probably it is true that when we have anything we can call conscious awareness we have mind of a sort, and who is to say how far down the animal scale this goes? But where we have what we call higher mental processes we must bring in a distinguishing feature besides just conscious awareness. This I should call symbolizing activity—the power of using words and other signs to convey meaning, i.e. a new way of functioning with principles of its own. This is more than just conscious awareness, and more than a quality; it is a new kind of constructive activity. Alexander, with his direct realist theory of knowledge, in which all knowing is simply compresence *plus* consciousness, can leave this symbolizing activity out of his account of mind. He gets, I believe, into great difficulties in consequence in his account of knowledge and error. But that is another story.

Alexander then generalizes this idea that new qualities emerge from complex patterns, so that the world is looked on as a hierarchy of qualities, such that the higher qualities in the scale possess and depend on the lower qualities, but at each new stage in the hierarchy a genuinely new quality appears. The discovery of these new qualities is empirical. "There is no possibility of predicting that such and such a type of motion complex will have such and such a quality until you have actually found that this kind of complex does in fact have this kind of quality. Such novelty is clearly compatible with complete obedience to law: it is a law of nature that such and such a complex has such and such a quality, but it is an *irreducible* law and cannot be discovered until instances of its operation have been met" (Broad). Empirically, we can distinguish the following levels in the hierarchy: at the base of the whole thing is Space-Time differentiated by motions. Certain organized patterns of motions are bearers of the qualities we call material; organizations of matter are bearers of qualities found in physical structures and chemical syntheses; these in turn at a certain level are bearers of life, and some living structures are bearers of the quality of mind, or consciousness, which is the highest empirical quality known to us. There is no reason to suppose, however, that mind is the highest possible emergent quality. Alexander thinks that at a certain level mind in its turn may be productive of a new emergent quality, which he calls deity. I have gone farther than Alexander in suggesting that at each level we have not only a new quality, but sometimes at any rate a new *activity* with its own character, and when this happens it seems somehow to dominate the whole structure including the lower levels which make it possible. It does not, however, transform them into something different.

Physico-chemical processes continue to be physico-chemical processes, and neural processes are physico-chemical processes with their own special character. But when someone is really thinking, and thinking at the top of his form, there may be no separable animistic or mental factor present, but his whole body seems to be transformed into a vehicle for this new activity of thinking. I do not think Alexander's idea of emergence does justice to this aspect of the situation, that there is a novel way of functioning, as well as a new quality.

The view of the relation between the new emergent qualities and the organized structure of lower qualities which forms its base is thus a generalization from Alexander's view of the relation of mind to body. The "body" aspect of anything consists in constituent factors into which it can be analysed. The "mind" aspect is the new quality which they manifest when functioning as a whole. It is also (to use a phrase of Whitehead's) the "spearhead of novelty," making for the possible emergence the new qualities beyond itself for which it will in its turn provide the "body." So "matter" is a form of organization emergent from something still more elementary which can simply be called "motions"; in that way the "material" form of organization could be called the "mind" of the "body" of motions from which it emerges. (Alexander may be called a naturalistic philosopher but he should certainly not be called a materialist. "Matter" to him is simply a description of the qualities of one level of organization in the hierarchy). To Alexander the defining qualities of matter are the primary qualities such as extension and inertia. The secondary qualities are emergents from matter. So on our analogy, colour may be looked on as the "mind" of the complex of organized motions on which it subvenes in certain contexts. The general principle is that the distinctive quality of the structure at its own level is the "mind" of that structure. "Mind" here does not mean consciousness or thought, which is the quality characteristic of the level we call "mind" proper. It is "mind" in an analogical sense, the characteristic of a new qualitative synthesis. "There are no degrees of kinds of consciousness lower than consciousness itself, as Leibniz thought, but different grades of reality each with an element which is not mind but corresponds to mind in its office."[1]

But now what about the most daring of all extensions of the analogy —"Time is the Mind of Space"? The base of everything, to Alexander, is Space-Time, the matrix or "stuff" from which everything else is derived. Not two distant things, Space and Time, but a single reality, Space-Time, with two aspects, supplementing and necessitating each other on the body-mind analogy. Alexander is here obviously

[1] *Space, Time, and Deity*, II, p. 336.

not using the analogy in quite the same sense as when he says e.g. that matter is the "mind" of motions. For Time is not an emergent quality of Space, but S and T are both necessary in order that there may be complexes with emergent qualities. Everything in the universe to Alexander is a differentiation of this one fundamental S-T. If we ask why it should be differentiated, Alexander's answer is that this is due to the Time aspect, which introduces "restlessness" into the mere extension of Space, so that it splits up into complexes of *motion*—not the motion of *things* in S-T, but pure motions. Is such a notion conceivable?

Let us see how Alexander analyses it. S-T is to be thought of as an infinite continuum of interrelated complexes of motion. These can be analysed into relations between point-instants, a point-instant being the limiting case of a motion. I think there is a good deal of difficulty in this notion of point-instants. Sometimes Alexander speaks of them as if they were real elements, the smallest instances of spatio-temporal spread, sometimes as if they were ideal concepts, the bare notion of Time at a point or Space at an instant, whereas any actual motion has a spatio-temporal spread. As Professor Broad has remarked, it would have been easier if Alexander had known when he wrote *Space, Time, and Deity* of Whitehead's Method of Extensive Abstraction, according to which, starting from concrete happenings which can be perceived as volumes with a certain spatio-temporal spread, you can derive the notion of elements such as points and instants from the extensive connections of perceived volumes without being committed to a view of actual minimum point-instants.

This would mean we want something from whose structural properties point-instants can be derived. Whitehead suggests a continuum of events whose relations to one another display certain structural properties, derived from the ways they overlap each other, from which the motions of S and T, and points and instants, can be derived (i.e. a relational view of S-T). It would be much easier if Alexander had been prepared to describe S-T as the structure of a continuum of events, rather than as an absolute stuff from which things are derived. It would also, I think, make more sense of his theory of "*perspectives*."

The notion of perspectives is Alexander's attempt to express how S-T can be ordered with reference to particular point-instants. It seems tempting to define S as the assemblage of all events at an instant and T as the succession of all events occupying one place. But this is the kind of abstraction Alexander calls a "section." It is an artificial way of analysing, since there is no such thing as instantaneous S, or T without location. The point-instant is always spatial and temporal, with a spread in each. Hence the perspective is not just S ordered in respect to an instant and T ordered with respect

to a point. It is a line of advance, or a phase of the process of the world which is both spatial and temporal, seen in relation to some point-instant as centre of reference.

A perspective thus contains different dates. Alexander takes the illustration of a tree sawn across. For the carpenter the concentric rings are simultaneous. This is to look at it as an artificial section. For the botanist they are of different dates, carrying with them the history of the tree. This means a perspective is a historical phase of the process of nature, ordered with reference to some event as centre, and integrating into the perspective all other events which are in some way related to the event from which the perspective is developed. If we ask, How related? Alexander's general answer is, by causal interaction. So simultaneity within a perspective (as distinct from the abstract simultaneity in a section) is defined with reference to some interaction, e.g. the observation of two events as happening at the same time depends on the transmission of light signals which take time to travel and affect our senses, so that events simultaneous in one perspective are not necessarily simultaneous in another in which the distances are widely different.

Thus a perspective would be a phase in the process of the world taken from a given event *e* in which all such events enter as can be shown to be related to *e*: they may be observably contemporaneous or may be earlier or later stages in motions in which *e* is a stage. The definition of a perspective thus brings in the notion of motions and their interrelation, and even of causal interaction. It is a real question whether we can make sense of this in terms of pure S-T. The possibility of interaction surely calls for some fundamental properties besides the spatio-temporal, e.g. those accounting for the transmission rates of light, at any rate if S-T is looked on as Alexander looks on it as homaloidal, having uniform structure. Hence we need surely to start not as Alexander does from motions as a differentiation of pure S-T, but from a "continuum of events" (not a very satisfactory phrase, but I cannot suggest a better) having some property or properties in virtue of which they interact. The S-T properties might then be derivative from certain structural characteristics of these interrelations.

Alexander himself tells us he got at the notion of perspectives in physical S-T from considering the unity of the self in "mental" S-T. "Space," he says, "is full of meaning and anticipation." There is no such thing as awareness of the self at an instant. The least moment of conscious experience is a "specious present" with a certain durational spread (and Alexander adds, because it is embodied, also always a certain spatial spread). Our consciousness of what we are thinking at any moment is linked with the memory of what we were thinking, say, a fraction of a second ago, and it is directed in antici-

pation to what we are going to think a fraction of a second hence. This unity of the self in the specious present through memory and anticipation can be extended indefinitely. What we are at any given stage is constituted by memories of the past and anticipation of the future. Hence the unity of the self is constituted by events of differing dates being brought into a perspective with reference to the self of "present" experience. Similarly a physical perspective consists of all events which can be shown to be earlier or later stages of processes of which a given event which is taken as centre of reference is a phase. Hence the notion of a perspective essentially involves time; it is a line of advance describing a *historical* phase of becoming.

But why should the Time aspect be said to be the analogue of "mind" and the Space aspect the analogue of "body"? Is to call "Time the Mind of Space" just a fanciful analogy? I do not see that it can be defended unless Time is allowed to have properties besides the properties Alexander gives it of succession and irreversibility. As mere succession, Time would be, in Locke's phrase, "a perpetual perishing." As integrated in a perspective, we get the inclusion of "past" in present phases, a cumulative process on the analogy of mental experience, where memory from the past helps to constitute present experience, so giving a mastery over mere successiveness.

The mere notions of temporal succession and irreversibility do not tell us why there should be complexes of motions so organized as to make possible unified syntheses, still less syntheses with new emergent qualities. I believe that Alexander's notion of the qualitative synthesis is a valuable one, but it surely takes more than Time to produce these syntheses. We must be able to say that there is a general tendency for complexes of one order to combine with each other under suitable conditions to form complexes of the next order. Hence we must allow some fundamental property or properties in the world besides S-T, something which makes possible these complexes of organization which are the bearers of qualities at their several levels. Alexander in fact admits this, when he speaks of a *nisus*, or creative tendency in S-T. But can you really get this out of his notion of S-T as an infinite four-dimensional continuum? I do not think so, unless you implicitly assume that the mere fact of succession necessarily means creative advance. Alexander may have been near enough to the nineteenth-century philosophies of inevitable progress to be able implicitly to assume this: we in the middle of the twentieth century are not so sure. But what I think we can say is that by insisting that we "take Time seriously" Alexander is giving a view of nature and process which is essentially *historical*—that is to say, there is an irreversible direction, defined, by "Time's Arrow" (Eddington's expression). I think much of the difficulty of under-

standing Alexander is due to the way in which he oscillates between two views. In one view S-T is something absolute and complete (a kind of substance), an infinite whole, distinguishable, it is true, into point-instants, but in which motion simply means the redistribution of the temporal co-efficients of spatial outlines within the whole S-T. In the other view T stands for what Whitehead calls "the advance into novelty." On the former view S-T is an absolute stuff of which things are made; and we can ask whether, like the materialist's matter, this is not an abstracted concept treated as if it were a substance. On the latter view we could say that nature is focused in lines of advance with a history, and at each level of the process where there is a new emergent quality, this quality is, as it were, the spearhead of creative advance at that stage. This is not just because it comes latest in time, but because it expresses a new form of organization, characterized by new qualities. We should like to think that this is the function of mind as we know it. But even if we could say that in this way the new emergent quality at each stage is analogous to mind, this is not just to say with Alexander that it is analogous to Time. There must be some other fundamental properties or properties to the process besides S-T. We should have to emend Alexander as has been suggested—starting from the "continuum of events," define S-T as certain properties of its structure, but say that events must have properties over and above their S-T structure in virtue of which they can interact and be related in qualitative syntheses. If we could say this, it would be more plausible to say that the *nisus* which makes for "advance into novelty," which is not Time but is measured in terms of Time, is the "mind" factor in the events whose extended patterns (measured in terms of Space) are the "body" factor.

Another way of putting it would be to say that the "body" aspect of something is the external view of nature as unified in that particular perspective, while the "mind" aspect is the "idea," or expression of the distinctive internal quality of that particular unified perspective. In this way there would be a close comparison with Spinoza's view of the body-mind relation, and also with the way Spinoza generalizes it in his view of nature as one substance seen under the two attributes of thought and extension. This was a comparison which Alexander himself was proud and happy to draw. He said that if they wrote on his urn in the crematorium "*Erravit cum Spinoza*" he would be content. And in that company we may perhaps leave him. Spinoza is, of course, one of the masters of those who hold that mind is not to be interpreted in terms of Time, whereas we have seen that Alexander comes near to identifying mind with the temporal aspect of nature. Here he has travelled far from Spinoza—too far, we may say, for it surely takes more than Time to produce

and sustain the sequence of qualitative syntheses which can be traced in the world, and of which mind is the highest which we know. Nevertheless, in insisting that we "take Time seriously," Alexander has sounded a note which is lacking in Spinoza, and a note which is likely to be heard in any modern speculative philosophy.

SCEPTICISM AND MEANING

STUART HAMPSHIRE, M.A.

1. It is a commonplace that contemporary empiricism, or anti-metaphysical philosophy, at least in this country, is a re-statement of the essentials of Hume's position with the aid of the more complete analysis of *a priori* reasoning provided by logicians within the last fifty years; what logical empiricism has most substantially added to Hume's sceptical method is the means of stating and applying his distinction between purely analytic sentences and sentences conveying information about matters of fact more precisely than he was able to state or apply it. It was Hume's governing purpose in every part of his writing to defend what is now generally called the language of common-sense, which is essentially what he called natural belief, against every kind of philosophical theory, whether rationalist or professedly sceptical. By "philosophical theory" is meant in this context any attempt by the use of logical or *a priori* arguments either to justify or to amend our common-sense beliefs or assertions; Hume tries to show that all such attempts are mistaken in logic and ineffective in fact. The work of the genuine sceptic, who is the true philosopher, is repeatedly to draw attention to the limits of human reason; to draw attention to the limits of human reason is to point to the logical impossibility of answering philosophical demands for some general, and therefore non-empirical, justification of our natural beliefs; such demands involve the substituting of some single, imposed criterion of justification in the place of the various and shifting criteria which we in fact habitually use. Hume exhibits the impossibility of satisfying this metaphysical demand in respect of our ordinary assertions about physical objects in the external world, about persisting individual minds and persons, or about the goodness and badness of human behaviour. Philosophers can investigate empirically the conditions under which particular types of belief are *in fact* formed and particular types of assertion *in fact* accepted as true; and they can distinguish between beliefs which are, in the normal sense of the word, rational, namely, beliefs based on the observation of repetitions in our experience, and superstitious beliefs, having their origin, not in observation, but in disorders of the imagination linked with verbal confusion; but they can go no further. In this sense Hume conceived himself to be a moral scientist drawing his material from the inquiries now distinguished as history, anthropology and psychology; philosophers can describe the conditions under which particular types of assertion are in fact accepted as true, but they cannot

prescribe the conditions under which they must (in a logical sense of "must") be so accepted.

It follows that epistemology, no less than overt metaphysical speculation, is a pseudo-science fit for the burning, in so far as epistemological "theories" are intended as answers to the question "what universal *logical* justification can be found, apart from our natural habits of speech and our customary expectations, for accepting the propositions which we do accept about physical objects, the existence of minds other than our own, etc?" To entertain the pseudo-doubt which leads to such demands for logical justifications may itself be a natural propensity of the human mind, as history suggests that it is; but the pretended doubt is only allayed when the philosopher has once again indicated the confusion between deductive inference and natural habit which is always involved; and the metaphysical "doubt" cannot be doubt in the full and normal sense of the word, since we find that in fact the common-sense expectations of the metaphysicians persist unattacked, irrespective of the philosophical "theories" professed as answers; and in this sense (for here the normal criteria of belief conflict) their natural beliefs can be said to persist unaffected.

But interpretation of Hume has always been perplexed, because he does not always (and particularly in the *Treatise*) cling to this positivist thesis and method. He sometimes seems to have a metaphysics of his own, a philosophical theory to the effect that all our factual beliefs and assertions *must* ultimately be justified by some reference to sense-data and images; he seems sometimes in the *Treatise* to be prescribing a logical necessity of logical justification, and not simply to be stating the various criteria which we find, as a matter of fact, to be habitually and naturally used in justifying our different beliefs. The reasons for this ambiguity in Hume are worth investigation, if only because the ambiguity is reproduced in contemporary empiricism, whenever, under the disguise of logical analysis, *theories* of belief or knowledge or perception are produced, the theories being more than mere summaries of the conditions under which typical claims to believe, to know or to perceive something are normally accepted as true.

One source of Hume's ambiguity is well recognized and does not affect contemporary philosophical sceptics—namely, the inherited terminology of impressions and ideas, with the accompanying assumption that all meaningful words must somehow be shown to correspond to some impression or idea; for this terminology led Hume to inquire into the ultimate *derivation* of the ideas for which words like "cause" and "necessity" stand; so, in the philosophical inquiry into the derivation of our ideas, he seemed to have a *method of philosophical criticism* of our natural beliefs, that is, a

universal criterion by reference to which they must be justified or rejected.

But, even if the terminology of ideas is eliminated, there remains in Hume a further confusion which (I believe) can be shown to obstruct a clear statement of his sceptical position—namely, a confusion about the peculiarities of the word "resemblance" and its cognates. In spite of his rejection of abstract ideas, he still thought of a perceived relation or relations of resemblance as necessarily involved in all classification and uses of language; he was never a *complete* nominalist; for he dismissed inquiries into the customary uses of words as the trivial business of the grammarian and not the proper business of the philosopher, who is interested only in the relations between impressions and ideas which our words represent. This confusion about the peculiarities of the word "resemblance" or "similarity" still persists; and it obstructs a clear statement of the nature of the sceptical philosopher's method in distinguishing the different kinds of argument conventionally associated with different kinds of belief or assertion.

2. Hume's mistake was to regard the words "similarity" or "resemblance" as names of relations in the sense in which, for instance, "contiguous in time" or "contiguous in space" or "to the left of" or "after" are names of relations. Certainly Hume realized that the words "resembling" or "similar to" in some way function very differently from expressions like "to the left of" and "after"; and he marked this dimly realized peculiarity of the use of the words "resemblance" and "similarity" in his own non-logical terminology by calling resemblance and similarity philosophical relations, so distinguishing them from words like "to the left of" and "after" which stand for natural relations. But he did not realize *what* the peculiarity of the word "resemblance" is, and how *wholly* different it is in its use and purpose from words like "to the left of" and "after"; if he had realized this, he could never have spoken of "resemblance" as the name of a relation of any kind, not even of a peculiar or distinctive kind of relation; he would merely have said that "resemblance" is not to be classified with other expressions normally called names of relations, or in (non-logical terminology) that there is no such relation as resemblance.

"Resemblance" *looks as if* it should be classified as the name of a relation, or *looks as if* it could be classified as a descriptive symbol. To say that resemblance looks like the name of a relation or looks like a descriptive symbol, is simply to say that it functions *grammatically* in the same way as words or expressions which we would also classify as names of relations or as descriptive symbols; that is, if we substitute the word "resemblance" for relation-naming words in

a sentence, the result is not generally or necessarily bad English grammar. From the sentence "the house is to the left of the barn" one can obtain by this substitution the sentence "the house resembles the barn," which grammatically is equally correct. But the substitution produces in this case, and will *always* produce, a *logical* change; that is, in no case will the sentence resulting from the substitution have the same logical use as the initial sentence. When the initial sentence containing relational expressions is a complete statement, as in this example, one will always obtain, by replacing a normal relational expression with "resemblance" or "similarity" or any of its cognates, a sentence, which, however grammatically correct, is not a complete statement; and this is what is meant by saying that "resemblance" is not the name of a relation or a descriptive symbol. In any sentence of the form A R B, where A and B are either demonstratives or descriptions, if "resembles"[1] is put in the place of R, the resulting sentence is not a complete statement.

Compare the two sentences—"The house is to the left of the barn" with "the house resembles the barn," both grammatically correct. One might express the sense in which "the house resembles the barn" is not a complete statement by saying that, as it stands, it is completely uninformative, that it tells one nothing, other than that there is a house and there is a barn. A natural reaction to the sentence would be—"Of course anything resembles anything; you have not made a statement, that is, communicated anything which I can test or deny, until you say in what respect the two things resemble each other." If I then specify the respect, and say, for example, that they resemble each other in design, then and only then I have introduced the missing descriptive symbol which makes the sentence a complete statement. "Anything resembles anything" is another way of saying that *merely* to say of something that it resembles something else is to state nothing. Given any three events or any three objects, A, B, and C, we communicate nothing if we say that "A resembles B more than it resembles C," unless we specify, or the context suggests, the respect in which A resembles B more than it resembles C.

Instead of saying either (*a*) that "resemblance" is not the name of

[1] There may be a use of "resemblance," in the limiting case of "exact resemblance," in which to say of two things that they exactly resemble each other in some specified respect is to say that there is no difference between them in that respect. If there is such a use of "resemblance" or "similarity" (which I doubt), my remarks do not apply to it. Of course in any complete investigation of "the problem of universals," something would need to be said about the very few descriptions which are absolutely determinate or specific in the sense of being applicable only to things which are in some respect indiscriminable. My purpose here is only to deny sense to the thesis that *all* descriptions involve reference to a *universal* relation of *resemblance*.

a relation or (*b*) that "resemblance" is not a descriptive symbol, one might express the point by saying that "resemblance" is an *incomplete expression. Because* it is an incomplete expression, one starts to talk nonsense as soon as one starts to talk of a relation of resemblance-in-general, in abstraction from resemblance-in-a-specified-respect. It is a natural mistake, because in ordinary speech formally or strictly incomplete sentences such as "he resembles his father," are normally interpreted as complete statements, the context of their use supplying the missing element, the implied respect of resemblance; if someone says "he resembles his father," we adjust ourselves to the ellipse without noticing it, and supply "in respect of facial expression or character." It is easy for philosophers, isolating sentences from their context, to start thinking and talking about perceiving *the resemblance* between two people, and to forget that what is perceived, and what is communicated by this sentence, is not just resemblance, but resemblance-in-facial expression or resemblance-in-character.

3. Consider any descriptive[1] word or phrase—e.g. the word "astringent." Suppose someone asks "What does the word 'astringent' stand for, and what does it mean?" One would answer either by giving a paraphrase, a substitute expression the use of which is known to the questioner, or indicate an assortment of astringent things and then say "Do you see what it means now?" The questioner might then say—"Obviously the word 'astringent' must stand for some *similarity* between the various things which you have indicated, otherwise you and so many other people would not agree in calling them all astringent; personally I do not *see* any resemblance between the style of that Mérimée story and the taste of that apple. I shall avoid saying, following Locke, that I have so far failed to abstract the common property, which you call astringency, from the examples which you have given; but I can say (following Hume and Russell) that I have so far failed to perceive the resemblance to which you are referring when you call them all astringent." One might then answer—

"It is no less, and no more, misleading to describe your condition as one of having failed to notice a resemblance between the things which I have shown you, than it is to describe you as having failed to abstract a common quality. For the same sort of philosophical puzzle can be (and in fact has been) suggested, whether the resemblance terminology or the common quality-terminology is used."

[1] Moral terms are not to be included among descriptive expressions, precisely because to state the normal conditions of their use is to state a moral code and not merely to clarify a language; moral terms are unanalysable, in the sense that there can be no standard or correct conditions of their use; to decide the conditions is to make a moral, and not a linguistic, decision.

The questioner might then say—"But there must be some means of describing the difference between my present condition, which is that of knowing some of the things to which the word 'astringent' is applied but not knowing *why* it is applied to them, as opposed to your condition of seeing the relation between these things which makes people call them astringent. And I insist that it is natural in this context to talk about seeing or not seeing the resemblance between the things which are called astringent."

To which one might reply—"Of course you can say, if (mysteriously) you find it helpful, that when I describe all these things as astringent, I am saying that they resemble each other in respect of being astringent. But that only shows once again that the word 'resemblance' is redundant."

This is the type of situation which has always seemed to justify Hume, Russell and others in representing all classification, and so all knowledge, as beginning with the perception of a fundamental relation or relations of resemblance.

Given a sufficiently large assortment of objects, we are inclined to assume that the sentences "all these things resemble each other in the same way" or "the resemblance between any two of these objects is exactly similar to the resemblance between any other two" convey complete and significant statements which might conceivably be false; for we may be inclined to think that we can conceive a collection of objects, a sufficiently large collection, of which it might not be true that they all resemble each other in some one respect. But could we? That is what I question. Of any finite group of objects, however numerous and apparently heterogeneous they may be, it is always meaningless to deny, and in that sense also meaningless to assert, that they all resemble each other in some one respect.

The learner might be said to be looking for the respect of resemblance, and, when he at last says, "now I see what you mean," he might be said to have discovered *the* resemblance to which I was referring. But what has he discovered? We can only answer this question by considering how he himself, or anyone else, would test the truth of his claim to have seen what is meant by astringency, to have found *the* resemblance referred to. He would test his claim, and so would I and anyone else, by observing whether or not he generally applied the word in the contexts which I and other people apply it, and not in contexts in which I and other people do not apply it; if he was satisfied that he did generally tend to apply it, and to withhold its application, in accordance with other people's use, he would be satisfied that he knew what the word meant; then and only then we could say—in the other terminology—that he had found *the* resemblance referred to.

Can we not therefore say that his knowing what I mean by the

word simply *is* his habit of associating the use of the word (in his own mind, not necessarily in public speech, because of course he might choose to deceive) with the situations with which I associate it, and of not associating it with the situations with which I do not associate it? Or is it logically possible that the same situations might suggest the use of the word to him as to me, and yet he not really know what I mean by the word?

I think we are inclined to hesitate in answering "yes" to the first question and "no" to the second largely because of the situation in which a pupil, learning the meaning of a word, *suddenly* says "Now I see what you mean: I see what astringency is now!" It is this sudden *revelation* which makes us inclined to talk about an *act*—either of *abstracting* a common quality or of *perceiving* a resemblance. We are inclined to say that we know that we will in future use the word in the standard way only *because* we have noticed a common quality or resemblance; we are disposed to resist the nominalist's invitation to describe the situation the other way round; that is, we are unwilling to say that we have noticed the common quality or resemblance if, and only if, we generally use a word as other people use it. So we tend to insist on distinguishing two phases—first, seeing the common quality or resemblance, and *therefore* using the word in the standard way when the appropriate situations present themselves.

But we very often confidently *think* that we understand an expression and later find by experiment that we do not; my statements that I understand are never in this sense incorrigible statements, which I can justify by introspection on a single occasion. Even more often I may be simply doubtful, quite uncertain whether I attach any clear meaning to a word until I have thoroughly tested myself by applying it to examples. But in coming to understand what such a word as "astringent" means there may be the final stage of learning, the stage of illumination; there sometimes occurs something which can be intelligibly described as the felt determination of the mind to use or apply the word when certain things present themselves; or rather we suddenly discover that, if we are asked, or ask ourselves, to describe certain things, this word is one of the words which suggests itself. As soon as we find by experience that a word sometimes *naturally and habitually suggests itself* when we ask ourselves for descriptions of things, then we say that we know what we mean by the word, or know how to use it. And this discovery, which may be either swift or gradual, that the word does in fact suggest itself as a description of some things and not of other things, precisely this is the illumination to which we refer when we say—"Now at last I see what the word means" or "Now at last I know how to use the word."

If I discover by experiment that the word generally suggests itself to me in connection with the contexts with which it is generally associated in most other people's habits, then I can say that I know the *proper* meaning of the word or that I use it *correctly*. If I find that it generally suggests itself on occasions and in contexts with which it is not associated in other people's use, I can say that, although I mean *something* by it, I do not mean what other people mean. "I think I now know what the word 'astringent' means but am not certain," is ambiguous, in the sense that there are two possible objects of uncertainty. I might be uncertain whether my use of the word, although firmly established in my experience, generally agrees with other people's use—and this is the more usual and natural sense of "I think I know what it means"; or I may feel a more radical and interesting uncertainty, an uncertainty solely about my own understanding of the word; I may be uncertain whether there may not in fact arise a great number of situations in which I shall hesitate helplessly between applying the word and not applying it, in which I seem to have a choice. It is this second sense with which I am concerned.

Consider, as an illustration, the word "romantic" as an epithet applied to works of art; I might say of it—"Of course this word has been used by different people in many different senses; but I think I know what *I* mean by it." But I might subsequently say "I thought I knew what I meant by the word, but I was wrong, I did not really know, or at least I only knew very vaguely." I should retract in this way, if and (I think) only if, a number of works of art were presented to which, as I would find by experience and only by experience, I did not in fact either definitely feel impelled to apply the word "romantic" or definitely impelled not to apply it, while not hesitating in the application of other descriptions to the work in question. I do not clearly know what I mean by a descriptive word or phrase if, and only if, the proportion of cases in which I hesitate about its application, while not hesitating about the application of other descriptions to the things in question, is abnormally high. The clarity of a descriptive word or concept is a matter of the ratio of the number of cases which suggest themselves as border-line cases to the unhesitating cases. By making a choice in these border-line cases, I further determine, or make definite, the meaning of the expression thus shown to be vague; for I thereby establish links with other descriptions.

Giving reasons for the application of a description to something, answering the question "*why* do you call this work romantic?" is a matter of providing other descriptions, which one normally applies to works also called romantic, and which are admittedly applicable to the work in question. In a very small minority of cases one may even answer the question by quoting a definition, that is, a necessary

and sufficient criterion for the use of the word "romantic"; but such explanations by definition must be a minority, because one thereby makes the word "romantic" redundant and useless except as an abbreviation. But in all cases clarifying the use of a descriptive word or phrase is a process of drawing attention to its established links with other descriptions.

There is one last argument for "noticing resemblances" as necessarily involved in using and discriminating between the uses of descriptive words or phrases. We often speak of the same word or phrase being used in several different senses or with several different meanings. Clarifying or explaining the use of a word or phrase usually involves distinguishing the two or more different senses in which it is used; we seem thereby to be compelled to distinguish between the actual use of the word and its several different meanings. We may be inclined to say that in this process, typical of philosophy, of distinguishing *different* senses of the *same* word, we are noticing that the same word stands for several different resemblances or common properties. But in distinguishing two or more different senses of the same word, we are again concerned solely with linguistic usages. For the criterion which we apply in deciding whether the same word is normally used in two or more different senses is whether it is linked with, or is replaceable by, two or more other expressions which are not linked with, or are not replaceable by, each other. Such questions as "Is the word 'remember' used in two different senses?" are answered by considering whether there are two expressions, each of which is substitutable for the word "remember" in some contexts but not in others, and which are not themselves equivalent. Thus in making these distinctions of meaning we are always concerned with making explicit our rules or habits in definitely coupling the use of one word or expression with that of another; we are tracing the links in the network of our vocabulary.

4. That classification, or the application of descriptive words or phrases, is not properly described as seeing or noticing a relation of resemblance between things and impressions could be more clearly and logically established in another way—by considering the use of the word "recognize." "I understand the descriptive word or phrase x," entails "I will generally recognize x's when they are presented to me" which in turn entails "I understand the descriptive word or phrase x"; the two expressions are equivalent; recognizing is necessarily involved in understanding, or knowing the meaning of, a descriptive expression. But recognizing does not necessarily involve seeing a relation of resemblance; for I may recognize something as an x without necessarily recalling an image of, or being presented with a specimen of, some other thing, which is an x; that is, I may

recognize something as an x when there is only this something present to my mind; therefore my recognition of it as an x cannot consist in seeing a *relation* between it and some other actual or imagined thing. It follows logically that "understanding the descriptive word or phrase x," which is equivalent to "being able to recognize x's," does not necessarily involve seeing a relation of resemblance, because it does not necessarily involve seeing any kind of relation; and this argument constitutes a proof that classifying or describing does not necessarily involve seeing relations of resemblances between things or impressions. But, before quoting this familiar proof in terms of "recognition," it is useful to expose the reasons or pseudo-reasons which have led philosophers to talk about a universal, philosophical relation of resemblance as the ground of all classifications.

5. To summarize the main point about resemblance, before attempting to re-state Hume's scepticism in the light of it:

(1) The word "resemblance," is not the name of a relation, or (better) is not a complete descriptive symbol; in other words, sentences of the form "A resembles B" or "A resembles B in some respects" or "A resembles B more than it resembles C" are not complete statements, as sentences of the form "A is to the left of B" or "A is bigger than B" are complete statements. In order to obtain a complete statement, we have to introduce into the sentence a genuine descriptive symbol by specifying (or implying) the respect of resemblance.

The point could be expressed by saying that we can indicate specimens of things which are bigger than something else, but we cannot indicate specimens of things which resemble each other; the function "x resembles the house" does not determine a class, the class of things which resemble the house, as "x is bigger than the house" determines a class.

(2) To understand a descriptive expression X more or less clearly is to recognize more or less unhesitatingly things or events as either X's or not X's, when they are presented or described.

(3) If, and only if, we find that we are constantly hesitating in the application of a particular expression, while not hesitating in the application of other descriptions to the thing or event in question, we say that that expression is not clear to us, or that we do not know clearly what we mean by it.

(4) If Hume had interpreted his principle of association as the not further explicable association of impressions and ideas, where ideas are words or symbols, he could have said—what in several passages he virtually does say—that the apparent conflict between philosophical scepticism and common-sense belief arises from a mistake made by philosophers. The philosopher's mistake is to talk as if

there is some other sense in which one can either *criticize* or *justify* our ordinary forms of description of the world by some general, logical or phenomenological arguments which purport to do more than simply describe the standard conditions for the use of the descriptions in question. Hume might have answered that there is no sense in which customary forms of description can be *justified* by any kind of philosophical or logical argument; they can be described, and they can be changed, that is, we can and constantly do, set ourselves to establish in use new, or partially new, forms of language or methods of description; we gradually acquire new habits and associations.[1] But philosophers have generally talked as if there is a sense in which we can, as philosophers, step outside our language in order to draw attention to similarities in the objects of our experience which are not recorded in our languages, or to similarities in the forms of our languages which do not correspond to similarities in the objects of our experience; and that, somehow by *pointing to* (not describing) the non-correspondence between perceived similarities and our customary forms of description, we can *give reasons* for replacing the kind of statements (*e.g.* about physical objects) which we ordinarily do make, by statements of some other form (*e.g.* by statements about sense-impressions). But merely to point is just to *refuse* to give a reason or justification.

As philosophers, we may ask such questions as "Is happiness distinguishable from pleasure?" or "Is willing distinguishable from desiring?" and a multitude of other questions which seem to involve attending to resemblances which may not be recorded in the established usages of our language. We have the idea that we may compare our vocabulary with "the facts," and decide that our vocabulary does not fit "the facts," in the sense that the descriptions which we use do not correspond to the relations of resemblance which we perceive.[2] One scarcely ever hears or reads a philosophical argument without meeting the words "similarity" or "resemblance" used in the abstract way, *e.g.* in phrases like "the situations in which one says X are not like the situations in which one says Y," or "the situations in which one says X are more like the situations in which one says Y than they are like the situations in which one says Z."

The nominalist need not deny that we can ask and answer such questions as "Is willing distinguishable from desiring?"; nor need he

[1] Of course the descriptive resources of our language are constantly being extended (apart from the deliberate introduction of technical terms) by new images and metaphors which, when stale, become literal descriptions. But how do I justify a new metaphor or image? Certainly not by any kind of logical or philosophical argument.

[2] When we compare a vocabulary (not a statement) with "the facts," we *necessarily* find ourselves comparing two vocabularies; for we must *state* the facts in some other vocabulary—or be silent.

say that sentences of the form "the situations in which one says x are not like the situations in which one says Y" are always meaningless, since the context generally supplies the missing respect of comparison. We answer such questions as "Is willing distinguishable from desiring?" by asking ourselves whether we would ever talk about willing something and not talk about desiring something. We describe to ourselves typical conditions in which the word "Will" is normally used and ask ourselves whether we should naturally and regularly also apply the word "Desire" in these conditions. "Attending to resemblances" always means "attending to resemblances in certain respects"; when we supply the descriptive expressions which specify the respects of resemblance in which we are interested, we are concerned only with the normal associations between these descriptive expressions. If philosophical inquiries (outside formal logic) are inquiries into such customary associations, it follows directly that "philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected"; and this is the tenet which defines the philosophical sceptic.

IS THERE A CASE FOR THE GENERAL WILL?

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It is fashionable nowadays to discredit the theory of the general will, and an attempt to rehabilitate it is not likely to receive much sympathy. Nevertheless, I propose to give some reasons for adopting a more lenient attitude towards the theory, and to indicate some possible lines along which a rehabilitation might be conducted.

Orthodox refutations of the general will theory proceed somewhat as follows. It is pointed out that the term, as used, for example, by Rousseau, is ambiguous. Sometimes the generality of the general will seems to reside in the subject of the will, and sometimes in the object. In the first case, the objector disposes of the general subject, showing that this would entail a super-organism over and above the individual; and that, in the absence of any such organism, the general will could mean only the sum of individual wills. In the second case, a typical line of attack is to show that, even if there is a common object of willing—which is itself held to be highly problematical—yet the individual attitudes to this common object will be all different, so that here again there is only a sum of different individual wills.

I wish to maintain that this ambiguity, so far from constituting a fatal weakness in the theory of the general will, is actually a source of strength. But first I shall examine a more fundamental objection, resting on the assertion that there is no such thing as a will. For the type of objections mentioned above assume that the notion of "will" is not itself in question. They amount to the statement that, even if there is such a thing as the will, it can only be an individual and not a general will. But the objection I am now considering removes this assumption and denies the existence of a will—and, *a fortiori*, of the general will.

Fortunately, there is no need to examine the ground of this objection to the notion of "will." For the very existence of this objection is itself a powerful support for the general will. Whatever grounds are alleged for the assertion that the will does not exist, some reasons must be found for the utility of supposing that it does. However doubtful the status of the "facts" to which it is assumed to refer, the word "will" has performed, and still performs, a useful function. I wish to suggest that whatever reasons may be found to account for the utility of the concept of the individual will may also account for the utility of the concept of the general will. Let us now examine these reasons.

At the common-sense level, the will is assumed to be something

which precedes, and causes, an individual voluntary action. But such an action, on analysis, fails to reveal anything corresponding to the will. Introspection does not reveal a consciousness of "willing" as a separate mental activity leading to acting. Nor does a critical observation by another person of the particular action reveal anything more than the factual physical changes in the external world (though much more may, of course, be inferred). These discoveries have the effect of relegating the will to the realm of metaphysics. But the practical utility of the concept demands analysis. We then find that the division of an act into intention and result gives us a greater power of prediction than does the examination of the act as a whole. The intention is more characteristic of the act than is the actual physical result; more important, it is more characteristic of the agent. It implies an element of permanence and reliability, on which we base our forecasts of future events. This is called knowledge of a person's character. In other words, this hypothetical division of an act into intention and result increases our control over our environment. The intention we call the "will," and a series of such intentions exhibits the element of permanence which enters into individual character.

It is essential to distinguish "intention" from "motivation." Both terms have their uses, but the dangers of confusing them can be seen, for example, in the shortcomings of the utilitarian political philosophers. By dwelling on "motives" as if this were the only way of referring to the significant element of action, and especially on the motives of pleasure and pain, these philosophers tended to regard the human being as a bundle of desires and fears—just as later exponents of psychological theories of the state spoke of him as if he were a bundle of complexes. Now we can hardly state dogmatically that the human being is a unity or is a plurality. But there are at least certain purposes for which it is convenient to regard him as a unity and not as a plurality. And it is because it shows him as a unit in action that the term "will" is often useful. This last point is so important that I think it would hardly be overstating the case to say that the will "is" this unity. For the unity, from the standpoint of a person's actions, cannot be completely described in any other terms, and certainly not in physical ones: for a person's actions are not confined to the particular region of physical space occupied by the body.

We have thus arrived at what may be called a pragmatic justification for the use of the term "will" as applied to the individual. Firstly, it establishes a criterion for judging character and forecasting actions; secondly, it emphasizes the importance of intention as distinct from practical consequences; and thirdly, and most significantly, it represents the individual as a unity.

Now the reasons which justify the use of the term "will" as applied to a society are the same as those which justify it as applied to the individual. What a society does is made up of what individuals do. But to leave the matter there is to acquiesce in a condition parallel to that in which individual actions might be regarded as mere changes in the physical world. The actions of a society, like those of an individual, cannot be usefully correlated without a similar division into intention and result. To say this is to say much more than the commonplace dictum, that institutions can only be described in terms of the ends for which they exist. For it entails that the ends are not the ends of individuals. The intention of the society cannot be equated with any combination of the intentions of its members. We saw that for some purposes it is convenient to regard the human being as a unity, and for others as a plurality, and that neither of these views was "true" in any sense other than a pragmatic one. The same applies to the state and to all less comprehensive societies. States and societies do act; or, to be more precise, there are facts which it is convenient to describe as acts of the state rather than as acts of individual citizens. The statement that the act of a society is "really" equivalent to a collection of particular acts of particular members may be logically irrefutable, but it is not of greater value than the statement that the act of an individual is "really" equivalent to a collection of psychological events. If it is permissible, and even essential, for certain purposes to regard the individual as a unit in action, it is equally permissible to regard a society as such.

It may be objected that the unity of the individual is at any rate factual, while that of the state is hypothetical—even, it may be said, an empty hypothesis. But I am arguing that the unity of the individual, in the sense in which we speak of the will or the self, is also hypothetical. I shall make this point clearer by dealing with a further objection. It will be objected that the application of the terms "unity" and "will" to both individual and state entirely blurs the distinction usually made between an organism and an organization. I shall reply by distinguishing between three types of unity. Two of these apply to the human body, which is both a material and an organic unity: for the human body can be described both in materialistic terms as a single piece of matter and in biological terms as a single organism. The third type of unity is psychological. It is in reference to this type of unity that the will unifies the self. The coincidence between biological and psychological unity is only a contingent one. Cases of "divided personality" illustrate this. Now the difference between the individual and the state consists at any rate partly in this, that the individual can practically always be regarded as a unit in all three senses, whereas the state can be regarded, for certain purposes, as a unit only in the third or psycho-

logical sense. It follows that, just as there is no necessary connection between will and organism in the case of the individual, so there is no necessary connection between will and organism in the case of the state. Consequently, the concept of the general will is not incompatible with the very proper distinction between organisms and organizations.

But where, it may be asked, is the unity of a society located? It is even clearer than in the case of the individual that the unity is discoverable not in the physical effects of the actions but in the intention. What makes a society one society is the end for the sake of which it came into existence and continues to exist. This is easily seen in the case of small and well-defined societies, such as a tennis club or the Council for the Preservation of Rural England. But in larger societies, such as the churches and the trade unions, and especially in the most comprehensive of all societies, the state, the unity becomes hard to discover, because it becomes difficult to say what the common purpose is. But this need only mean that different individuals will give differing accounts of the purpose of such a society. And this makes it still more obvious that the purpose of a society is not identifiable with any combination of the recognized purposes of individuals.

But the unity of the individual was grasped and put to use for purposes of correlating experience only by means of the concept of the will. In the same way, the essential unity of the state is clarified by the concept of the general will. In fact, as in the case of the individual, there is reason for claiming that the general will "is" the unity of the state. Both the terms "individual will" and "general will" have a pragmatic justification, and do not entail any necessary conclusion as to the metaphysical status of any entity. The important thing is to recognize that the individual will and the general will have exactly equal claims to recognition. Any grounds there may be for denying the one will be grounds for denying the other.

This account cannot be complete without an empirical justification of my point, and I can give only the barest summary of one. The task would be to produce evidence that the general will is in fact a concept in current use, either under another name or as an implicit assumption. I can find no explanation for some of the problems of political obligation except by assuming that there are facts answering to the requirements of the general will theory. Are there such facts? Political obligation implies a duty to obey the laws of the state, which are enacted and promulgated by persons. It also implies a duty to obey the executors of the law, such as police and Ministry officials, who are also persons. Yet there is no duty to obey a person with whom I have not entered into a voluntary obligation. My reason for obeying him is not that he is a certain person—I have no duty

to him as such—but that he holds a certain office. And this implies, among other things, that I recognize that he will act according to the rules governing the tenure of his office and not in his own personal interest. If it were not known to be possible that a person could act otherwise than in his own immediate interest, there could be no obligation to obey him, and therefore no political obligation.[1]

But if he does not act in his own interest, in whose interest does he act? The answer is immaterial. He acts according to rules, and has his own private interest in doing so. Political obligation arises not because a person in office acts in anyone's interest, but because he acts in accordance with rules which are embodied in a certain structure, and because this structure represents the unity of the state which we have called the general will.

It should now be clear why the ambiguity denounced by the critics is, as I mentioned at the outset, a source of strength to the general will theory. I have tried to show that the general will is to the unity of the state what the individual will is to the unity of the individual. But the individual will is a unity which can be referred indifferently either to the individual self or to the end towards which the acts of the individual are seen to tend. Similarly the general will ought to imply both that there is something general which wills and that there is a general end which is the object of the will. The critics have seen that this is in fact the case. But their criticism ignores the change of dimension. They assume that the "something general which wills" could only be a kind of super-individual, a theory which leads to an organic view of the state. But I think I have shown the error in supposing that the subject of the general will would need to be an organism. It would not, however, be paradoxical to attribute to it a kind of "personality" (defined in a strictly psychological sense) bearing the same relation to the general will as a human personality bears to an individual will. This large-scale "personality" would be the kind of thing referred to in such expressions as "the English character" or "the American way of life."

The further objection noted, that there cannot be an object of the general will because the individual attitudes to a so-called common object would be all different, assumes what it sets out to prove, that their cannot be a will distinct from combinations of individual wills. But it seems to me that, if there were such a will, it would have an object, the existence of which would be quite compatible with the variety of individual attitudes to it. No individual will, no individual interpretation, even, of the general will, is identical with the general will. No individual wills the common object. Indeed, as we saw in the case of the state, he may not know what it is. To assert that he does will the common object is a self-contradiction:

[1] I owe the substance of this paragraph to Mr. J. L. Austin.

for he wills what he wills, and the common object is what the society wills.

I have throughout been careful to refrain from assigning any factual existence to the general will. I have been content to suggest that, if there is any pragmatic justification for the use of the term "will" in ordinary descriptions of persons and their actions, then there is a similar pragmatic justification for the use of this term in the description of societies and their actions. Given the conditions under which it becomes a useful concept, it is quite appropriate that the contrast between individual and society should be expressed in terms of the contrast between the individual and the general will.

EXPOSITION AND EXPLANATION[1]

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ARGUMENTS, at least the best of them, should be based upon principles of logic, and therefore be beyond dispute. But unfortunately many philosophical arguments are based upon principles which, though claimed by some to be principles of logic, or at least to be true, are disputed or rejected by others. This difficult position arises, no doubt, because it is the philosopher more than anyone else who is entitled to delve into questions of the validity of first principles. In a philosophical undertaking of any magnitude it is therefore imperative for the author to state as clearly as possible the principles which seem to him certain, and which constitute the guiding lines of his method. Any criticism could then take only one of two forms: (1) it could allege that the argument under criticism does not conform to the principles laid down, though these principles are themselves accepted. (2) it could allege that the argument is mistaken because something is wrong with the principles, in which case the object of criticism is properly the principles and not the argument. But a valid criticism could *not* take the form of condemning a certain argument in the light of a principle which, while appearing to the critic to be true and undisputed, is in fact inconsistent with the principles which the author has laid down.

During the past few years it has gradually become quite clear to me that philosophy is suffering from a failure to observe a certain needful distinction in the matter of method (viz. the distinction, to be elaborated subsequently, between exposition and explanation). It is my purpose in this paper to show the extreme importance of drawing this distinction in a satisfactory manner, and to show how mistakes of a far-reaching kind attend the failure to make the distinction, or the making of it in the wrong way. I shall insist upon the distinction as a first principle of method, for it will become clear that most philosophical arguments are logically posterior to this distinction, in the sense that the criticism of a given argument either would have to accept the distinction, or would properly be a criticism of the distinction and not of the argument.

The distinction is necessitated by the fact that philosophers, both traditionally and at the present time, commonly make use of two widely different methods, which I shall call respectively the methods of exposition and explanation. Although I think that between them they cover practically the whole field, I do not wish to

[1] Professor Paton kindly read through the original version of this paper, and offered several helpful suggestions, many of which I have utilized.

deny the possibility of other methods. The point to be insisted upon is that where either of these two occurs it should be distinguished from the other. If the two methods occur *together* in a given philosophical argument, this may be due (*a*) to necessity, e.g. explanation seems always to involve some measure of exposition as a basis, or (*b*) to the fact that the philosopher happens to use both methods, each in its appropriate place and properly distinguished from the other, or (*c*) to a confusion, leading to typical errors which it is my purpose here to examine.

Now I am well aware of the fact that, running through the whole of modern philosophy, there has been a powerful movement to single out for study only such problems as can be stated and discussed in perfectly clear terms. It has been maintained that only this sort of discussion is worth while. Further, philosophers have been widely conscious of this movement. For instance, the distinction between *analytical* method on the one hand, and *hypothetical* or *speculative* method on the other, has often been made[1]; and this is the same as my distinction between exposition and explanation. Only I wish to point out how often, too, the essential distinction has been sacrificed in consequence of the very means employed to make it, and how profound a confusion has resulted from so thinking the distinction in alien terms. In short, theories which in themselves have nothing to do with the question of clarity have gained acceptance as *criteria* of clarity. The question of clarity has then been forgotten in the complexities of discussing and applying the criterion. The ever-present danger of a criterion is that it leads us back from the unknown into the arms of a familiar theory, which develops into a methodology repudiating everything except what can be interpreted in its terms. We are no longer like explorers curious to discover what lies ahead, but rather like an army protecting itself from what lies ahead. The early days of logical positivism were marked by an enthusiasm (itself inspired by the ideal of clarity) which only too easily jumped the gap between clarity and the criterion for it. Philosophy has suffered ever since. But at least we can go back and rescue what is essential.

With regard to the endeavour to achieve clarity, I mention three doctrines obviously involving the introduction of criteria. (1) The most well known was that a proposition is meaningful (is clear) only if a method of sensibly verifying it is in principle possible. (2) It was commonly held that a puzzle which is *prima facie* a puzzle about ideas is rendered clear only by interpreting it as a *verbal* puzzle, from which arose the doctrine that the problems of philosophy (since they must be clear) must be verbal. (3) It was supposed

[1] See e.g. Professor Ryle on "Phenomenology," *Arist. Soc. Sup.*, Vol. II, pp. 74, 82–3.

that necessary truths (since they must be accounted for in a transparently clear manner) express merely determinations to use language in a certain way, i.e. are conventional. All three doctrines appear to me to suffer from the mistake of adopting a completely wrong attitude to the problem of achieving clarity, viz. they all aim at removing everything from a given problem except that aspect of it which is already clear, whereas the importance of achieving clarity of course consists in achieving it *where it is not yet achieved.* The ideal of clarity is not an invitation to scale down the object to the dimensions of our present subjective capacity for comprehending it, but to train our subjective capacity to the comprehension of it as it is (admittedly by small steps if necessary). These are two diametrically opposite ways of achieving clarity. The great danger of the subjective element in empiricist philosophy is that its very nature is to accept precisely the *wrong* way.

A second mistake grows out of this, and operates in close association with it. A criterion is naturally treated as discriminating *against* those theories and methods which fail to satisfy it. E.g. not only are certain propositions recognized as meaningful, others are *denounced as non-sense.* We have anti-metaphysics, anti-ontology, and anti-apriorism. Now I am prepared to recognize that *for me* the most hopeful and fruitful method in philosophy lies in the study of those problems alone which can be stated and discussed with transparent clarity. But this in no way denies anyone else the right to pursue a different method, which *for him* may be the more fruitful. The subjective advisability of a certain method must not be interpreted as a property of the facts, and as thereby to be imposed upon everyone. There is a distinction, but *no opposition,* between exposition and explanation.

A third mistake, one of oversight, results from these two. The sharp opposition and criticism characterizing the second mistake is accompanied by a failure to make the requisite *distinction.* After all, metaphysics and ontology are not definable as speculative (hypothetical) philosophy, any more than logical positivism and its descendants can be claimed to be free of hypothesis and purely analytical. The whole distinction between hypothesis and analysis is blurred, and in fact is often explicitly denied existence.[1]

The two methods will be seen to determine two *levels* of philosophical discussion, from the fact that explanation is in the end justifiable only by means of an exposition (of principles, etc.) supposed to underly it. In what follows, (1) I shall point out how one philosopher (Kant) has observed this distinction in his method, and how other philosophers have developed along the lines of either the

[1] Hodges, following Dilthey, quite explicitly rejects the distinction, *Aris. Soc. Sup.* Vol. II, pp. 92–5.

one or the other level of discussion. (2) Next it will be my task to show how misunderstandings and mistakes have arisen from treating an item on the one level as if it belonged to the other, e.g., as if it could be criticized in terms of the other. At the same time I shall draw attention to the pernicious character of those principles of method which directly confuse the two levels. (3) Finally I shall consider in turn a few major philosophical problems, with the object of showing to what great confusion modern philosophical discussion has been led as a result of overlooking this distinction, and as a result of subscribing to principles whose main purpose seems to be to obliterate it.

(1) In the *Critique of Pure Reason* the distinction between exposition and explanation occurs in at least three places. Most obviously it occurs as the distinction which Kant makes between the metaphysical and the transcendental expositions of the conceptions of space and time. Although the word "exposition" ("Erörterung") is used to refer to the second as well as to the first of the two distinguished procedures, the second, but not the first, is certainly treated as an *explanation requiring justification*, for Kant lays down a certain principle by means of which the facts (obtained by the foregoing exposition) are to be accounted for, and sets himself the task of showing (*a*) that the principle is sufficient to explain the facts in question, (*b*) that only the one explanation will work (B 40). The same distinction occurs, though less clearly, in the contrast between the two phases in the deduction of the categories, viz. the metaphysical and the transcendental deductions. That the latter is in principle explanatory is shown by the employment of a lengthy method of justification, involving as before a demonstration that the one, and only the one, explanation will work. The other place in which the distinction occurs is in the Introduction. Here he first notes that mathematical propositions and certain very general propositions of physics are necessary (B 4–5) and that their necessity is of a peculiar sort (B 14–18). This I call the expository stage in the argument. Next he proceeds to the possibility of giving an explanation of this peculiar sort of necessity in terms of pure reason and the principles contained in it (B 24–25), i.e. we have here the explanatory stage. Before leaving Kant we should also notice that a parallel distinction occurs in the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*. That moral judgments are *a priori* and universally authoritative is justly held to be at basis a matter of exposition. We are confronted with a certain sort of experience whose exposition consists in a careful examination and report upon its general features. It is simply the laying bare of a given subject-matter. But beyond this we proceed to reasons, normally in the shape of hypotheses, by which we seek to explain why the features revealed in the

exposition are such as they are. Thus when Kant proceeds to the conclusion that the discovered features of moral judgments are to be accounted for only as rooted in the nature of *human reason*, he is at least in principle in the realm of hypothesis and explanation, even if afterwards the hypothesis in question is fully justified, i.e. "deduced."[1]

Platonic theory affords a striking illustration of the distinction which we are considering. On the one hand the attempts to define knowledge, justice, etc., are attempts to expose the general characteristics of certain inescapable experiences, but on the other hand, the theory of the Forms is an hypothesis (except for anyone who correctly claims direct insight into their nature) designed to explain the character of indefinability discovered, by the exposition, to attach to the terms in question. Great philosophies often begin at the level of exposition, and pass gradually to the level of hypothesis. When the passage is imperceptible, the mistake is often made of crediting the latter part with the certainty properly attaching only to the former. I think that a mistake of this kind is made in Bradley's *Logic*.

Bergson and Whitehead I would consider to be philosophers who have pre-eminently followed the path of explanation, as distinct from exposition. This is made clear in Bergson's works by the fact that he seeks vigorously to prove his main contentions by marshalling heavy batteries of evidence from the fields of biology and psychology. In Whitehead's main work, *Process and Reality*, the predominance of this method is shown by the fact that he begins by laying down specific tests, such as that of "adequacy," by which to judge whether his initial assertions are to be accepted, and he develops his argument with these tests in mind. An attack on logic in *Modes of Thought* is also indicative of the fact that he does not favour an analytical (but an hypothetical) method. I do not regard it as a matter for criticism that a philosopher should choose the method of explanation as more important for his particular task. No damage results when, as here, the philosopher in question clearly recognizes the nature of the method which he is using. The danger occurs when he believes himself to be using a purely logical or analytical (i.e. expository) method, while in fact his procedure is fundamentally hypothetical, or depends upon some particular hypothesis which, in a half-conscious manner, he may be regarding as an article of faith.

(2) I am, then, committed to the distinction between exposition and explanation. Moreover, I regard this distinction as itself a

[1] In the light of Professor Paton's suggestions, I have qualified and improved upon my original remarks on Kant. But it must not be assumed that Professor Paton agrees either with my rendering of Kant's theories, or with the views which I express.

matter of exposition, and not as a requirement of explanation or as an hypothesis. I doubt whether I would have any common ground for discussion with anyone who denied its validity, for a common ground is what can be laid bare to both parties, so that if there is no distinction between this procedure and such as are not expository, nothing can be agreed upon as a common ground.

In comparatively recent times, Russell has advocated "logical analysis" as a new philosophical method, and he has to some extent followed such a method himself. In so far as philosophers speak of "analysis" as a method, or lay claim to strictly logical principles as basis for any particular piece of reasoning, I think they are on the whole referring to the same method as the one which I have called expository. But in so far as a philosopher speaks of "*linguistic* analysis" he is suggesting, probably quite intentionally, an *hypothesis*, viz. the hypothesis that the problems of philosophy are entirely, or in principle, linguistic. Now a hypothesis requires full discussion and support. No one, I think, pretends to *see* that all the problems of philosophy are linguistic, and up to the present philosophers have been divided as to the truth of the doctrine. To couple it with the logical term "analysis" is therefore an invitation to accept the doctrine as co-ordinate with *logical truths*, and this would not be justified even if the doctrine were *as a matter of fact* true. The effect, of course, of surreptitiously introducing an *hypothesis* into the field of *exposition* is to protect the hypothesis from open discussion, and yet to make it operative as a logical principle. At the same time we are invited to identify logical principles with rules of language, and the problems of philosophy become indistinguishable from those of grammar. Moreover, the whole proceeding has the appearance of being conducted on a purely logical level.

What is meant by the terms "logical positivist," "logical empiricist"? Dr. Waismann has suggested some acute criticisms of the former. "Logical" as opposed to what? *Illogical* positivists? My criticism is of a different kind. A "logical positivist" differs from a "positivist" in that he appears to accept positivism *on logical grounds*. This impression arises from the fact that the clearly formulated verification principle endows his whole proceeding with a marked logical tone. The assertion "A proposition is meaningful only if there is in principle some method of verifying it by reference to sensible experience," contains the terms "proposition," "meaningful" and "sensible experience," all of which are associated with logical certainty, or with certainty of a kind which is often confused with it. For instance, we can answer the question whether a *proposition* is *meaningful* without answering the question whether it is true or false, i.e., such questions seem capable of discussion without reference to particular matter of fact, and for this reason the level of discourse

is at once assumed to be purely logical. Similarly, the term "sensible experience" is supposed by many to indicate a rock-bottom certainty scarcely distinguishable in its nature from logical certainty. The consequent impression that the verification principle has the character of a logical truth is, of course, confuted by recalling that it is after all only an hypothesis. But many philosophers nevertheless continue to apply it (in some form or another) as a main guiding principle of method, and as part and parcel of their general logical equipment. For similar reasons phenomenalism is frequently treated as the mark of a logician. Again, those who habitually conduct their enquiries in terms of words and sentences (as examples) are at once accepted as logicians, on the grounds I suppose that the *seeing* and the *hearing* of words and sentences afford a kind of certainty which is distinctively logical. In these two cases (phenomenalism and verbalism) the assumption that sense certainty is on all fours with logical certainty is in still greater evidence than in the case of the verificationists themselves, but it is not part of my purpose here to discuss this particular error.

The danger of any hypothesis which tacitly claims a basis in logic is that the question of the truth of the hypothesis is begged from the start, in the very method of procedure, and that the field of logically possible hypotheses is thereby restricted. In other words, a limit is arbitrarily imposed upon the field of exposition. Philosophers can now investigate only what they are allowed to investigate by those who have decided which terms of philosophical discourse are meaningful, and which are not. In modern philosophy, for instance, the term "ultimate totality" has been banned as meaningless. Consequently, anyone who asserts something about ultimate totality is held not merely to be talking untruth but to be talking utter non-sense. This direction for investigation is therefore closed. But notice, it has been closed only by a certain *hypothesis*, which has been allowed to pass from the level of explanation to that of exposition, and has thus acquired the unlawful power of prohibiting the very investigation of contrary hypotheses. Though baffled, many philosophers will continue to use the term "ultimate totality" and other terms which have suffered a like fate, but naturally there can be no understanding between them and those who hold that the term is meaningless. The link which would have made a common understanding possible has been removed by a hypothesis, not because the latter has been thought *true*, but because it has been accepted as *logically* true, i.e. as a part of logic. This regrettable outcome would have been avoided if a clear distinction had been made in the first place between theories whose function it is to expose meanings, and theories whose function it is to frame hypotheses for the purpose of explanation.

But the verification principle is objectionable not merely because it masquerades as a logical principle, but also on account of its particular content. For it quite explicitly asks us to identify (confuse) the *meaning* of a proposition with the *method of determining its truth.* Now if anything can be settled by the analytical method, it is the *meaning* of a given term or proposition. But the method of determining the truth of a proposition has reference to it *as an hypothesis,* and accordingly belongs to the other level of enquiry.

A proposition without meaning is merely the words of a sentence, i.e. it is no proposition at all. In such circumstances how can we talk about *its* verification? Only some *meaning* can be true or false, and this is the same as to say that only a *proposition* can be true or false.[1] "The matches are on the mantel-piece" means that the matches are on the mantel-piece, and that they are there is precisely what is rendered false by the fact that they are not there but on the table. To discuss the verification of a proposition therefore presupposes that there is already a meaning to discuss. In particular, to examine whether there is in principle any method of verifying a given proposition presupposes that there is already a meaning in virtue of which we recognize that we are discussing just this proposition and not another. Whether there is such a meaning cannot therefore depend upon the *result* of this examination.

This refutation of the verification principle is of importance because it throws light upon the relation between explanation and exposition, the relation, viz., of presupposition. This relation arises because exposition is the analysis of some subject-matter (e.g. a given argument, theory, proposition or complex concept), which may as a special case be an explanation. Any explanation thereby presupposes the results of correct exposition. The "results" of exposition are, in the case of an explanation, whatever more elementary meanings are obtained by analysing the complex meaning constituting the explanation. It seems to me self-evident that the complex meaning constituting an explanation is first analysable into simple propositions, and that simple propositions are themselves further analysable into elementary meanings fundamentally different in kind from propositions, e.g. actual things and actual simple concepts (or universals). At least the second of these two statements has been strongly denied in recent years by Wittgenstein, Ramsey, and their followers. I could justify it, but I hope that it is not necessary for me to do so here. I hope that I am not perilously involved in this controversy when I claim that explanation and exposition proceed as it were in opposite directions; the former *uses* certain

[1] I have subsequently realized that it is an over-simplification to identify a proposition absolutely with its meaning. But such difference as there is is not such as to upset the present argument.

relatively simple meanings, out of which a complex meaning is constructed for some particular purpose, while the latter re-discovers the simple meanings, whose occurrence (i.e. existence) is a necessary condition for the explanation to be meaningful. To say that the results of exposition are *presupposed* by the explanation is therefore more than to say simply that they are *implied*, for implication would indicate merely a condition for the *truth* of the explanation, not a condition for it to be *meaningful*.

This discussion of presupposition enables us to see how, in view of the self-contradictory character of the verification principle, meaning can be understood as independent of the determination of truth or falsehood. The meaning of a proposition is a peculiar construction out of an existing subject-matter, and although there may be some mystery about this kind of construction we are perfectly familiar with it in its normal form, which is simply the "*asserting* of something *about* the given subject-matter." If a proposition appears to be about a non-existent something, e.g. a unicorn, analysis consists partly in discovering what it really is about, e.g. the *description unicornish*, and the description is taken to be an existing meaning (and not mere words) by the fact that it is treated as *applicable* to things (even if it happens not to apply to anything). Thus at least something must be presupposed as a condition for meaningfulness. Both what a proposition asserts and the things to which it refers can therefore be obtained by exposition. For this purpose we do, indeed, require to know something about the circumstances in which the proposition is asserted (though not the facts which would make it true or false) for without such an understood context no proposition is determinate, i.e. without sufficient data to tell us what things are being referred to and what is being asserted about them, a given sentence has not a given determinate meaning.

Phenomenalism is a doctrine resulting from a special application of the verification principle. Deriving from Berkeley's "Esse est percipi," it asserts that to say that a material object (say Balliol College) exists *means* nothing but a list of hypotheticals, each one to the effect that if anyone (having normal faculties) were to act in a certain way he would have a sensible experience of a certain kind. Now we have several ways of constructing, in thought, a series of terms. We could, for instance, easily construct in imagination a series of images all similar in certain respects to a given image, for instance all triangular. In many simple cases of such a construction, the series can be determined *internally*, by reference to one term which is subsequently *within* the series, as in the above example of a series of images all triangular. But in the case of the attempt to define Balliol College in terms of a series of views *of it*, there is no way at all of determining the series except by reference to the very

object to be defined by the series. The views are not merely *similar* to a given view. If, on walking round "Balliol College" I had a series of visual experiences all merely similar to the first, I would conclude that I was suffering from an hallucination. The views must vary in a specific way, besides being all in a certain sense similar. The exact way in which they must vary, in order to define the object adequately, is constructible and conceivable only by bringing in the object itself as focal point of reference. The definition is therefore circular. Moreover, this argument shows that what is meant by saying that a material object exists is presupposed by what is meant by the list of hypotheticals.

(3) (*a*) *Existence and Things.*

Under this heading I merely re-state the fundamental objection to phenomenalism. The ordinary explanation of an hallucination is that we have certain sense-experiences precisely similar to the sense-experiences which we would expect to have if a certain thing (material object) existed; but that no such thing exists, and that the sense-experiences have therefore to be explained without reference to such a thing as a part-cause of them. Here we are admitting the *contingent fact* that certain sense-experiences can occur independently of the existence of things. But phenomenalism says far more than this; it makes a parallel claim on the level of *meaning*. For it defines what is meant by the existence of a thing in terms of what is meant by saying that certain sense-experiences would occur under certain conditions, i.e. it involves at least the contention that *what is meant by* saying that certain sense-experiences occur is independent of *what is meant by* saying that something exists. That this step from a relation between occurrences to a relation between meanings is arbitrary, and even false, is strongly suggested by the criticism given in the last section, where it was shown that the phenomenalist conclusion as to the meaning of saying that something exists is mistaken. But quite apart from that criticism, the step seems arbitrary in itself, occurring only in consequence of a tacit confusion between the contingent and the logical levels of discourse. It is true that the philosophical question "Do material objects exist?" is of such a nature as to be undecidable by the ordinary (sensible) methods of testing for existence; but this fact renders the question *meaningless* only if phenomenalism be assumed, i.e. only if it be assumed arbitrarily that what *is meant* by speaking about the existence of a material object is definable in terms of what *is meant* by speaking about a series of possible sense-experiences. The question "What does it mean to say that something exists?" can be answered only by giving an exposition, and the result of introducing a theory belonging to the level of explanation can only be confusion.

(*b*) *Causation.*

Confusion reigns here, too, because the two levels of discussion are not distinguished. It is one thing to give an account of the *meaning* of causal connection, and quite another to decide whether instances of causal connection exist in the world, or to propose an explanation of the way in which the idea of causal connection comes to be attributed to things. The former task is logical, the latter speculative or hypothetical.

Hume was on the whole satisfied that his own account of causal connection belonged to the hypothetical level of thinking. He was concerned to trace the origin of the idea, and very seldom spoke as if he supposed himself to be giving its *meaning*. But modern empiricists want far more than this. They want to put the whole Humian theory on the level of logic by offering it as an *analysis* or as a *re-definition* of the idea of causal connection. By this means they at once deprive their opponents of the language ("cause") essential for the expression of the opposite hypothesis, produce an appearance of conformity with common sense, and lend an air of logical certainty to what is only an hypothesis. The regularity view must be recognized for what it is—a view, an hypothesis. It is not an *analysis*.

Dr. Ewing has protested vigorously against the empiricist account of causation.[1] But before the protest can be thoroughly effective a distinction must be drawn between that part of it which can evidently be based upon an analysis of the meaning of causal connection, and that part of it which is simply a counter-hypothesis to the Humian view. After an exposition of the meaning has been given, an empiricist view (confined to the level of hypothesis) would still be possible. The serious criticism of the empiricist view applies to it therefore only in so far as it invades the field of logic, and lays claim to be an exposition of meaning. By taking an hypothesis to be a feature of logical structure, certain lines of investigation are closed, and such is inevitably inimical to all true science.

(*c*) *Identity and Conventionalism.*

Russell's definition of identity ($x = y \,.=.\, (\phi)\,(\phi!\,x \supset \phi!\,y)$ Df)[2] similarly imports into logic something which is justified only as an empirical test (the identity of indiscernibles). That the *meaning* of identity cannot be given by this formula is easily seen from the fact that the symbol "ϕ" occurs twice in the *definiens*, i.e. for every value of ϕ we have an implicit identity in the *definiens*, and the definition is circular. It seeks to define identity in terms of a range of identities. The *effect* of this definition is to deprive logic and

[1] Arist. Soc., 1932–33, *A Defence of Causality.*

[2] *Principia Mathematica*, 2nd edit., p. 168.

philosophy of the language ("identity") needed for investigating the true meaning of identity. Again, therefore, the outcome is to close down certain avenues of possible investigation.

When it is seen that the meaning of identity is independent of the substitution principle (viz. $x = y \,.\supset.\, (\phi)\,(\phi!\,x \supset \phi!\,y)$), conventionalism in logic is seen to be undermined,[1] for here we have a case in which the meaning of a logical constant is certainly not constituted by the logical principle alleged to define it, and must be supposed to be given independently of it. Conventionalism is only another example of an attempt on the part of contingent doctrines to usurp the place of logic. Its explanation of logical necessity occurs at a level of discourse at which explanation as such is out of place, and only exposition is appropriate.

The formalist thesis that logic is fundamentally a set of meaningless marks or sounds is also refuted by the admission that at least one logical constant is not definable in terms of logical principles, for the indefinability of identity signifies that logic is impossible without assuming identity to be independently meaningful.

(*d*) *Reflexive Paradoxes.*

The dominant aim of all those who, to my knowledge, have sought to solve reflexive paradoxes such as "The statement which I am now making is not true," is to *avoid* the paradoxical consequences. To this end the general method of solution has been to devise a language in which certain symbols (such as "$\phi\,(\phi\,x)$") do not occur. This is an amazing situation. For if an analytical method can work anywhere, it is surely in such a situation as this, in which we are presented with a pair of logical arguments which anyone can examine and pull to pieces. Moreover, an analytical method possesses the immense advantage that the results at which it arrives are based upon insight into the relations of the subject-matter, not upon the precarious business of weighing up the pros and the cons of an *ad hoc* hypothesis. In these circumstances, too, an hypothetical method suffers from the grave defect that, if a certain hypothesis is accepted, it is at once accorded a logical status; it takes its place with other logical principles, as the principle underlying the logic of reflexive paradoxes. This has been the destiny of the Theory of Types which, on account of its application to reflexive paradoxes, has been accorded the right to eliminate certain symbols, such as "ultimate totality," from our language. It so happens that such an hypothesis generally limits language to a greater extent than is strictly demanded by the logic of the paradoxes. The result is a phenomenon which we have

[1] Although the definition of identity is conventionalistic in tendency, Russell certainly cannot be classed as a conventionalist, since elsewhere he stresses the fact that non-formal principles are indispensable to logic.

frequently noticed before, viz. certain lines of possible investigation in the field of logic are ruled out by an hypothesis which has been illegitimately introduced into the logical level.

This brief glance at some of the outstanding philosophical problems has shown only too plainly the dire confusion which has resulted from the failure to distinguish the two levels of discourse in the consideration of any given theory. In advancing some theory, it has usually been considered sufficient to throw it indiscriminately into the field along with any other theories pertaining to the same subject, and in general it has occurred to no one to ask the further question, Are we to consider this theory as an exposition of certain meanings, or as an hypothesis to explain certain facts? Just how the theory is to be treated must depend entirely upon the answer to this question. If a philosopher claims to *see* something, it does not make sense to contradict him in terms of an *hypothesis*, though of course others are entitled to consider, in the light of what *they* see, whether his claim is or is not to be accepted.

To this almost universal unconcernedness with the distinction there has been one notable exception, viz. in the admirable work, chiefly due to Professor Moore, of distinguishing carefully between theories about the *meaning* of good, and theories about the grounds of goodness. Apart from this there has been chaos. The major disaster has been the re-definition of, and thence the appropriation of, the key philosophical words such as "cause," "meaning," "knowledge," "existence," "identity," by certain hypotheses; with the result that the field of legitimate philosophical enquiry has been arbitrarily confined within certain limits.

DISCUSSION

THE CONCEPT OF MIND[1]

The Concept of Mind is already recognized as a work of first-rate philosophical importance. It is unnecessary to spend time on commending or summarizing it, and I shall therefore proceed at once to appraisal and criticism.

Superficially Ryle's work reminds one of Locke and Hume. There is the same avoidance of ponderous terminology, and the same plain-man approach. The resemblance, however, is deceptive, for Ryle is primarily concerned with logic, not with psychology, though his view has important psychological implications; and neither Locke nor Hume had much use for fine logical distinctions.

Indeed it seems to me that the work with which the *Concept of Mind* can best be compared is the *Critique of Pure Reason*. I shall dwell on this comparison a little because I find it helps me to distinguish the wood from the trees in Ryle's book; for Kant also aimed at the destruction of a myth. He saw clearly that philosophical progress was being held up by the pseudo-sciences of rational ontology, cosmology and psychology, and he knew just what was wrong with those studies. He demolished them with meticulous patience in the Dialectic, and, although he recognized that the illusion which gave rise to them was of such a kind that human beings could in one sense never quite escape it, he claimed that he had exposed and explained it so that its power to delude and harass philosophers was finally destroyed. He did his job so thoroughly that we now wonder why he made such a fuss about it. "After all," we think, "he need only have pointed out that existence is not a predicate, and that no empirical conclusion can be drawn from purely logical premises. That is all that has to be said, so why the reiteration and complication?"

I believe that in a few years this kind of thing will be said, and for just the same reasons, about Ryle's Ghost in the Machine. The false disjunction of mind and body will be like the ontological argument, and the puzzle will be to understand how anybody ever came to take it seriously. This is not to say that Ryle's annihilation of it is unimportant. It matters a great deal, and there will be argument and discussion about it. The rational sciences did not die of shock when the *Critique* appeared, but they were never the same again. In the form in which Kant attacked them, they just faded away, and in that form they are no longer a trouble to anybody. The doctrine of the semi-detached mind (or soul) will now fade out in the same way, and we shall be better off without it.

But the Dialectic is not the part of the *Critique* which has been most fruitful. Like Ryle's demolition of his ghost, it was and was meant to be destructive. In both cases the question that interests us is "What happens next?" Kant pointed out for the first time that the basis of the rational sciences was a logical blunder. They started by misconstruing sentences like "God exists" and "The Universe has no beginning in time," and were then led to paradoxical or nonsensical conclusions. This is straightforward enough. What is difficult and controversial is Kant's attempt to expound the correct idiom in which to talk about material objects, moral attributes, purposes, and so on. He could not avoid this attempt, nor did he wish to do so. He was not satisfied

[1] *The Concept of Mind*. By Gilbert Ryle, London: Hutchinson's University Library (Senior Series), 1949. Pp. vi + 334, 12/6.

to be elegantly lazy like Hume and take to backgammon. Ryle is in the same position. It is not enough for him to show that the two-world theory with private access to special status events is nonsense. He has to show why it is nonsense, and to develop a view which is not nonsense with which to replace it.

What, then, is Ryle's argument against the two-world view, and what are the developments to which it leads? The keyword is, of course, "type fallacy" or "category mistake," and the line of thought can be traced back to Russell's solution of logical paradoxes. There are some types of statement which are logically inadmissible even though they are grammatically correct. Originally this was a point about formal logic, but it is now employed to clarify the logical grammar of mental occurrence words. The technique is to put down a sentence with blanks in it and to ask how these can be filled without making nonsense. Thus, in the simplest form, "X is patriotic" makes sense if X is replaced by "Mr. Winston Churchill" or "Queen Victoria." It makes sense, too, though it needs re-writing, if the subject is "The Liberal Party" or "The British Council." It makes no sense for "triangularity" or $\sqrt{-1}$.

There is nothing revolutionary about this. It was known about in Cambridge and Vienna in the 1930's, and the application of it to minds and bodies has been thought about too. Karl Marx, for instance, saw clearly enough that a category mistake in this sense was involved both in attempts, like that of Feuerbach, to "reduce" truths about mental operations to physical and biological terms and in the claims of idealists and utopians to make statements about minds refer to a shadow world divorced from physical and biological facts. But this was purely negative, and therefore it led nowhere. Dialectical Materialism is a blind alley because it only goes on teaching us what we ought not to say. It is unhelpful if we want not merely to avoid nonsense but to talk sense. This is what Ryle claims to do, and the essential point of his argument is the distinction between disposition words and occurrence or episode words which, with numerous elaborations and ramifications, may fairly be said to dominate the whole book.

The opening move is simple and innocuous. Sentences like "X is brittle" and "X is patriotic" do not report an episode or collection of episodes. They look like simple categorical statements, but even a superficial inquiry into the way in which they are normally used shows that they have quite a different task to perform. Their job is not to report occurrences but to assert tendencies or propensities; and a propensity is not another occurrence of a peculiar kind, though the categorical form of our sentences suggests that it is. To say that X has a disposition is to say something hypothetically about him (or it). He *would* do so and so in certain specifiable circumstances. The glass *would* shatter (and not buckle) if it were struck by a missile of such and such weight travelling at so many feet per second. The man *would* risk his life in the event of an invasion—and so on.

Destructively this is a powerful weapon against the Ghost in the Machine. Nonsense has been talked because a category mistake has been committed. Disposition words have been misconstrued as occurrence words, and a special place called the Mind has been invented to house the non-existent episodes to which the misconstruction gives rise. "Cognition," "Volition," "Emotion," "Imagination" and other high-sounding words are unpacked and shown to be instances of this logical blunder. This argument seems to me to be clearly correct; but it is not simple, and in the course of it further distinctions emerge which are clearly important, and whose implications I am not sure about. There are three of these which deserve particular mention. They are (1) That between determinate and determinable disposition words, (2) that between

performance words and achievement words, (3) that between genuine hypotheticals and categoricals on the one hand and mongrel-categoricals or semi-hypotheticals on the other.

1. *Determinable disposition words.*

Many mental operation words, especially those concerned with knowing, believing and opining are determinable, not determinate. They do not refer to single, nuclear operations which can be isolated and observed by the epistemologist. There are, indeed, no such operations to be described. We cannot detect occurrences of knowing, deducing and so on either in other people or in ourselves, and to look for or invent them is simply to misunderstand the logical grammar of words like "know" and "believe." They do not stand for isolable activities but for whole ranges of distinct but related performances and achievements. There are plenty of words like this, such as "ruling," "soldiering," and most of the hobbies in *Who's Who*. Indeed, determinate or single-track disposition words are rather rare in ordinary speech. This is important because, until the distinction is made, the construing of mental operation words as dispositional and not episodic is unconvincing if not impossible.

2. *Performance and achievement words.*

Occurrence words do not all report episodes of the same type. "He ran in the race" is a different type of sentence from "He won": "He aimed" from "He hit the target"; "He watched" from "He saw." Some verbs, however, e.g. "observe," are commonly used in both senses. But this logical impossibility of using achievement words to report failures is commonly misconstrued so as to imply the factual impossibility of error in some kinds of cognitive activity.

Both these distinctions play an essential part in the elimination of the two-world myth. They also serve positively to show that mental operation words are far more complicated than traditional theory permits them to be and that sentences in which they occur have always a hypothetical ingredient. This comes out more clearly in the third and most important distinction.

3. *Mongrel-categoricals.*

Disposition words do not stand for additional but peculiar things or episodes. Just as a university is not a ghostly college, and a pair of gloves is not an extra glove, so "X is brave" does not report any act or state additional to his public and observable behaviour. But it does say more than "He did *a* at time t_1 and *b* at time t_2 . . ." It says also, "and he *would* do *c*, etc., under certain conditions." The point is most clearly put in connection with such words as "carefully," "cautiously," etc., and is illustrated by the distinction between merely habitual and deliberate or planned behaviour. Indeed, though Ryle does not explicitly say so, it seems to me that the whole of his account of free will, motives, moods and emotions is dominated by this idea. Roughly, it is that what differentiates human from sub-human behaviour can properly be described only by sentences of this semi-hypothetical type.

What this comes to is (*a*) that intelligent behaviour is always the actualization of a disposition, (*b*) that dispositions are not extra things which cause or give rise to certain kinds of conduct, they *are* the man's tendency to behave in certain specifiable ways. To say "He is a cautious man" is to say *both* that he has done certain observable things *and* that those acts were typical of him. He *would* do other similar things in appropriate circumstances. The statement is therefore both categorical and hypothetical, i.e. a mongrel

categorical. At first sight this seems highly satisfactory. It disposes very neatly of the mind-body dualism and enables us to avoid pseudo-problems about solipsism and the egocentric predicament. The theory that our overt behaviour is somehow caused by occult and uninspectable entities called desires, emotions or volitions (known collectively as our characters) is swept away and we are left with public, observable data, namely, describable actions which are occurrences, and equally describable dispositions which are simply those actions plus a tendency to perform other describable actions in specifiable circumstances.

All the same, I feel two difficulties about it. The first is this. It is essential to Ryle's argument to maintain that disposition and episode words are of different logical types. The basis of his case against the exponents of the two-world theory is that they ignore this point. Hence we want to say (*a*) there are acts which are occurrences and which are correctly described in the categorical idiom (He stole five pounds from his employer yesterday), and (*b*) there are dispositions which are not occurrences or collections of occurrences which are correctly described in hypotheticals (He has never stolen anything yet, but if you leave your money lying about he will probably help himself). But how do we get from these to the semi-hypothetical (*c*) "He is a dishonest man"? Is it just (*a*) + (*b*)? Or do (*a*) and (*b*), on closer examination, themselves turn out to be semi-hypotheticals? Either answer has its drawbacks, but it seems clear that the second has to be chosen.

The second difficulty is to be sure that I have said all that is meant by "X is patriotic" when I have unpacked it in this sort of way. Of course it does not mean that his behaviour is caused by pangs or twinges in the sense in which a man may be caused to upset his glass by a spasm of cramp. But if I were assured that he experienced no feeling or sentiment whatever, should I have no qualms about saying it? How about "A loves B"?

I think the real difficulty is this. To dispose of the Ghost in the Machine we are led to make the distinction between disposition and episode words extremely sharp so as to reveal the category mistake. But when we come to elucidate the difference between "carefully" and "carelessly," and that between human and animal behaviour, this sharp disjunction is an embarrassment. We then want to talk the language of mongrel-categoricals in which it is so much softened that it hardly survives at all. Ryle's own attack on the hypnotism which disjunctions exercise over us is instructive on this point (p. 140).

I do not know what ought to be done about this, but I think the same awkwardness occurs at three points in which Ryle is especially interested, and which he does not seem to me to have elucidated completely.

The first concerns feelings. Ryle agrees, of course, that these are private, and, perhaps for that reason, he is not very interested in them. They are rather contemptuously dismissed as "twitches," "pangs," "spasms," etc. I cannot, indeed, feel your toothache, but I cannot hold your catch either, and to suppose, as many have done, that the incommunicability of feelings is due to some factual obstacle, like trying to telephone over a bad line, is to misunderstand the situation. It is the logic of feeling-words that is contravened by "I feel or might feel your pain." This is true and important, but is it the complete answer? I do not want, any more than Ryle does, to say that moral or aesthetic sentences express emotions; but I think there is something wrong about the challenge "Is your difficulty about inter-communication a logical or a factual one?" I cannot answer it because, except at the rudimentary level of whistling tunes, I am not sure what is the proper idiom to use for describing what goes on. It is easy enough to discriminate between a propensity to

indigestion and an actual attack. But how should I describe my tenth hearing of "The Ring"? I do not think perception recipes will meet the case, but I do not think that the introduction of neat feelings as a supplement is what is wanted either.

This leads to the second point, namely, imaging and perception generally. Here again, in order to establish his position, this time against phenomenalism and sense-datum theory, Ryle has to take a tough line about perception words. There are no neat sense-data, there is imaging but there are no images in private picture galleries, and so on; and again I am sure that this is correct in principle. But again something seems to be left out. It is part of the grammar of "perceiving" and "imagining" that I cannot now imagine that I am writing. I *am* writing. Yet I find the process I describe as "imagining that I am writing" when I am *not* doing so a good deal more elusive than Ryle shows it to be. The distinction between seeing and "seeing" is important and illuminating, but I think there is more than that to it.

Finally, there is the self. As far as it goes, Ryle's analysis is convincing, and I do not see how it can be carried further; yet the *Review of Reviews* doctrine which he offers is somehow incomplete. I want something more than this, but I cannot say what it is. Perhaps if Ryle will explain more fully just what it is that he accepts as brute facts (or in an older language, the Given) I shall understand the situation rather better.

What it comes to in the end is this. Unquestionably Ryle has done a first-class job in applying linguistic technique to epistemology and psychology. He has shown with great force and lucidity that most if not all of the traditional questions about minds and bodies are improper questions to which nothing but nonsensical answers can be given. But I doubt whether some of the disjunctions to which he is committed by his own method will themselves stand up to criticism in the form in which he states them. I have dwelt at some length on occurrence and disposition words, but I am even less confident about the underlying distinction between "logical" and "factual" which is assumed throughout. I know how to set about examining and criticizing the logical grammar of words in ordinary and scientific use; but will it do in the end to say, "There are *both* facts *and* talk about facts"—or is this another category mistake?

T. D. Weldon

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

For the past fifty years English philosophers have been occupying themselves chiefly with questions of logic and the theory of knowledge. This interest was, to begin with, justified on the principle of "first things first," but latterly it has been suggested that logic, in some sense, *is* philosophy, and that what is not, in some sense, logic, is science pursued unscientifically, religion mistranslated into pseudo-rational terms, or moral persuasion disguised as disinterested enquiry. Since, however, those who hold this view do not believe in fixed essences enabling them to get insight into what things *really* are, they cannot claim to show that philosophy *really is* logic, or that its *real function* is to clear up certain types of verbal muddle. What they succeed in doing, apart from shifting discussion to the problems that interest them, is to show that much of the writing of moral philosophers and metaphysicians has been naïve if not nonsensical. (But nonsense has no essence.) If people whom appointment committees and the general public—not yet persuaded to adopt a new definition—persist in calling philosophers, engage in such activities as discussing rationally the moral standards and aims of their society, to refuse them the name is merely to evince disapproval of the way in which they spend their time. It is necessary to say this because of the very great difference in the interests of French philosophers from those of their English contemporaries. In the first place, it has to be admitted that few of the French philosophers have been subjected to the process of logical catharsis which is now usual and proper in English philosophical training. (The French received their treatment during the time of the "Idéologues," but have shown little disposition to return for more.) But it is clear that many French philosophers regard it as one of their functions to examine critically the ideals of their time. They are thus less inclined than are some of their English colleagues to suppose there is a sharp division between philosophy and psychology, or philosophy and sociology. In this respect, I should say, they are less given to belief in "the philosophical essence," and less apt to submit to the role of mute purists sadly preserving their verbal impeccability. In brief, they are much more given to chancing their arm.

The first book I shall mention is the late Simone Weil's *l'Enracinement* (Gallimard, 1949). Mlle Weil was a teacher of philosophy who thought it her duty to live at the material level of an unemployed person and to give away what she earned above this. For considerable periods she was employed as a factory worker. She died in England (where she had joined the Free French) just before the end of the war, leaving behind her the manuscript of this book as well as of others in which she endeavoured to explain her mystical religious faith. It is written in language of extraordinary clarity and simplicity. At times, as when she discusses the need, as she regards it, of controlling the press in the interests of truth, the simplicity merges into naïveté. ("For example, a lover of Ancient Greece, reading in Maritain's last book 'the greatest thinkers of antiquity did not dream of condemning slavery,' would bring Maritain before one of these tribunals. He would bring there the only important text on slavery that has come down to us, that of Aristotle. He would have read to the magistrates the phrase 'some assert that slavery is absolutely contrary to nature and reason.' He would make it clear that there is no reason why we should not regard these people as

among the greatest thinkers of antiquity. The tribunal would blame Maritain for printing, when he could easily have avoided the error, an assertion that constituted a wicked libel against a whole civilization.") But her discussion of the role played by nationalism in organizing contemporary moral aims is most valuable, especially in its emphasis on how the modern state has destroyed many of the smaller societies in which ordinary men have found their happiness. As a result, she thinks, state governments have become objects of resentment to the very populations who feel vicarious pride in their military prowess—she writes of the "attitude de mendiant insolent" of ordinary men towards their governments. Mlle Weil considers that the worship of force that a debased patriotism engenders has even affected natural science, which gets much of its prestige from being regarded as the demonstration of how force and matter govern everything. A more disinterested pursuit of scientific truth, she holds, would show its kinship with aesthetic contemplation and religious insight rather than with the blind power that would overwhelm justice in the end. Detached from the pursuit of power, science would once more become a means of revealing the beauty and divinity of things.

Mlle Weil's book is written in a spirit of simple faith in the New Testament ideal of human brotherhood. M. Jean Grenier, on the other hand, in his *Entretiens sur le bon usage de la liberté* (Gallimard, 1948), writes with extreme sophistication an attack on all ideals, whatever they may be. Intelligent and educated people to-day are, according to M. Grenier, in a position comparable to that of the Australian who, returning to his bungalow after a long holiday, sits on a chair and finds it collapse into dust, touches a wardrobe which straightway evaporates, and when he shakes the door sees the whole house, which had been undermined by termites, dissolve into cloud. It is thus, according to M. Grenier, that the ideals of men crumble in the climate of our time. Some people remain indefinitely hesitating between conflicting aims. Others close their minds to doubts and blindly accept some traditional or revolutionary creed. The existentialists preach an almost equally blind form of irrational activity, which, according to M. Grenier, is romanticism revived. His remedy is not the existentialist "engagement," but the "dégagement" of the Taoists. The wise man, in face of the impasse into which the active pursuit of any ideal must necessarily lead, renounces the active life, embraces the morality of "the lilies of the field," detaches himself from social pressures, opposes interference, whether organized or unorganized, and as for himself, "il faut se laisser aller." The intelligent inactivity which he recommends is, of course, a much more difficult thing than it might at first appear.

Professor Raymond Polin's *du Laid, du Mal, du Faux* (Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), is more concerned than are the previous two books with the sort of problems that interest English moral philosophers to-day—although the idiom is different, and more cosmopolitan. The problem, briefly, is this, There is a tendency, once people have come to think about such concepts as good and bad, or beautiful and ugly, to suppose that there is an order of value running from the very good through the moderately good and the neither-good-nor-bad to the moderately bad and the very bad, and similarly for the beautiful and ugly. Schemes like this have been advocated by a number of philosophers, but M. Polin thinks that the whole conception is radically false. One of his lines of criticism is directed against the conception of the point of indifference or zero value between the positive and negative values. He considers that this is an essential part of the view, but that no meaning can be attached to it. His own view is that there can be no value unless there is positive assessment, so that there can be no indifference,

but only conflict and indecision. (Moore, of course, holds that there are positive goods and positive evils, but it seems to me that there is difficulty in his implied comparison with "nothing at all." According to Moore (roughly), if something is intrinsically good an agent ought to create it rather than nothing at all, and if something is intrinsically bad an agent ought to create nothing at all rather than it. Thus "no universe at all" seems to be a sort of zero point. I would ask whether the existence of A and B, A being intrinsically good to the extent that B is intrinsically bad, and the two together not making up an intrinsically good organic whole, is not better than the existence of "nothing at all." If it is, "nothing at all" cannot play the required role of indifference point, quite apart from the possibility that the existence of moderate evils might be regarded as better than utter non-existence.) To return to M. Polin's arguments, he points out that the valuations we actually make are not merely of more or less along a single scale, but are enormously more complex, and that even within one sphere of valuation such as the moral, it is senseless to try to make quantitative comparisons. This scholarly and well-argued book is the third of a series of books that M. Polin has written about values (the other two are *La Création des Valeurs* (1944) and *La Compréhension des Valeurs* (1945) in which he maintains that values are not entities that exist or subsist, waiting to be discovered, that evaluation is not knowledge, that *judgments* about values necessarily miss their primary character of being created and maintained by men, and that the type of words we use to express these judgments are constantly changing so that they are never able to fulfil even the function of embalming dead valuations. The features of these books that are of particular interest to English students of philosophy are (*a*) the emphasis on the different *types* of value experience, (*b*) the emphasis on the different standards adopted within each type, and (*c*) the suggestion that those who are aware of the human origin of the values they create may be able to form a more satisfactory society than is possible to those who are in subjection to rules regarded as external and absolute. There is a concreteness about M. Polin's method of argument which differentiates it from the abstract trivialities of some writers on ethics.

There are three other books I should like to mention, although I cannot give them the attention that is their due. In the first place, I think a good many people in this country would be interested in M. Jules Monnerot's *Sociologie du Communisme* (Gallimard, 1949). This book is primarily about communism as it is to-day, how it has become what it is, and how it differs from the systems of thought and action that prevail in the West. Revolutionaries in the West have been to some extent romantic members of our society ("something between a hero and an actor," suggests M. Monnerot), but the leaders of the Russian revolution were men who developed an entirely new mode of life as the result of being so thoroughly excluded from the Tsarist society. A particularly interesting feature of the book, apart from the discussion of the Russian version of the dialectical method, is the attempt to state fully what is involved in the description of communism as a "secular religion." The second book to be thus briefly mentioned is Professor Pierre Mesnard's *Le Vrai Visage de Kierkegaard* (Beauchesne et ses Fils, 1948). This is to be recommended to anyone wishing to find out about Kierkegaard without being overcome by the gushes of emotional ballyhoo that writers about this extraordinary man are so apt to emit. This book is illuminating in its account of Kierkegaard the man, careful and intelligent in its account of his teaching, and useful in providing an explanatory bibliography of his works and of works about him. Finally, mention must be made of M. Gaston Grua's edition in two volumes (*G. W. Leibniz. Textes Inédits d'après les*

Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Provinciale de Hanovre. Presses Universitaires de France, 1948) of hitherto unpublished writings of Leibniz. These are divided into the following groups: faith and reason; visionaries and quietists (notes on Barclay, Penn, Boehme, and other "enthusiasts"); the Church; the supernatural end and grace; liberty and the best; the soul and the world (with a long psychological paper—de affectibus—dated 1679); wisdom and happiness; justice; juridical plans; juridical problems. These writings are collected from the manuscripts in the library at Hanover which were to have appeared in the Prussian Academy of Sciences' edition of Leibniz that was interrupted by the war. M. Grua does not think they will lead to any important changes in the estimates of Leibniz's thought that have been formed in the last thirty years. He does think they show that Leibniz was not "two-faced," with an esoteric doctrine of his own, as has been suggested. These papers illustrate not only the vast extent of Leibniz's reading, but also the care with which he took notes from what he read and made summaries of it. Since M. Grua has arranged the papers in each group in chronological order, has indicated the already published writings of Leibniz to which they relate, and has provided many brief notes and an index, students of Leibniz and of his times will find this book of considerable value, and will look forward to M. Grua's forthcoming edition of the Theodicy and forthcoming book on Leibniz's doctrine of justice.

H. B. Acton.

ERRATUM

Philosophy in Italy (Philosophy, Vol. XXV, No. 93). The reference to Hobbes on p. 173, *De Corpore, I,* 3, should be *De hom.*, 10.

NEW BOOKS

Matter, Mind, and Meaning. By W. Whately Carington. With a preface by Professor H. H. Price. (Methuen. Pp. xx + 257.)

The death, on March 2nd, 1947, of Mr. Whately Carington, was a severe loss to the S.P.R., of which he had been a most active member for some thirty years, and a heavy blow to the young and struggling science of psychical research, to which he had made very valuable contributions, both theoretical and practical. Up to the last few months of his life, when he became incapacitated through illness, he was engaged in writing a book on philosophy, entitled *Matter, Mind, and Meaning*, to which he attached great importance. At the time when further work on it had ceased to be possible he had completed about two-thirds of it. After his death the manuscript passed into the hands of Professor H. H. Price, who has prepared it for the press and provided a most interesting preface and occasional footnotes.

Professor Price says that the first five chapters were almost complete in their final form. These are entitled "Outline of the Discussion," "The Failure of Metaphysics," "Meaning," "Matter," and "Mind." The main body of the book now ends with the sixth chapter, entitled "Mind and Matter." Of this there existed only two very brief alternative versions, which Professor Price has tried to conflate. The editor has added, from papers left by the author, three Appendices, entitled "Don't Shoot the Philosophers—yet!," "Life after Death, the need for an Inversion of Thought," and "Does Tomorrow Exist?"

It should be remembered that Whately Carington had published a few years earlier a very interesting book entitled *Telepathy*, in which he put forward, and tried to support by experimental evidence, what might be called the "Association Theory" of telepathy. The theory may be stated as follows. The ordinary account of revival of an associated idea is this. If the ideas of X and of Y have become associated in the mind of *M*, then, if an idea of X or of something like X should recur in *M*, there is a tendency for an idea of Y or of something like Y to recur in *M*. Whately Carington's proposed extension is this. If the ideas of X and Y have become associated in the mind of *M*, then, if an idea of X or of something like X should occur in *any other mind N*, there is a tendency for an idea of Y or of something like Y to occur in *N*. To put it shortly, association between two ideas in *any* one mind tends to bring about the occurrence of one of them in *any* mind in which the other occurs. The theory of mind which is proposed in the present book makes this supposition of the widespread effects of an association of ideas in any one mind plausible instead of paradoxical.

Whately Carington's final philosophical position is a form of neutral monism. Minds and matter consist of the same kind of constituents, viz. sensa (extra-somatic and intra-somatic) and images, arranged in characteristically different ways. His explicit ground for this view is that it is necessitated by the doctrine, which he accepts and insists upon, that every intelligible sentence which is not tautologous must be in principle verifiable or refutable by sensation or introspection.

I do not think that Whately Carington's theory of neutral monism, or the positivistic account of meaning and the consequent scornful rejection of "metaphysics" which lead up to it, are of any great interest or importance as original contributions to philosophy. He fully admits his indebtedness to

Earl Russell in regard to the former, and to Messrs. Ogden and Richards and Professor Ayer in regard to the latter. The main value which I can ascribe to this part of the book is as a lively popular introduction to the weightier and more technical work of these writers.

What gives to this book such interest and originality as it possesses is the fact that Whately Carington had an expert knowledge of psychical research, and recognized that it has established results which philosophy can ignore only at its peril; whilst Earl Russell and Professor Ayer (in common with the vast majority of western philosophers) have never shown the least sign of interest in, or acquaintance with, the results, nor realized that they constitute a challenge to philosophers. Whately Carington tries to show that the occurrence of telepathy and clairvoyance can be fitted fairly easily into a neutral monist theory of matter and mind; and he maintains that their existence presents extreme difficulties to other theories. It is to be presumed that he intended also to show that well attested paranormal *physical* phenomena, both sporadic and experimental, fit easily into the neutral monist picture. This, as Professor Price points out, he did not live to accomplish. Price himself makes two very bold and interesting alternative suggestions in his prefatory essay. Indeed I must confess that I found the preface and the notes rather more interesting than the book.

In conclusion I would make the following comments. (1) There is a great deal of talk in the book about "consciousness," in the abstract, and we are told that whenever two or more *cognita* are interconnected there is "consciousness." This leaves me completely unilluminated. I naturally ask: Consciousness *by whom* and *of what*? Suppose, e.g. that a number of visual sensa form a single visual field, as happens, e.g. if I look up at a blue sky with white clouds floating about. No one using words in their ordinary senses would say that the white-looking sensa are "aware of" or "conscious of" each other or of the blue-looking sensa; nor would he say that the blue-looking sensa are "aware of" or "conscious of" the white-looking ones. What could intelligibly be said is that *I* am conscious of the field containing all these sensa, and that *I* discriminate the white ones from the blue background. I am not saying that this statement involves a "Pure Ego" or anything that Whately Carington might object to as "metaphysical." I am saying that his own vague and abstract statements about "consciousness" seem to lead to such absurdities as I have indicated above.

(2) Whately Carington writes as if there were no alternatives between neutral monism and a Pure Ego theory of the mind, which he rejects as meaningless. Even Professor Price writes as if the Pure Ego theory and the Cartesian theory of mind and body were current, and were responsible for the fact that most philosophers ignore or reject the well established results of psychical research. But surely one might hold some form of "bundle theory" of the mind without being committed to neutral monism; surely very few contemporary philosophers do in fact hold the Pure Ego theory; and surely most philosophers are aware (though perhaps they do not always lay enough stress upon) the facts of multiple and alternating personality.

(3) Even if one did hold a Pure Ego theory of the mind, it would still be a quite contingent fact that each human body has one and only one mind animating it, and that the mind which animates a human body can *directly* affect only the brain and nervous system of *that* body. Conversely, if one held a bundle-theory or even a neutral monist theory of the mind, the facts which have led to the view that each mind can directly affect only the brain and nervous system of *a certain one* correlated organism would be what they now are. Thus, it is not clear to me that a Pure Ego theory of the mind should

make one *specially* disinclined to accept evidence for telekinesis, or that a neutral monist theory should make one *more* inclined to accept it.

I have noticed a large number of misprints in the book. P. 107, l. 12, omit *as*; p. 108, last line but one, for *on* read *of*; p. 112, last line but two, for *that* read *than*; p. 126, l. 21, for *sufferent* read *suffered*; p. 184, eighth line from the bottom, for *exclude* read (I think) *include*; p. 200, Note 1, l. 3, for *untra* read *ultra*; p. 202, line seven from bottom, for *if* read *of*; p. 225, Note 1, l. 5, for *apents* read *agents*. There are probably other misprints which I have overlooked.

C. D. Broad.

F. H. Bradley. By W. F. Lofthouse. (Philosophers' Library, No. 1. Epworth Press. 1949. Pp. viii + 273. Price 10s. 6d.)

Even those who are unsympathetic to Bradley's positive doctrines will grant that he was one of the most powerful, acute and effective critics in the history of English philosophy. If he is little read to-day by the younger generation of philosophers, it is safe to say that targets of his criticism, like Bain and Mansel, are read more seldom still. Perhaps it is the very excellence of his distinctive criticism which has stood in the way of the acceptance, or even the study, of his more constructive work. Too many readers of *Appearance and Reality* have stopped half-way; they have allowed themselves to be convinced by a dialectic which reduces a rose to a cluster of qualities and relations, or the self to "a bundle of discrepancies," or the essence of goodness to approbation, and then have relapsed into a positivism which Bradley is unfortunately no longer here to destroy.

Dr. Lofthouse is not one of these. He was an undergraduate when *Appearance and Reality* was published; it seems safe to guess that he fell in love with it at once and that what he now gives us is the fruit of a life-time's reflection on all that Bradley ever published. He has undertaken the hard task of summarizing Bradley's main contentions and criticizing them for the benefit of those "who will probably care more about their hold on their faith than about any philosophical system." Although a cordial welcome must be given to a book which attempts to do justice to Bradley and to bring him out of undeserved neglect, it must be doubtful if a summary of this kind can be readily intelligible to those unacquainted with the original works or if it can adequately convey the flavour of Bradley's argument in all its richness and ingenuity.

Like other admirers of Bradley, Dr. Lofthouse is dissatisfied with the account of the Absolute in which *Appearance and Reality* culminates; and he tries to show that Bradley's argument ought to have led him to Christian theism. Is this not to be guilty of the common fault of fathering our own convictions on our favourite authors? It is one thing to argue that some of Bradley's doctrines can be used as a philosophical framework for Christian theology; quite another to claim that Bradley ought to have occupied ground which he specifically abandoned.

T. M. Knox.

Democracy and the Quaker Method. By F. E. Pollard, Beatrice E. Pollard and R. S. W. Pollard. (London: The Barnesdale Press. Pp. 160. Price 8s. 6d.)

The authors of this unpretentious study are members of the Society of Friends, and their theme is the significance for political theory and practice

of the Quaker method of arriving at corporate decisions. As is well known, the Friends do not in their "business meetings" have recourse to voting, believing that if the meeting is animated by the right spirit and by a real will to agreement the device of vote-taking is neither necessary nor helpful. It emphasizes differences instead of overcoming them. If the right spirit is *not* present then the attempt must be made to attain it, or the deliberations will be fruitless. Hence the insistence from the earliest days of the Society that there must be no radical severance between the temper of worship and the temper of deliberation, so that the meeting may at need reinforce its will for agreement and enlighten its discernment for wise decision by admitting a devotional pause in which the common thought may be steadied and lifted on to a higher plane.

The authors describe and discuss interestingly examples of the success, and the occasional failure, of this method from Quaker records up to very recent times, and draw suggestive comparisons with examples of it in other types of deliberative bodies, British and foreign. Much that they note is certainly relevant far beyond the confines of the Society of Friends. Perhaps they have not sufficiently realized how inevitably the Quaker method may have to be modified in the *political* field. There, decisions of vital practical moment may *have* to be reached in emergencies and carried out against the opposition of a recalcitrant minority, for there is often no time for the integrative process to build up the unified will. Those who rightly claim that recourse to a majority decision is often a sign of impatience and distrust of the persuasive power of a common "concern" do not always recognize that the refusal to take or implement a decision is itself a decision which may have far-reaching practical consequences. Politics has to do with just these problems. None the less it is well to be reminded, and never more opportune than to-day, how far more satisfactory it may be to achieve a really united decision by which both majority coercion and minority obstruction will have been transcended. The history of the Society of Friends is certainly peculiarly rich in examples of this achievement.

J. W. Harvey.

The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Hitherto Unpublished. Edited by Kathleen Coburn. (London: The Pilot Press, Ltd. Pp. 480. Price 25s.)

At the end of his *Autobiography* John Stuart Mill tells us that the two men whose influence he had sought to reconcile in his own thinking were Bentham and Coleridge; and in the essay on Coleridge which Mill contributed to the *London and Westminster Review* (an essay which deserves to be better known) he dwells at some length on the powerful influence which the poet had had on his own intellectual development. The outcome of his attempt to reconcile two thinkers so different as Bentham and Coleridge could only have one conclusion; one had necessarily to give way to the other and it is now a matter of history that Mill finally decided in favour of Bentham. This is interesting not simply for the light it throws on Mill's own life, but as a demonstration of the fact that to a thinker of Mill's calibre Coleridge's thought represented a very real alternative to the empiricism he in fact embraced.

Even to-day we are apt to overlook the great importance that Coleridge had for the thinkers of the early nineteenth century. Only in comparatively recent years have we begun to appreciate his significance in the fields of theology, politics, psychology, and metaphysics, as well as in the domain of literature and aesthetics where his authority has been more readily recognized. To a

great extent this has been because he left little in the way of systematic writings; his influence amongst his contemporaries depending so much on personal association and acquaintance. For this reason any efforts to make available Coleridge's unpublished work must be welcome and Miss Coburn in editing the series of philosophical lectures he gave in 1818–19 deserves our gratitude.

Miss Coburn's editorial task has been considerable, for the establishing of a reliable text for these lectures has been difficult and at times well nigh impossible. In the winter of 1818–19 Coleridge delivered a course of public lectures on the history of philosophy at the *Crown and Anchor* in the Strand, the course running parallel, part of the time, with another but shorter course he gave on Shakespeare. Coleridge had intended to publish the Philosophical Lectures himself, as an Introduction to his *magnum opus* in philosophy, but this was only one of many similar intentions that remained unfulfilled: the *magnum opus* was never written and the Lectures remained only in note form. The text that Miss Coburn gives us is based chiefly upon the transcription of shorthand notes made for Coleridge's friend Hookham Frere by a professional shorthand writer who attended the lectures. Miss Coburn has been able to check these notes against Coleridge's own MS. notes which he prepared for the lectures, but one can see that the textual problem must have been formidable, for not only was the shorthand writer often baffled by his material but the lecturer himself often abandoned his brief MS. to speak extemporarily. Yet the book that we have is generally readable and the editor has had a scholarly respect for the text, refraining from putting her own interpretation on a doubtful passage without explaining the emendation in a footnote.

It is doubtful whether the Lectures will add much to Coleridge's reputation as a philosopher. Let it be added at once, however, that this remark is not made in a derogatory spirit. After all, these were Lectures given to an audience of whom Coleridge himself said that their "acquaintance with the history of philosophy would commence with their attendance on the Course"; an audience who had braved the rigours of a winter evening to attend a discourse that had to hold the attention and provide a measure of entertainment as well as instruction. They were lectures which deliberately chose as their subject the whole history of philosophy from pre-Socratic times to the French Revolution and, therefore, were unable to give much detailed attention to particular philosophers. What Professor of philosophy to-day would like his reputation to rest upon the transcription of shorthand notes taken at an extension course on the history of philosophy? Moreover, the mere reader lacks the advantage given to the original auditors of hearing Coleridge speak; an experience that must have been memorable if we call to mind Hazlitt's earlier description of the poet:

> "He talked on for ever; and you wished him to talk on for ever. His thoughts did not seem to come with labour and effort; but as if borne on the gusts of genius, and as if the wings of his imagination lifted him from off his feet. His voice rolled on the ear like the pealing organ, and its sound alone was the music of thought. His mind was clothed with wings; and raised on them, he lifted philosophy to heaven."

If there remained but a fraction of this eloquence, no wonder that the shorthand writer sometimes neglected his note-taking.

Yet even if it were wrong to regard these Lectures as a studied work by which Coleridge's reputation as a philosopher should stand or fall, they do nothing to detract from his status. More than anything, perhaps, they confirm his extraordinarily wide reading and his sympathy with views he did

not share. There is disappointingly little in them on the philosophy of Plato and Kant who were his undoubted masters. His purpose was to describe vast movements of thought, to discern currents upon the large surface of ideas rather than to concentrate on individual thinkers; his intention was explanatory and not critical. Surprisingly enough it is in dealing with those whose views differ most widely from his own that we get the greatest penetration of his mind. The lecture on Scholastic philosophy is most interesting: Coleridge displays for his time and generation an unusual knowledge and, even more, an unusual sympathy with the medieval thinkers. He realizes that their interest in logic and language was, at the very least, a necessary discipline for philosophy at that stage. He is, of course, on the side of the Realists in their dispute with the Nominalists, but this does not prevent his seeing that Occam facilitated the subsequent development of scientific thought. The truth is that Coleridge had a shrewd insight into the problems of scientific thinking—he was well abreast of the issues involved in the vitalist-mechanist controversy of his own day—and he could not but admire such men as Occam and Bacon. He perhaps divided in too facile a manner the whole of philosophy into the Platonic tradition, which took account, according to him, of artistic experience, and the Aristotelian tradition, which took account of scientific thinking; but was he not right in demanding that the relationship between science and contemporary empiricism should be much more rigorously scrutinized?

These Lectures do not give us, what we should have so much liked, the record of Coleridge's original and critical thinking, but they present an interesting picture of a generous and acute mind ranging over the history of philosophy and enlivening it from time to time with illuminating *obiter dicta*. Furthermore, they will interest not only students of Coleridge, but all who wish to have light thrown on the intellectual scene at the beginning of the last century.

R. L. Brett.

Patriarcha and other Political Works. By Sir Robert Filmer. Edited by Peter Laslett. (Oxford: Blackwell's Political Texts. 1949. Price 12s. 6d.)

Blackwell's Political Texts aim, in general, at reprinting, with a suitable introduction and perhaps some notes, some of the more notable political writings. But on this occasion something further has been added—an edition of a seventeenth-century English writer which gives for the first time a satisfactory and reliable text. It is well known that Filmer's *Patriarcha* was not printed until many years after it was written, but that it had circulated in a number of manuscript copies among Filmer's acquaintance. It was printed on three occasions in the late seventeenth century; the first two editions (in 1680) deriving from corrupt and imperfect manuscripts, and the third (1685) less corrupt but far from satisfactory. The only other edition was that of 1884 in which the editor reproduced one of the editions of 1680. Mr. Laslett, however, was fortunate enough to have discovered in the Filmer family papers a manuscript (now in the Cambridge University Library) which gave a far more authentic text than had yet been published: it is this text which is printed here, with the useful addition, at the foot of the page, of the references which Filmer omitted to give for some of his quotations. It is an admirable and important piece of work, and Mr. Laslett is to be congratulated both on his good luck and on the use he has made of it. The other political writings of Filmer which are reprinted presented no such textual problems, but since most of them are available only in seventeenth-century editions, it is valuable to have them here.

If this were all, Mr. Laslett would have put us deeply in his debt; but it is not all. In some forty pages of introduction he has given us the most intelligent account of Filmer and his ideas that has yet appeared. There is a brief account of the results of his considerable researches into the life of Filmer, which is followed by an admirably concise statement of the argument of *Patriarcha* and its place in the political controversies of the seventeenth century. But the most notable part of the introduction is that in which Mr. Laslett deals with the place and significance of Patriarchalism generally in seventeenth-century thinking. Nobody (least of all Mr. Laslett) will contend that Filmer was a powerful and impressive abstract thinker. But in this introduction he is given his correct and not insignificant place as "the codifier of conscious and unconscious prejudice" and as an opponent of the way things were going in his day whose archaic method of argument concealed something which we, even more than his contemporaries, can understand to be worth considering.

MICHAEL OAKESHOTT.

The Life of Reason: Hobbes, Locke, Bolingbroke. By D. G. JAMES. (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1949. Pp. xiii + 272. Price 18s.)

This is the first of four volumes on "The English Augustans," that is, English literature of the Age of Reason, which Professor James takes to extend from 1650 to 1780, from Hobbes's *Leviathan* to Johnson's *Lives of the Poets*. The present volume discusses the primary philosophical influences, in Hobbes, Locke and Bolingbroke, and the poetry of the period will be examined later. (We may, however, expect further philosophical discussion in the third and fourth volumes, which are evidently to take in Berkeley, Butler and Hume as well as poets and critics.) That Professors of English literature can write attractive philosophy we know from Macneile Dixon's Gifford Lectures. Professor James's philosophic interests in *The Life of Reason* are narrower, but they are strictly philosophic. His book is not just a sketch of the philosophic background for students of literature, but is of interest to philosophers both for its interpretation (at any rate of Locke) and for the author's own view of the role of imagination in knowledge and aesthetic experience.

Hobbes is presented as an inconsistent combination of rationalist and materialist, rationalist because he regards geometry as the key to discovery. Before he became a philosopher Hobbes had a genuine interest in history and poetry, but once "rationalism" had taken hold of him he equated imagination with fancy and confined knowledge to science, the tracing of causes and effects. The matter and motion of physics underlie mental, moral and civil philosophy, and because mechanics uses geometry this implies, according to Professor James, that geometrical reasoning is for Hobbes the pattern of all inquiry. His is "the proud mind," which exalts the capacity of human reason to understand and control the world. Locke is "the humble heart," who believes in the mediocrity of man's estate. Like Pascal, he seeks a golden mean in determining the boundaries of human reason, and his judicious mixture of empiricism and rationalism includes, as its chief ingredient on Professor James's interpretation, the piety of religious faith. The chief purpose of Locke's philosophy is "to supply philosophical ground for religious assent. We have heard so much of Locke the empiricist, and of Locke the rationalist, that we have overlooked the most important Locke of all, the philosopher of assent." But he was false to himself in two particulars. Instead of making belief in God a matter of assent, he attempted "out of a certain timidity" a rational demonstration of divine existence; and in the influential chapter *Of*

Enthusiasm, added in the fourth edition of the *Essay*, Locke "loses his nerve," upsets the nice balance of reason and assent that expresses his true self, and gives a handle to Deism (which Professor James finds odious). Here Bolingbroke comes in. His inclusion with two great philosophers obviously requires explanation. As a philosopher he is, in all but his brilliant style, merely a third-rate follower of Locke; where he deviates from Locke (on general ideas), he is wildly wrong. But he shows "in what form Locke's *Essay* and *Reasonableness of Christianity* passed into the mind of the succeeding age." And since he was the stimulant of Pope's philosophical poetry his views have a special interest for the study of that. Whereas Locke's empiricism was shot through with humble piety, Bolingbroke is again the proud mind but without Hobbes's rationalism, without any real effort or desire to think. Fired throughout by prejudice and irrational enthusiasm against the enthusiasts, he belabours philosophers (especially Platonists), historical researchers, and anthropomorphic theologians, and is in his turn belaboured by Professor James.

All three of the writers discussed belittle the imagination, and have small use for poetry and history except as moral agencies. This, Professor James considers, is as much due to defects of epistemological theory as to temperament. In his own view, imagination is the link between sense and understanding, and so is the beginning of knowledge. Impressions of sense become ideas only when prehended by imagination as symbols. Symbol is the fusion of image with fact, so as to produce an idea. It is found in its pure form in aesthetic experience (or at least in poetry, for we are not given any clear indication of how this view would be extended to all the arts), but perception too, the grasping of impressions as ideas, cannot take place without it. The tension between imaginative symbol and intellectual concept gives the clue to the problem of universals as being (if I understand aright a rather difficult section) both in particulars and separate from them. The role of imagination is no less in religion than in art, "for poetry and religion are never far away from each other." But since imagination is basic to understanding, imaginative experience (including the aesthetic and the religious) is part of the life of reason, and this is what the Augustan philosophers and poets failed to see.

Labels are notoriously slippery things to handle. "Rationalism" in the history of philosophy is usually opposed to empiricism, and is regarded as a sign of "tender-mindedness" (which to positivistic empiricists seems to be synonymous with softening of the brain). "Rationalism" in the sphere of religion is opposed to faith, and here it is very much a mark of "tough-mindedness." Now to call Hobbes a thoroughgoing rationalist is sensible enough if we think of rationalism as opposed to faith, of "the proud mind" as opposed to "the humble heart." And this opposition seems to be the one with which Professor James is fundamentally concerned. Yet, when he comes to Locke and Bolingbroke, he talks of rationalism as opposed to empiricism, and holds that Bolingbroke carried the empiricist element in Locke to a positivistic extreme. But if we are to speak of "rationalism" in this sense, Hobbes was scarcely more a rationalist, and certainly no less an empiricist, than Locke. To compare him in his "rationalism" with Descartes is extremely odd. Hobbes's empiricism is nowhere acknowledged (or at least given that label) in this book. Even his reiteration of the classical dogma of empiricism "whatsoever . . . we conceive has been perceived first by sense" is quoted as an example solely of his materialism. Perhaps the neglect of Hobbes's ethical and political philosophy is in part responsible for the curious insistence that he is throughout a geometrical rationalist. Professor James thinks that the theory of perception and knowledge is the branch of philosophy most germane to aesthetics, and he is of course fully entitled to pursue that line of approach, which does

indeed lead to his own very stimulating theory of imagination and symbolism. But Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, all following Hobbes's empiricism and naturalism (however much they opposed his egoistic psychology), thought that aesthetics is closely linked with moral philosophy. At any rate, it is surely unfair to Hobbes to give an account of his philosophy that deliberately omits his theory of ethics and politics. And I suspect that it may be unfair to the discussion of Augustan literature which is to follow, for Hobbes's views on ethics, and the twofold reaction which they inspired, are by no means without influence on eighteenth-century literature.

Professor James is, understandably enough, antipathetic to Hobbes and Bolingbroke. Himself a man of piety, he finds Hobbes's pride "obnoxious," and though he admits Hobbes's intellectual stature he does not, in my judgment, do it sufficient justice. As for Bolingbroke, if he was to be introduced, with appropriate apology and explanation, among the philosophers, might he not have been let down a little more lightly and treated with a brevity suitable to his light weight as a philosopher? Professor James's chapter on Bolingbroke has something of the sledge-hammer quality exhibited in Bolingbroke's own attacks on Platonism (which, after all, is a tough sort of nut). But with Locke it is a very different story. Here Professor James finds a man after his own heart, save for Locke's lack of interest in poetry. For Professor James too, "our station in the universe is one of mediocrity" and piety the key to understanding. Whether Locke is primarily "the philosopher of assent" may be debatable, but we are given good grounds for debate. And it is Locke's theory of knowledge that stimulates the elaboration of Professor James's own theory. In the course of explaining his view of the workings of imaginative symbolism, Professor James gives us some excellent literary criticism, using mainly Shakespearean examples. This, and the theory of symbolism which it illustrates, alone make the book well worth reading. The discussion of Locke's theory of knowledge, and the general thesis on the shortcomings of Augustan philosophy and poetry, are highly interesting and provocative.

There is rather a large number of misprints. I have noted the following: p. 43, l.19; p. 45, l.22; p. 110, l.26; p. 113, l.24; p. 120, l.14; p. 147, l.19; p. 189, l.25; p. 232, l.10; p. 241, last line. One or two syntactical slips also remain uncorrected: on p. 20, l.30, "the one hand" should, I think, be "the other hand"; and on p. 212, ls.19–20, there is a double negative that strictly reverses the meaning intended.

D. Daiches Raphael.

Philosophy and Common Sense.—The Inaugural Lecture by W. J. H. Sprott, M.A., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Nottingham.

Philosophy is one of the industries the operatives in which live in a certain danger of working themselves out of their job. There are some people who now say that the chief duty of a teacher of philosophy is to persuade his pupils that there are no philosophical problems. The argument is, roughly, as follows. All significant statements are either tautologies or records of observed fact. The tautologies are the affair of mathematicians or the lexicographers: records of observed fact may be left to the empirical sciences and the reporters of the press. There is accordingly nothing left for the philosopher to do.

With views such as these in the air special interest attaches to the inaugural lecture of a new professor of Philosophy. Here, at least, is his opportunity to say what he takes his job to be. Mr. Sprott is especially well qualified to face the situation with philosophical detachment; since if *he* worked himself out of his job many others await him as an expert in the fields of psychology or sociology. But he is obviously unperturbed for other reasons as well.

In presenting his subject (to the lay audience for which the lecture was intended) he makes effective use of a very pleasant conceit—the idea of a conducted tour through a philosophical academy. Significantly, he does not call it an "academy," since he has no use whatever for anything pretentious. For him it is the "Philosophy Block."

In point of fact it is obvious that the building in question is a converted Victorian house. It has some very large rooms, a number of little ones, a conservatory and a lot of corridors and passages. We are first taken to a room on the door of which "in rather faint old lettering is the word "Epistemology," but written above it in bright new letters is the inscription "Logical Analysis." Our guide might have told us (but did not) that the room itself has been completely refurnished. Previously it had been equipped, as had the whole house, with large and snugly upholstered arm-chairs into which the occupants sank deeper and deeper as their thoughts became more and more profound. Now they sit at tables resembling scientific benches, but devoid of apparatus; and they sit on very hard stools. Properly enough, Professor Sprott ignores these material details since he has so much to say about the vigorous thought that goes on in this room. It is occupied by the disciples of Bertrand Russell, and of Carnap. One of the prominent figures in the room is Professor Ayer, engaged as is his wont, in calling what is nonsense by its proper name.

We pass on to the next department, meeting some interesting personalities on the way. The details of these meetings, as in all symbolic dreams, are charged with high significance. We first meet Dr. Joad "who is not going to accompany us but is going a different way." (He apparently has no room of his own, but roams the corridors seeking a room which contains a pulpit.) We next meet Professor Broad, who *is* going our way. He seems to have tired of the company in the room we have come from and "we follow him" into the department of metaphysics. "Picture two rooms and a conservatory. The first room is completely empty, save for a large picture of Hegel." We are then told what used to happen there. The adjoining room to which we proceed is that of the "scientific metaphysicians." That is the room that Broad was making for, and it was once the scene of a rather acid dispute between Sir Arthur Eddington and Professor Susan Stebbing.

Our tour has been consistently instructive, but it is when we come to the conservatory that the real fun begins. The conservatory contains "a cluster of metaphysicians of a very different calibre. They are the visionaries, the prophets who preach a Philosophy of Life. The temperature is raised, the atmosphere is heavy and orchidaceous."

It is here that Professor Sprott's genius for interpretation is most charmingly displayed. He understands orchids because he is both a scientific botanist and a connoisseur. He cannot stand the pretentious, but otherwise his sympathies and his understanding have no limits. One might be tempted to say that he is too sympathetic a man, too good a man, to be a good philosopher. Good philosophers sting, but the gland behind Mr. Sprott's barb secretes only balm. And yet, to say this would not be quite true. He may be kind and good, but he is not too good to live. His comments may not sting, but they can hardly fail to make his victims tingle. The spice of naughtiness is there in the right proportions, and he clearly enjoys an impish pleasure when he pricks a very big bubble with a very small pin. Sometimes the pin is so small as to be invisible. Nothing is said: the effect is produced by the context. It is in the conservatory that Pascal is quoted: "When I consider the tiny span of my life, which is swallowed up in the eternity which precedes and follows it, when I consider the tiny space that I occupy and can even see, lost as I am in the infinite immensity of Space which I know nothing about and which knows

nothing about me, I am terrified and marvel to find myself here rather than there, for there is no reason at all why 'here' rather than 'there' or 'now' rather than 'then.' "

On this Professor Sprott comments, with admirable restraint and admirable delicacy, simply as follows: "It is a small step to the view of Sartre and Camus that life is fundamentally 'absurd.' " Had Professor Sprott been Professor Ayer, had he been even the plain man who refuses to work himself up into a state about the obvious, he would have said: "Of course, if you make absurd statements in describing the world, no wonder life appears to you to be absurd. If you are disposed to marvel at and be terrified by the fact that you are in one place rather than another, you must I fear accept the consequences of your temperament. I can't, I fear, say anything to help you."

He does not say any of these things, because such things are for him *both* bubbles to be gently pricked *and* the orchids of philosophy. Above all, he seems to say, whether they be bubbles or whether they be orchids, we must try to understand them. We must try to understand what people who say things like this are trying to say. In the endeavour to understand there are times, Professor Sprott says, at which clarity vanishes and a thick fog descends. But, he says, let us persist. And we can be sure that if there is something to find in the fog he will surely find it.

We must not loiter in the conservatory. There is still the Department of Ethics. The judgments made in this department, as the author remarks, are very odd, but he is not prepared to agree that they are tautologies, nor that they are empirical, nor that they are mere expressions of feeling. Here, at least, is a job of work big enough to keep a philosopher busy for some considerable time—to bring some consistent order into the ethical judgments we are all prepared to make.

The address ends, with some judicious observations on the function of philosophy in correcting over-specialization, upon its function in the clarification of thought and upon its function in the pursuit of truth. "The pursuit of Truth" is the theme of Professor Sprott's measured and restrained peroration:

"Ah, you murmur to one another, he is going to end on a high note after all." But, no, he is going to resist all temptations to the end. He contents himself, as he will content all judicious readers, with a plain and sensible reflection plainly and sensibly expressed: "You all know the ordinary workmanlike insistence on trying to get things right, the urge to make perpetual war on muddle, the passionate irritation with slap-dash sloppiness of thought. That is all I mean by the pursuit of Truth."

The students of Professor Sprott are very lucky. They will be given the run of the whole of this old converted Victorian house. And under his guidance they will come to no harm; they will, indeed, come to quite a deal of good.

C. A. Mace.

Books also received:

Ray Lepley (Ed.). *Value: A Co-operative Inquiry*. Geoffrey Cumberlege: Columbia University Press, New York. 1950. Pp. 487. 48s. ($6.00).

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Vol. XLIX. 1948–49. London: Harrison & Sons. Pp. 224. 30s.

Ram Pratap Singh. *The Vedanta of Sankara*. Vol. I. Jaipur: Bharat Publishing House. 1949. Pp. vi. + 426. Rs. 10.

Gottlob Frege, trans. J. L. Austin. *The Foundations of Arithmetic*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Pp. xii + 119. 16s.

E. J. Dingwall. *Very Peculiar People: Portrait Studies in the Queer, the Abnormal and the Uncanny*. London: Messrs. Rider & Co. 1950. Pp. 224. No price stated.

James H. Leuba. *The Reformation of the Churches*. Boston, Mass.: The Beacon Press. 1950. Pp. xiv + 219. $2.75.

Philipp Frank. *Relativity: A Richer Truth*. Foreword by Albert Einstein. Boston, Mass.: The Beacon Press. 1950. Pp. xvi + 142. $2.

William MacEwen. *Enduring Satisfaction: A Philosophy of Spiritual Growth*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. Pp. xxiv + 317. $6.

W. P. D. Wightman. *The Growth of Scientific Ideas*. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd. 1950. Pp. 495. 25s.

Heinrich Heppe. *Reformed Dogmatics*. (Trans. G. T. Thomson.) London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1950. Pp. xiii + 721. 50s.

W. K. C. Guthrie. *The Greek Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle*. London: Methuen & Co., Home Study Books. 1950. Pp. 168. 5s.

Franklin J. Matchette. *Outline of a Metaphysics: The Absolute Relative Theory*. New York: Philosophical Library. Pp. xiv + 108. $3.75.

Ralph Barton Perry. *General Theory of Value*. Harvard University Press: London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1950. Pp. xvii + 702. 60s.

Swami Baulananda. *Message to Humanity*. Madras: The Poverty Relief Service. 1950. Pp. 84. No price stated.

Kali Prasad. *The Psychology of Meaning*. University of Lucknow. 1949. Pp. iv + 209. Rs. 10 or 15s.

Thomas Gilby. *Phoenix and Turtle: the Unity of Knowing and Being*. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1950. Pp. ix + 154. 16s.

Max Black. *Language and Philosophy: Studies in Method*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Oxford University Press: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1949. Pp. xiii + 264. 28s.

F. M. Cornford. *The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays*. Cambridge University Press. 1950. Pp. xix + 139. 12s. 6d.

R. D. Karmarkar and R. N. Dandekar (Ed.). *Annals of the Bhandarkar* Oriental Research Institute, Vol. XXIX. 1948. Poona: Bhandarkar Institute Press. 1949. Pp. viii + 345. 10s.

I. J. Good. *Probability and the Weighing of Evidence*. London: Charles Griffin & Co. Ltd. 1950. Pp. 119. 16s.

Karl Löwith. *Meaning in History*. University of Chicago Press: Cambridge University Press. 1950. Pp. ix + 258. 30s.

Marvin Farber (Ed.). *Philosophic Thought in France and the United States*. University of Buffalo Press. 1950. Pp. x + 775. $7.50.

Wendell Thomas. *On the Resolution of Science and Faith*. New York: Island Press. 1950. Pp. xii + 300. $3.50.

Montague Summers. *The Physical Phenomena of Mysticism*. London: Rider & Co. 1950. Pp. 263. 21s.

Arthur Pap. *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*. New York: The Macmillan Company: London, Macmillan & Co. 1950. Pp. xv + 526. 35s.

Stanley Matthew Daugert. *The Philosophy of Thorstein Veblen*. New York: King's Crown Press: London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1950. Pp. viii + 134. 18s.

Maxwell Silver. *The Way to God*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. Pp. x + 303. $3.00.

Paul Claudel. *The Eye Listens*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. Pp. ix + 293. $5.00.

Regis Jolivet. *Introduction to Kierkegaard*, translated by W. H. Barber. London: Frederick Muller. 1950. Pp. xv + 233. 15s.

MAURICE NICOLL. *The New Man: an Interpretation of Some Parables and Miracles of Christ.* London: Stuart & Richards. 1950. Pp. 153. 15s.

PERCY WILLIAMS BRIDGMAN. *Reflections of a Physicist.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. Pp. xii + 392. $5.00.

DOROTHY DONNELLY. *The Golden Well: An Anatomy of Symbols.* London: Sheed & Ward. 1950. Pp. xiv + 191. 10s. 6d.

LEONARD NELSON. *Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy: Selected Essays.* Yale University Press: London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1950. Pp. xxii + 211. 30s.

GAVIN ARDLEY. *Aquinas and Kant.* London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1950. Pp. 256. 18s.

STUART CHASE. *The Proper Study of Mankind.* London: Phoenix House Ltd. 1950. Pp. 288. 16s.

WILHELM PAUCK. *The Heritage of the Reformation.* Boston: The Beacon Press. Pp. 312. $4.00.

FREDERICK COPLESTON, S.J. *A History of Philosophy.* Vol. II: *Augustine to Scotus.* The Bellarmine Series. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd. 1950. Pp. x + 614. 25s.

T. E. JESSOP (ED.). *The Works of George Berkeley,* Vol. III (*Bibliotheca Britannica Philosophica*). London: Thomas Nelson & Sons. 1950. Pp. 337. 30s.

STERLING P. LAMPRECHT. *Our Religious Traditions.* Harvard University Press: London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1950. Pp. viii + 99. 16s.

GERALD HEARD. *Is God Evident? An Essay Towards a Natural Theology.* London: Faber & Faber. 1950. Pp. 252. 12s. 6d.

G. R. G. MURE. *A Study of Hegel's Logic.* Geoffrey Cumberlege: The Clarendon Press. 1950. Pp. viii + 375. 30s.

RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE. *The Social Structure of Values.* Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1950. Pp. xx + 418. 18s.

ALBERT EINSTEIN. *Out of My Later Years.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. Pp. viii + 282. $4.75.

LESLIE STEPHEN. *The English Utilitarians*: Vol. I. Jeremy Bentham. New York: Peter Smith. 1950. Pp. viii + 525. $15.00.

CORLISS LAMONT. *The Illusion of Immortality,* with Introduction by John Dewey. New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. Pp. xvii + 316. $3.95.

JOHN BAILLIE. *The Belief in Progress.* Geoffrey Cumberlege: Oxford University Press. 1950. Pp. viii + 240. 10s. 6d.

PAUL-HENRI MICHEL. *De Pythagore à Euclide: Contribution à l'Histoire des Mathématiques Preéuclidiennes.* Paris: Société D'Edition "Les Belles-Lettres." 1950. Pp. 699. No price stated.

ALB. VAN DEN DAELE, S.J. *Indices Pseudo-Dionysiani.* Louvain: Bibliotheque de l'Université. 1941. Pp. 155. No price stated.

ÉMILE BRÉHIER. *Transformation de la Philosophie Française.* Paris. Ed. Flammarion. 1950. Pp. 253. No price stated.

ROBERT JAROMIR. *Bibel und Zeitgeist: eine religionssoziologische Untersuchung.* Affoltern (Switzerland): Aehren-Verlag. Pp. xxii + 568. No price stated.

MARIO DEL PRA. *Lo Scetticismo Greco.* Milan: Fratelli Bocca. 1950. Pp. 462. L.1500.

INSTITUTE NOTES

We deeply regret to announce the death of V. Subrahmanya Iyer, of Mysore, on December 25th, 1949. Mr. Iyer was devoted to the pursuit of truth, and several years ago gave a sum of £150 to the Institute in order to provide for an occasional lecture on the Nature of Truth. A short account of his career and his philosophical views will be given in a later issue of the JOURNAL.

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Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

NOTICE

THE THIRD GERMAN CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

The Academic Committee of the Congress, consisting of Professor Dr. Plessner, Professor Dr. von Rintelen and Dr. Wein, have decided to hold the Third German Congress of Philosophy from October 2nd to 6th in Bremen. The Congress will concentrate less on loosely-connected lectures than on carefully-prepared discussions or "Symposia." A number of philosophers and representatives of subjects related to Philosophy will study the various aspects of the topics set for deliberation, and will defend the opinions they have formed in the Congress discussions. The following symposia have been proposed:

(1) Power and Right.

(2) Historical Materialism and the Problem of Ideology.

(3) The philosophical basis of Symbolic Logic.

(4) The problem of Environment.

(5) Problems of Cosmology.

(6) The problems of consciousness, of language and of poetry.

Members who are interested are advised to communicate with Dr. J. Wein, Bremen, Richard-Dehmel-Strasse 7, Germany, for any further information. The Committee will welcome British visitors to the Congress.

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THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

APPEAL FOR NEW MEMBERS AND DONATIONS

THE Council is willing to receive applications for membership of the Institute from all those who are interested in philosophy.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussions in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the Journal, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from annual subscriptions. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

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